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With the phenomenal growth of the Internet, more and more people enjoy and depend on
the convenience of its provided services. Unfortunately, the number of network-based attacks
is also increasing very quickly. More and more fraud activities appear in online advertising
networks and online auction systems. Network attackers can easily hide their identities through
IP spoofing, stepping stones, network address translators, Mobile IP or other ways, and thereby
reduce the chance of being captured. The current IP network infrastructure lacks measures
and cannot effectively deter and identify motivated and well-equipped attackers. Therefore,
innovative traceback schemes are required to attribute the real attackers. By the way, network
traffic always comes with high rate in distributed format without obvious beginning and ending.
These properties make network traffic much different compared with traditional data sets, and
data stream model is more feasible to analyze network traffic and detect anomaly and attacks.
In this dissertation, we design effective techniques for detecting and attributing cyber crim-
inals. We consider two kinds of fundamental techniques: forensics-sound attack monitoring
and traceback, and forensics-sound online fraud detection. The contributions of our research
are as follows: We propose several innovative algorithms which answer some open problems
in fundamental statistics estimation over sliding windows. Those algorithms can be used to
detect anomaly and attacks in networks. We also propose efficient and effective algorithms
which can trace back stepping stone attacks and single packet attacks. Streaming algorithms
are presented to detect click fraud in pay-per-click streams of online advertising networks.
1CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW
1.1 Introduction
With the phenomenal growth of the Internet, more and more people enjoy and depend on
the convenience of its provided services. The Internet has spread rapidly to almost all over the
world. Up to June 2008, the Internet has distributed to over 233 countries and world regions,
and has more than 1.46 billion users [1]. Unfortunately, the wide use of computer and Internet
also has opened doors to cyber attackers. There are different kinds of attacks that an end
user of a computer or Internet has to face. For instance, there may be various viruses on the
hard disk, there may be several backdoors opened in the operating system, and there may be
a lot of phishing e-mails in his/her mailbox. Also, more and more fraud activities appear in
online advertising networks and online auction systems. According to the 2008 CSI computer
crime & security survey by Computer Security Institute (CSI) [91], cyber attacks cause a lot of
money losses each year. Network attackers can easily hide their identities through IP spoofing,
stepping stones, network address translators (NATs), Mobile IP or other ways, and thereby
reduce the chance of being captured. The current IP network infrastructure lacks measures
and cannot effectively deter and identify motivated and well-equipped attackers. Therefore,
innovative traceback schemes are required to attribute the real attackers. By the way, network
traffic always comes with high rate in distributed format without obvious beginning and ending.
These properties make network traffic much different compared with traditional data sets, and
data stream model is more feasible to analyze network traffic.
In our research, we study and design efficient and effective techniques for detecting and
attributing cyber criminals. We generally consider two kinds of fundamental techniques:
2forensics-sound1 attack monitoring and traceback, and forensics-sound online fraud detection.
We hope that our work may serve as fundamental components which can be widely applied in
network security and many other domains.
1.2 A Motivating Scenario
As shown in Figure 1.1, the Internet consists of many autonomous systems (ASes). To
defend potential attacks, many monitors are distributed in the network. They generate a lot






















Figure 1.1 A Motivating Scenario
Suppose that a host is under a Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack. If we take a
look at the corresponding log information, its statistics, such as variance and frequency, may
change a lot compared with its normal values. Also, suppose that a worm is spreading over the
1“Forensics-sound” means acceptable effectiveness (correctness and error bound) and efficiency (space and
time).
3Internet, and many machines are affected. The NOC may require a worm spreading map, so
that it can use the geometry information to take some countermeasures, for instance, shutting
down some affected machines, or requiring the corresponding monitors with in the affected
scope to report more detailed information.
There are many kinds of attacks in the Internet. Consider that there is an attacker which
launches attacks through several intermediate hosts instead of connecting to the victim directly.
This kind of attacks is called stepping stone attack. Such an indirect attack is difficult to
attribute. Stepping stone attacks are interactive attacks which generate a lot of IP packets.
On the contrary, some attacks can be finished within a well-targeted packet, which are called
single packet attacks.
Furthermore, the final purposes of the attackers to intrude and control the others’ machines
are not only for fun, but also to do many malicious tasks. They can control thousands or even
millions of bots to launch DDoS attacks, to send out spam emails, to generate fraudulent clicks
or eBay transactions to earn money, etc.
To defend such an attack scenario, several potential queries should be answered:
• Is there any anomaly in the network, in terms of frequency, variance, etc.?
• Can we find the geometry scope of the attackers or affected hosts?
• If the attackers are several hops away, how to attribute them?
• If the attacks are finished within one packet, how to trace back the attackers?
• How to detect fraudulent clicks?
If we like, many other queries or requirements can be listed here. We are interested in the
queries within two categories:
(1) How to analyze network traffic to detect anomaly and attacks, and trace back to the
real attackers?
(2) How to defend the fraud activities from attackers?
41.3 Objectives
In our research, we propose to design efficient and effective techniques for attributing and
defending against cyber criminals. Our research goals are
• To detect network anomaly and attacks, and trace back attacks to real sources.
• To defend online fraud activities.
To achieve these goals, we studied two kinds of fundamental techniques as follows.
1.3.1 Forensics-Sound Attack Monitoring and Traceback Techniques
1.3.1.1 Attack Monitoring Techniques
To monitor and detect anomaly and attacks in networks, we need to process a lot of data
gathered in the networks, such as logs and other information. If we treat network traffic as
a data set, and use traditional database system techniques to analyze it, we really can detect
many anomalies and attacks. However, network traffic has its own properties which make it
much different compared with traditional data sets.
(1) Network traffic always increases much faster than the development of computing tech-
nology (CPU, storage devices, etc).
It means that to analyze the network traffic, we always meet the problem of high rate/volume
data vs. limited processing resources. In each second, high rate network traffic is generated,
and a lot of logged activities wait to be analyzed. In many cases it is impossible to record all
traffic for later analysis with limited resources.
(2) Network traffic usually has no obvious beginning and ending.
It implies that it is improper to store data first and analyze later, or to cut data into pieces
and analyze them separately.
(3) Current status of network traffic is usually more important than previous status.
It implies that when analyzing network traffic, the data with different timestampes should
have different weights.
(4) Network traffic should be analyzed in online mode to guarantee quick response.
5If we have the capabilities to analyze the network traffic in online mode, we can identify the
ongoing attacks and thus take countermeasures to eliminate or mitigate the potential damages.
(5) The analysis results should be precise enough.
If there are a lot of errors in the network analysis results, then the network will be filled
with false alarms, which are very annoying and may disturb the normal daily operations of the
network.
Therefore, analyzing network traffic should have a different model compared with the pro-
cessing of traditional data sets. Data stream model is introduced in 1998 [56], which has
received considerable attention [18, 82]. In data stream model, the assumption is that the
input data is continuous with high rate such that the processing system has no enough space
to hold them in memory and analyze them later. That is, the interested characteristics must
be gathered with only one pass. Therefore, an algorithm over data stream model is desired to
have all or part of the following capabilities:
(1) Polynomial space requirement with respect to the size of the input data stream.
(2) One pass processing.
(3) More weight on recent data.
(4) Short processing time for each input element, and short computational time to answer
queries.
(5) Error-bounded.
To put more weight on recent data, sliding window model is a general time decay model for
data streams, which only considers the most recent N elements evenly, and discards the influ-
ence of all older elements, where N is the window size. Most available algorithms/techniques
in database system are not perfectly qualified in data stream model. In other words, analyzing
network traffic using the same techniques as analyzing a typical database will meet problems,
and new techniques are required.
Variance estimation can be useful in many different research fields, e.g., network monitor-
ing, intrusion detection, financial monitoring, weather forecast, disaster forecast, etc. Variance
is often related to anomaly and status change which is a powerful measure for anomaly detec-
6tion and forecast. Frequency is a fundamental characteristics in many database applications.
Furthermore, it has many applications in network security. For instance, it can be used to solve
the heavy-hitter and super-spreader problem. Here, a heavy-hitter means a source IP which
sends out a lot of packets; A super-spreader is a source IP which links to a lot of destinations
and may be a network scanner. Although some solutions have been proposed, there are still
gaps between the bounds of available algorithms and theoretical lower bounds, in terms of
space requirement or processing time. Consequently, our goal is to find optimal variance and
frequency estimation algorithms over sliding windows.
Geometric computation has many applications, such as computer graphics, computer-
aided design and manufacturing (CAD/CAM), geographic information systems (GIS), inte-
grated circuit geometry design and verification, etc. Also, geometric computation becomes
an important issue in network security after distributed networks (e.g., sensor networks) are
widely researched and deployed. For instance, in the early age of worm propagation, after re-
ceiving thousands of alarms from distributed network monitors, a geometric map is necessary
to show which regions have been affected so that countermeasures can be executed to interrupt
the worm propagation. Diameter can scale how far the worm has propagated, and convex
hull can reflect the boundary of the affected hosts. Furthermore, geometric computation is
required not only in the domain of geometric coordinates, but also in many other fields in
network security. For instance, network logs contain a lot of hosts which volume, connection
numbers, etc. are recorded, and we want to analyze and detect the dominant hosts in some
terms which should have more chance to be attackers. The skyline calculation can be applied
to this purpose. Our goal is to provide efficient geometric computation algorithms over data
stream models.
1.3.1.2 Attack Traceback Techniques
Network-based attackers can easily hide their identities through IP spoofing, stepping
stones, network address translators (NATs), Mobile IP or other ways, and thereby reduce
the chance of being captured. However, the current IP network infrastructure cannot effec-
7tively deter and identify motivated and well-equipped attackers. Therefore, it is desirable to
design effective and efficient traceback systems to attribute attackers and help reconstruct cy-
ber crime scenes. There are many forms of network-based attacks. In our research, we consider
two types of network attacks: stepping stone attacks and single packet attacks.
(1) Stepping Stone Attack Traceback
Network based attackers often relay attacks through intermediary hosts (i.e., stepping
stones) to evade detection. In addition, attackers make detection more difficult by encrypting
attack traffic and introducing delay and chaff perturbations into stepping stone connections.
Several approaches have been proposed to detect stepping stone attacks. However, none of
them performs effectively when delay and chaff perturbations exist simultaneously. In our
work, we propose correlation algorithms to efficiently and effectively attribute stepping stone
attacks when delay and chaff perturbations exist simultaneously.
(2) Single Packet Attack IP Traceback
While most DDoS attacks are conducted by flooding networks with large amounts of traffic,
there are attacks which require significantly smaller packet flows. Some attacks (e.g., Teardrop)
can even succeed by using only one well-targeted packet. Although several IP traceback systems
have been designed to trace back single packet attacks, their effectiveness is restrained by high
false positive rates. In this work, we design a Bloom filter-based topology-aware single packet
IP traceback system which has reasonable space requirement and fast processing speed, and
simultaneously has forensics-sound tracing capabilities.
1.3.2 Forensics-Sound Online Fraud Detection Techniques
With the rapid growth of the Internet, online advertisement plays a more and more im-
portant role in the advertising market. One of the current and widely used revenue models
for online advertising involves charging for each click based on the popularity of keywords and
the number of competing advertisers. This pay-per-click model leaves room for individuals or
rival companies to generate false clicks (i.e., click fraud), which pose serious problems to the
development of healthy online advertising market.
8To detect click fraud, an important issue is to detect duplicate clicks over decaying window
models, such as jumping windows and sliding windows. Decaying window models can be
very helpful in defining and determining click fraud. However, although there are available
algorithms to detect duplicates, there is still a lack of practical and effective solutions to detect
click fraud in pay-per-click streams over decaying window models. We propose to address the
problem of detecting duplicate clicks in pay-per-click streams.
Generally speaking, we hope that our proposed work can serve as fundamental components
which can be widely utilized in network security and many other domains. These forensics-
sound attack monitoring techniques, traceback techniques, and fraud detection techniques
can be integrated together to develop a holistic approach in detecting and attributing at-
tacks/criminals such as DDoS, botnet, click-fraud, on-line auction fraudsters, etc.
1.4 Contributions
The contributions of our research are as follows:
(1) We propose several innovative algorithms which answer some open problems in fun-
damental statistics estimation over sliding windows. Those algorithms can be used to detect
anomaly and attacks in networks. We also propose efficient and effective algorithms which can
trace back stepping stone attacks and single packet attacks.
• We address the problem of maintaining -approximate variance of data streams over
sliding windows. To our knowledge, the best existing algorithm requires O( 1
2
logN)
space, though the lower bound for this problem is Ω(1 logN). We propose the first -
approximation algorithm to this problem that is optimal in both space and worst case
time. Our algorithm requires O(1 logN) space. Furthermore, its running time is O(1)
in worst case.
• We study the problem of estimating -approximate frequency in data streams over slid-
ing windows. We propose the first efficient deterministic algorithm which can achieve
O(1 ) space requirement and only need O(1) running time to process each item in the
9data stream and to answer a query. We present two novel deterministic algorithms,
Snapshot-Basic and Snapshot-Advanced, which need O(1 ) space. Furthermore,
Snapshot-Advanced only needs O(1) running time. Both theoretical and experimen-
tal analysis show that our algorithms can be adopted to estimate item frequencies in
sliding windows over on-line high-rate data streams with the error guarantee. In ad-
dition, as an application of our algorithms, we extend them to solve the problem of
estimating flow size.
• we study the problem of estimating -approximate diameter, convex hull and skyline in
data streams over sliding windows. To our knowledge, the best existing algorithm for
the problem of estimating -approximate diameter in data streams over sliding windows
requires O((1 )
d+1
2 log R ) space [28], where R is the ratio between the largest distance
and the smallest distance of a pair of points, and d is the dimension. We first present
an improved algorithm which only requires O((1 )
d+1
2 logR) space. We then extend our
algorithm to solve convex hull estimation problem over sliding windows, and prove that
the exact diameter algorithm can get the -approximate convex hull estimation directly.




• We propose and analyze algorithms which represent that stepping stone attackers cannot
always evade detection only by adding limited delay and independent chaff perturbations.
We provide the upper bounds on the number of packets needed to confidently detect step-
ping stone connections from non-stepping stone connections with any given probability
of false attribution. We compare our algorithms with previous ones and the experimental
results show that our algorithms are more effective in detecting stepping stone attacks
in some scenarios.
• We propose a topology-aware single packet IP traceback system, namely TOPO. We uti-
lize router’s local topology information, i.e., its immediate predecessor information. Our
performance analysis shows that TOPO can reduce the number and scope of unnecessary
10
queries, and significantly decrease false attributions. Furthermore, to improve the prac-
ticability of Bloom filter-based IP traceback systems, we design TOPO to allow partial
deployment while maintaining its traceback capability. When Bloom filters are used, it
is difficult to decide their optimal control parameters a priori. We design a k-adaptive
mechanism which can dynamically adjust parameters of Bloom filters to reduce the false
positive rate.
(2) We propose streaming algorithms to detect click fraud in pay-per-click streams of online
advertising networks.
• We address the problem of detecting duplicate clicks in pay-per-click streams over jump-
ing windows and sliding windows, and are the first that propose two innovative algorithms
that make only one pass over click streams and require significantly less memory space
and operations. GBF algorithm is built on group Bloom filters which can process click
streams over jumping windows with small number of sub-windows, while TBF algorithm
is based on a new data structure called timing Bloom filter that detects click fraud over
sliding windows and jumping windows with large number of sub-windows. Both GBF
algorithm and TBF algorithm have zero false negative. Furthermore, both theoretical
analysis and experimental results show that our algorithms can achieve low false positive
rate when detecting duplicate clicks in pay-per-click streams over jumping windows and
sliding windows. A patent [55] is pending based on our research.
1.5 Dissertation Organization
The rest of this dissertation is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides a review of liter-
ature for the problems targeted in our research. We present our research in data streaming
techniques in Chapter 3, and these techniques can be used to monitor attacks. Attack trace-
back algorithms are proposed in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 discusses our techniques in online fraud
detection. We finally summarize our research and discuss our future work in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter reviews recent literatures which correlates to our research in this dissertation.
2.1 Data Processing over Data Stream Models
Data stream is a hot topic in many research areas, including databases, geometric com-
putation, network security, etc. After this concept is first introduced by Henzinger et al. in
1998 [56], many classical problems are reconsidered under this model. More information can
be found in surveys [18] and [82].
2.1.1 Variance Estimation
Datar et al. [35] proposed an algorithm to solve the Basic-Counting problem over sliding
windows using Exponential Histograms (EH). Given the sliding window size N , and the relative
error , the space taken by their algorithm is O(1 logN), and the time taken to process each
element is O(1) amortized and O(logN) in worst case. Gibbons and Tirthapura [50] presented
an algorithm based on a data structure called the wave that uses the same space as in [35].
However, their algorithm only takes O(1) time to process each element in worst case. They
also presented three extensions of the sliding window model for the distributed streams.
The EH algorithm [35] can estimate a class of aggregate functions over sliding windows. It
applies to any function f satisfying the following properties for all multisets X, Y :
1. f(X) ≥ 0.
2. f(X) ≤ poly(|X|).
3. f(X
⋃
Y ) ≥ f(X) + f(Y ).
4. f(X
⋃
Y ) ≤ Cf (f(X) + f(Y )), where constant Cf ≥ 1.
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However, variance does not satisfy the fourth property. For instance, suppose both X
and Y have zero (or very small) variance, but different means. Then the variance of X
⋃
Y
may not be bounded by any constant Cf . Therefore, the EH algorithm cannot be utilized in
variance estimation directly. Consequently, Babcock et al. [17] proposed a new algorithm for
maintaining variance over sliding windows of a data stream. In their algorithm, elements in
the data stream are partitioned into buckets, and the synopses of these buckets are maintained,
which can be used to merge adjacent buckets to save space according to particular combination
constraints. This algorithm requires O( 1
2
logN) space, and its running time is O(1) amortized
and O( 1
2
logN) in worst case. However, as mentioned by the authors of [17], there is a gap of
1
 between the optimal bound Ω(
1
 logN) and their upper bound.
Besides the bit counting and variance problems, several other problems of capturing char-
acteristics of data streams over sliding windows are studied. Zhu and Shasha [121] introduced
basic windows to compute the statistics over a sliding window. Golab et al. [51] utilized the ba-
sic windows mechanism in their deterministic algorithm to identify frequent items over sliding
windows. Babcock et al. [17] proposed an algorithm for maintaining a k-median clustering over
sliding windows of a data stream. Feigenbaum et al. [45] investigated the diameter problem in
the streaming and sliding-window models, and the diameter is the maximum distance between
a pair of elements within a data stream. Lin et al. [67] considered the problem of continuously
maintaining -approximate quantiles over sliding windows in a data stream. Arasu and Manku
[16] studied the problem of maintaining -approximate counts and quantiles over sliding win-
dows in a data stream. Tirthapura et al. [104] considered the problem of maintaining sketches
of recent elements of a asynchronous data stream in which the observed order of data is not
the same as the time order in which the data was generated.
2.1.2 Frequency Estimation
2.1.2.1 Frequency Statistics Algorithms
Problems related to frequency estimate have been studied by many researchers in different
fields. Flajolet and Martin [46] and Whang et al. [109] proposed probabilistic algorithms to
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estimate the number of distinct items in a large collection of data in a single pass. Alon et
al [14] researched the frequency moments of a sequence of items. Gibbons and Matias [49]
proposed sampling algorithms to identify top-k queries. Fang et al. [44] presented several
algorithms based on hashing to compute iceberg queries, but each requires at least two passes
over the data stream. Estan and Varghese [41] presented a sampling algorithm named sample
and hold and a hash-based algorithm named multistage filters. Charikar et al. [30] proposed a
data structure called count sketch to find frequent items. Manku and Motwani [72] presented
a randomized algorithm for computing frequency counts exceeding a user-specified threshold.
Cormode and Muthukrishnan [34] proposed randomized algorithms that identify frequent items
when both insertions and deletions are present. Manjhi et al. [70] studied the problem of
computing frequency counts for items occurring frequently in the union of multiple distributed
data streams. Super-spreader problem is researched by Estan et al. [42], Venkataraman et al.
[105] and Zhao et al. [120]. Other recent works on data stream algorithms have been surveyed
in [18, 82].
Here we shortly introduce the algorithm proposed by Misra and Gries [80] which maintains
-approximate frequency estimation using exact 1 counters with one pass. Suppose there is a
data stream of N items. First, a list of 1 counters is initiated to 0. For each item in the stream,
we increase its corresponding counter (if any) by 1. If it has no corresponding counter and
there is a counter cntx which equals zero, then cntx is assigned to this item and set to 1. If the
item has no corresponding counter and there is no zero counter, then every counter is decreased
by 1. Misra-Gries algorithm can maintain -approximate frequency estimation, because the
decrease operation of the 1 counters can only happen at most
N
(1/)+1 < N times. Karp et al.
[61] and Demaine et al. [37] improved the processing time of Misra-Gries algorithm to O(1)
in the worst case. Metwally et al. [76] proposed an algorithm which can report frequent items
and top-k items simultaneously.
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2.1.2.2 Algorithms over Sliding Windows
The previous frequency statistics algorithms [14, 30, 34, 41, 42, 44, 46, 49, 70, 72, 105, 109,
120] are designed to process all or a piece of the data stream. They cannot be directly used to
process data streams over sliding windows.
Zhu and Shasha [121] introduced basic windows to compute the statistics over sliding
windows. A sliding window is subdivided equally into shorter basic windows. Only a synopsis
data structure is maintained for each basic window and the entire sliding window. When a
new basic window is created, its synopsis is added to that of the entire sliding window, and
the synopsis of the oldest window is expired and deleted. The “smooth” of the sliding window
depends on the size of the basic windows. Smaller sized basic windows have finer scale but need
more space. Larger sized basic windows have coarse scale but need less space. Golab et al.
[51] utilized the basic windows mechanism in their deterministic algorithm to identify frequent
items over sliding windows. Their algorithm identifies and stores the exact top-k frequent
items in each basic window. Then these local top-k frequent items are used to find and update
the global frequent items. To find the exact top-k frequent items in the current basic window,
this algorithm keeps a counter for each unique item. In the worst case, all items in the current
basic window may be unique, therefore this algorithm needs sizeof(basic windows) entries in
the worst case.
Datar et al. [35] proposed an algorithm to solve the Basic-Counting problem over sliding
windows using Exponential Histograms (EH). Given the sliding window size of N , and the
relative error , the space taken by their algorithm is O(1 logN), and the time taken to
process each item is O(1) amortized and O(logN) in worst case. Gibbons and Tirthapura [50]
presented an algorithm based on a data structure called the wave that uses the same space
as in [35]. However, it only takes O(1) time to process each item in the worst case. Lee and
Ting [64] considered the significant one counting problem over sliding windows, where only
the items which numbers exceed a user-specified threshold are maintained.
Babcock et al. [17] proposed algorithms for maintaining variance and maintaining a k-
median clustering over sliding windows of a data stream. Zhang and Guan [115] also considered
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how to efficiently maintain variance in sliding windows, and proposed an algorithm which is
optimal in terms of both space requirement and worst case running time. Feigenbaum et al.
[45] and Chan and Sadjad [28] investigated the diameter problem in the streaming and sliding-
window models. The diameter is the maximum distance between a pair of items within a data
stream. Lin et al. [67] considered the problem of continuously maintaining -approximate
quantiles over sliding windows in a data stream.
Arasu and Manku [16] studied the problem of maintaining -approximate counts and quan-
tiles over a sliding window in a data stream. Their deterministic algorithm for approximate
counts uses the Misra-Gries algorithm [80] as a black-box. They constructed many black-boxes
with different sizes in different levels. These black-boxes can answer the queries combined to-
gether. This algorithm requires O(1 log
2 1
 ) space and O(log
1
 ) running time. Lee and Ting
[65] studied the same problem and proposed an algorithm which achieves O(1 ) space. However,
their algorithm needs O(1 ) processing time for update and query.
Tirthapura et al. [104] considered the problem of maintaining sketches of recent elements
of an asynchronous data stream in which the observed order of data is not the same as the time
order in which the data was generated. They presented algorithms for maintaining sketches of
all elements within the sliding timestamp window that can give provably accurate estimates of
two basic aggregates, the sum and the median, of a stream of numbers. Busch and Tirthapura
[26] proposed a deterministic algorithm for this scenario recently.
2.1.3 Geometric Estimation
Problems related to geometric computation have been studied by many researchers in
different fields. Also, a lot of sliding window related algorithms were proposed recently.
2.1.3.1 Diameter Algorithms
For diameter problem, Preparata and Shamos provideed an O(n log n) algorithm in two-
dimension [88], where n is the number of points. Clarkson and Shor proposed a randomized
algorithm in three-dimension using O(n log n) time [32], and later an optimal deterministic
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algorithm was designed by Ramos [89].
However, for higher dimensions, there is lack of subquadratic algorithms for diameter com-
putation. Therefore, several approximation algorithms were proposed. Agarwal et al. [13]
presented an approximation algorithm using O((1 )
d−1
2 ) space and O((1 )
d−1
2 n) time. Hersh-
berger and Suri [57] provided an adaptive sampling algorithm in two-dimension which uses
O((1 )
1
2 ) space and O(log 1 ) time per point. Indyk [59] developed a c-approximation algorithm
using O(dn
1
c2−1 ) space and running time for c >
√
2. Chan [27] proposed a fast -approximation
algorithm which runs in O(n+ (1 )
d−1.5) time.
2.1.3.2 Convex Hull Algorithms
Richardson [92] proposed an algorithm to approximate two-dimensional static convex hull
scaled by Hausdorff distance using O((1 )
1
2 ) space. Cormode and Muthukrishnan [33] presented
a radial histogram algorithm which can estimate a two-dimensional convex hull using O(1 )
space and O(1) running time per point. Agarwal et al. [12] presented a data structure to
maintain -approximate convex hull using O((1 )
1
2 log n) space and O((1 )
1
2 ) running time per
point. Hershberger and Suri’s adaptive sampling algorithm [57] also maintains two-dimensional
convex hull estimation using O((1 )
1
2 ) space and O(log 1 ) time per point. However, their
algorithms may not work over sliding windows.
2.1.3.3 Skyline Algorithms
Skyline computation was first studied by Kung et al. [63] in computational geometry. After
that, skyline computation and its variants have been well studied. Tan et al. [102] proposed the
first progressive technique that can output skyline points without scanning the whole dataset
in advance. In the database context, Borzsonyi et al. [19] developed two solutions based on
divide-and-conquer (DC) and blocknested-loop (BNL), respectively. Kossmann et al. [62] and
Papadias et al. [84] presented progressive algorithms based on the nearest neighbor search.
17
2.1.3.4 Sliding Windows Algorithms
Most previous geometric computation algorithms [13, 19, 27, 32, 33, 57, 59, 62, 63, 84, 88,
89, 92, 102] are designed to process all or a piece of the data stream. Therefore, they cannot
be directly used to process a stream of points over sliding windows.
Datar et al. [35] proposed an algorithm to solve the Basic-Counting problem over sliding
windows using Exponential Histograms (EH). After this paper, a lot of algorithms are proposed
to solve different statistics problems over sliding windows, such as variance, quantile, k-median
clustering, frequency, etc. [16, 17, 26, 50, 65, 67, 104, 115, 116, 117]. More inforamtion can be
found in surveys [18] and [82].
For the problem of diameter estimation in two-dimension over sliding windows, Feigenbaum
et al. [45] proposed a clustering algorithm which uses O(1 log
2N log(R )) space. Chan and
Sadjad [28] proposed an optimal algorithm for one-dimension which uses Θ(1 logR) space. For
higher dimensions, their algorithm needs O((1 )
d+1
2 log R ) space.
Lin et al. [68] and Tao and Papadias [103] considered the skyline computation problem in
a data stream over sliding windows. However, they studied this problem in a different context.
In [68], the estimation error is not theoretically guaranteed. The algorithm in [103] computes
the exact skyline which requires huge space in worst case when the window size is large.
2.2 Attack Traceback
2.2.1 Stepping Stone Attack Attribution
Ever since the problem of detecting stepping stones was first proposed by Staniford-Chen
and Heberlein [98], several approaches have been proposed to detect encrypted stepping stone
attacks [54].
The ON/OFF based approach proposed by Zhang and Paxson [119] is the first timing-
based method which can trace stepping stones even if the traffic were to be encrypted. In their
approach, they calculated the correlation of different flows by using each flows’ OFF periods. A
flow is considered to be in an OFF period when there is no data traffic on a flow for more than
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a time period threshold. Their approach comes from the observation that two flows are in the
same connection chain if their OFF periods coincide. We refer to this method as ON/OFF .
Yoda and Etoh [113] presented a deviation based approach for detecting stepping stone
connections. The deviation is defined as the difference between the average propagation delay
and the minimum propagation delay of two connections. This scheme comes from the obser-
vation that the deviation for two unrelated connections is large enough to be distinguished
from the deviation of connections in the same connection chain. We refer to this method as
Deviation .
Wang et al. [107] proposed a correlation scheme using inter-packet delay (IPD) charac-
teristics to detect stepping stones. They defined their correlation metric over the IPDs in a
sliding window of packets of the connections to be correlated. They showed that the IPD
characteristics may be preserved across many stepping stones. We refer to this method as
IPD .
Wang and Reeves [106] presented an active watermark scheme which is designed to be
robust against certain delay perturbations. The watermark is introduced into a connection
by slightly adjusting the inter-packet delays of selected packets in the flow. If the delay
perturbation is not quite large, the watermark information will remain along the connection
chain. This is the only active stepping stone attribution approach. We refer to this method as
Watermark .
Strayer et al. [100] presented a State-Space algorithm which is derived from their work
on wireless topology discovery. When a new packet is received, each node is given a weight
which decreases as the elapsed time from the last packet from that node increases. Then the
connections on the same connection chain will have higher weights than other connections. We
refer to this method as State-Space . This approach is based on two assumptions. First, the
likelihood of one transmission being a response to a prior transmission generally decreases as
the elapsed time between these transmission increases. Second, the inter-arrival times between
a fixed event and any other event are approximately Poisson distributed.
However, none of these previous approaches can effectively detect stepping stones when
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delay and chaff perturbations exist simultaneously. When chaff perturbation is added to the
flows and no delay perturbation exists, the timing information used in deviation, IPD and
watermark may be destroyed entirely. Also, many OFF periods will disappear, which degrades
the performance of the ON/OFF method. Even though the State-Space still achieves 0% false
negative rate, if the delay perturbation is an unknown constant, the false negative rate of
State-Space approach will obviously increase. Therefore, if both delay and chaff perturbations
exist simultaneously, none of the previous approaches may provide good performance.
Although no experimental data is available, Donoho et al. [39] indicated that there are
theoretical limits on the ability of attackers to disguise their traffic using evasions for sufficiently
long connections. They assumed that the intruder has a maximum delay tolerance, and used
wavelets and similar multiscale methods to separate the short-term behavior of the flows (delay
or chaff) from the long-term behavior of the flows (the remaining correlation). However, this
method requires the intrusion connections to remain for long periods, and the author never
experimented to show the effectiveness against chaff perturbation. We refer to this method as
Multiscale . These evasions consist of local jittering of packet arrival times and the addition
of superfluous packets.
Blum et al. [23] proposed and analyzed algorithms for stepping stone detection using
ideas from Computational Learning Theory and the analysis of random walks. They achieved
provable (polynomial) upper bounds on the number of packets needed to confidently detect
and identify stepping stone flows with proven guarantees on the false positives, and provided
lower bounds on the amount of chaff that an attacker would have to send to evade detection.
However, their upper bounds on the number of packets required is large, while the lower
bounds on the amount of chaff needed for attacker to evade detection is very small. They did
not discuss how to detect stepping stones without enough packets or with large amounts of




In this section, we review major existing IP traceback schemes that have been designed to
attribute the origin of IP packets through the Internet. We roughly categorize them into four
primary classes: a) Active Probing [25, 99], b) ICMP Traceback [21, 71, 110], c) Packet Marking
(including deterministic, probabilistic, and algebraic packet marking) [20, 36, 85, 93, 96], and
d) Log-based Traceback [66, 74, 94, 95].
2.2.2.1 Active Probing
Stone [99] proposed a traceback scheme called CenterTrack, which selectively reroutes pack-
ets in question directly from edge routers to some special tracking routers. The tracking routers
determine the ingress edge router by observing from which tunnel the packet arrives. This ap-
proach requires the cooperation of network administrators and the management overhead is
considerably large.
Burch and Cheswick [25] outlined a technique for tracing spoofed packets back to their
actual source without relying on the cooperation of intervening ISPs. The victim actively
changes the traffic in particular links and observes the influence on attack packets, and thus
can determine where the attack comes from. This technique cannot work well on distributed
attacks, and requires the attacks remain active during the time period of traceback.
2.2.2.2 ICMP Traceback (iTrace)
Bellovin [21] proposed a scheme named iTrace to traceback using ICMP messages for
authenticated IP marking. In this scheme, each router samples (with low probability) the
forwarding packets, copies the contents into a special ICMP traceback message, adds its own
IP address as well as the IP of the previous and next hop routers, and forwards the packet either
to the source or destination address. By combining the information obtained from several of
these ICMP messages from different routers, the victim can then reconstruct the path back to
the origin of the attacker.
A drawback of this scheme was that it is much more likely that the victim will get ICMP
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messages from routers nearby than from routers farther away. This implies that most of
the network resources spent on generating and utilizing iTrace messages will be wasted. An
enhancement of iTrace, called “Intention-Driven iTrace”, was proposed in [71, 110]. By in-
troducing an extra “intention-bit”, it is possible for the victim to increase the probability of
receiving iTrace messages from remote routers.
2.2.2.3 Packet Marking
Savage et al. [93] proposed a Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM) scheme. Thereafter,
several other PPM-based schemes have been developed [96, 85, 36]. The baseline idea of
PPM is that routers probabilistically write partial path information into the packets during
forwarding. If the attacks are made up of a sufficiently large number of packets, eventually,
the victim may get enough information by combining a modest number of marked packets to
reconstruct the entire attack path. This allows victims to locate the approximate source of
attack traffic without requiring outside assistance.
Deterministic Packet Marking (DPM) scheme proposed by Belenky and Ansari [20] involves
the marking of each individual packet when it enters the network. The packet is marked by
the interface closest to the source of the packet on the edge ingress router. The mark remains
unchanged as long as the packet traverses the network. However, there is no way to get the
whole paths of the attacks.
Dean et al. proposed an Algebraic Packet Marking (APM) which reframes the traceback
problem as a polynomial reconstruction problem and uses techniques from algebraic coding
theory to provide robust methods of transmission and reconstruction. The advantage of this
scheme is that it offers more flexibility in design and more powerful techniques that can be
used to filter out attacker generated noise and separate multiple paths. But it shared similarity
with PPM in that it requires a sufficiently large number of attack packets.
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2.2.2.4 Log-based Traceback
The basic idea of log-based traceback is that each router stores the information (digests,
signature, or even the packet itself) of network traffic through it. Once an attack is detected,
the victim queries the upstream routers by checking whether they have logged the attack packet
in question or not. If the attack packet’s information is found in a given router’s memory, then
that router is deemed to be part of the attack path. Obviously, the major challenge in log-based
traceback schemes is the storage space requirement at the intermediate routers.
Matsuda et al. [74] proposed a hop-by-hop log-based IP traceback method. Its main fea-
tures are logging packet feature that is composed of a portion of the packet for identification
purpose, and an algorithm using data-link identifier to identify the routing of a packet. How-
ever, for each received packet, about 60 bytes data should be recorded. The resulted large
memory space requirement prevents this method from being applied to high speed networks
with heavy traffic.
Although today’s high-speed IP networks suggest that classical log-based traceback schemes
would be too prohibitive because of the huge memory requirement, log-based traceback be-
comes attractive after Bloom filter-based (i.e., hash-based) traceback schemes were proposed.
Bloom filters were presented by Burton H. Bloom [22] in 1970, and have been widely used
in many areas such as database and networking [24]. A Bloom filter is a space-efficient data
structure for representing a set of n elements to respond membership queries. It is a vector of
m bits which are all initialized to value 0. Then each element is inserted into the Bloom filter
by hashing it using k independent uniform hash functions with range {1, 2, ...,m} and setting
the corresponding k bits (some bits may be overlapped) in the vector to value 1. Given a query
whether an element is present in the Bloom filter, we hash this element using the same k hash
functions and check if all the corresponding bits are set to 1. If any one of them is 0, then
undoubtedly this element is not stored in the filter. Otherwise, we would say that it is present
in the filter, although there is a certain probability that the element is determined to be in the
filter while it is actually not. Such false cases are called false positives. The space-efficiency of
Bloom filters is achieved at the cost of a small acceptable false positive rate f . From [43], we
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have
f = (1− (1− 1
m
)kn)k ≈ (1− e−kn/m)k. (2.1)
When m and n are given, f is minimized for
k = ln 2×m/n, (2.2)
Thus, we have
f = 2−k ≈ 0.6185mn . (2.3)
Bloom filters were first introduced into IP traceback area by Snoeren et al. [95]. They
built a system named Source Path Isolation Engine (SPIE) which can trace the origin of a
single IP packet delivered by the network in the recent past. They demonstrated that the
system is effective, space-efficient and implementable in current or next-generation routing
hardware. Bloom filters are used in each SPIE-equipped router to record the digests of all
packets it received in the recent past. The digest of a packet is exactly several hash values of
its non-mutable IP header fields and the prefix of the payload. Strayer et al. [101] extended
this traceback architecture to IP-v6.
Shanmugasundaram, et al. [94] proposed a payload attribution system (PAS) based on a
Hierarchical Bloom filter (HBF). HBF is such a Bloom filter in which an element is inserted
several times using different parts of the same element. Compared with SPIE which is a packet
digesting scheme, PAS only uses the payload excerpt of a packet. It is useful when the packet
header is unavailable.
Li et al. [66] proposed a Bloom filter-based IP traceback scheme that requires an order
of magnitude smaller processing and storage cost than SPIE, thereby being able to scale to
much higher link speed. The baseline idea of their approach is to sample and log a small
percentage of packets, and 1 bit packet marking is used in their sampling scheme. Therefore,
their traceback scheme combines packet marking and packet logging together. Their simulation
results showed that the traceback scheme can achieve high accuracy, and scale well to a large
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number of attackers. However, as the authors also pointed out, because of the low sampling
rate, their scheme is no longer capable to trace one attacker with only one packet.
2.3 Online Fraud Detection
2.3.1 Duplicate Detection
Bloom filters were presented by Burton H. Bloom [22] in 1970, and have been widely utilized
in many areas such as networking and database [24]. Bloom filters have been utilized to detect
duplicates in databases. Besides the Bloom filter-based duplicate detecting algorithms, many
other algorithms have been proposed in different research areas such as database systems,
operating systems, computer architecture and network security, etc. The problem of exact
duplicate detection is well studied, and many algorithms have been proposed. Please refer to
[48] for more relevant references.
2.3.2 Online Advertising Fraud Detection
Reiter et al. studied the hit shaving problem [90]. They considered the referral revenue
model that the referrers get payment for every click-through to target sites. A hit shaving is
a practice that the target site undetectably omits to pay a referrer for some number of clicks.
They proposed several approaches to enable referrers to monitor the number of clicks for which
they should be paid.
Anupam et al. proposed a hit inflation attack on pay-per-click online advertising schemes
[15]. Hit inflation is a kind of click fraud which is difficult to detect, where a referrer artifi-
cially inflate the customers’ clicks to make illegal profit. Metwally et al. proposed an algorithm
called Streaming-Rules to detect hit inflations in data streams [77]. They also built an algo-
rithm called Similarity-Seeker to discover coalitions among advertising publishers [78], and a
framework is outlined on a generic architecture [79].
Metwally et al. considered the problem of detecting duplicates in click streams [75]. They
proposed a scheme over landmark windows which is a direct deployment of Bloom filters [22].
They also discussed how to detect duplicates over jump windows and sliding windows. To run
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over sliding windows, they use a modification of Bloom filters named Counting Bloom Filter,
which is similar to [43]. However, their solution must keep all active click identifications in
memory to slide them out later after they expire.
Deng and Rafiei considered the problem of approximately eliminating duplicates in streams
with a limited space [38]. They proposed a data structure named Stable Bloom Filter, which
randomly evicts the stale information to release room for more recent elements. However, their
randomly evicting mechanism introduces false negatives besides the inherent false positives of
Bloom filters.
Gandhi et al. described a type of click fraud threat to Internet advertising called badver-
tisement [47]. This attack utilizes malicious JavaScript to publish sponsored advertisements on
clients’ web browsers invisibly. The authors proposed active and passive approaches to detect
and prevent such kind of click fraud.
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CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH IN ATTACK ATTRIBUTION PART I:
MONITORING TECHNIQUES
3.1 Variance Estimation over Sliding Windows
3.1.1 Introduction
The problem of capturing characteristics of large data streams has received considerable
attention [18, 82]. Many characteristics of large data streams, such as sum, mean, variance,
diameter, frequency, quantile, top-k list (hot list), distribution, etc., have been widely studied.
If we have sufficient large space and do not have time constraints, we can obtain any charac-
teristics that we want precisely. However, the issue in processing large data streams is that in
many cases we probably do not have enough space to keep each element in the data streams.
That is, we have to gather the interested characteristics with one pass and we have no chance
to go through the data streams again.
An even greater challenge is to process data streams over sliding windows. An algorithm
can work over sliding windows if it can not only gather the data streams characteristics, but also
update the characteristics when new data is inserted and old data is expired. Unfortunately,
many previous data stream algorithms cannot work over sliding windows. In this research, we
are interested in estimating element variance in data streams over sliding windows, while using
as little space and operation as possible and making only one pass over the data streams.
3.1.1.1 Motivation
Variance estimation can be useful in many different research fields, e.g., network monitoring,
intrusion detection, financial monitoring, weather forecast, disaster forecast, etc. Variance is an
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important statistical measure to evaluate the variability of random variables. Also, variance
is often related to anomaly and status change, therefore variance is a powerful measure for
anomaly detection and forecast. For instance, in weather forecast, variance is an important
variable to accurately forecast precipitation, temperature, wind direction and speed, etc. In
disaster forecast and reduction field, before disasters, such as earthquake, tornado and flood,
happen, there usually exists some anomaly that can be observed and evaluated using variance.
To calculate the variance of a fixed series of elements is trivial. However, in many cases,
different data have different weights (importance) according to the time. That is, there is time
decay in the data streams. For instance, for a network intrusion detection system, the current
network status is more important than that of one day ago, because we can use the current
network status to detect ongoing anomaly and intrusions and accordingly take some measures
to reduce the potential damage. Sliding window model is a general time decay model that only
considers the most recent N elements evenly, and discards the influence of all older elements,
where N is the window size. Sliding window model can provide recent data information by
removing the stale data. Unfortunately, it is nontrivial to calculate the variance of data streams
in sliding window model. For example, when a computer network is under attacks, it may show
large variance in terms of connection numbers, traffic volume and delays, etc. However, it is
difficult to maintain accurate variance of these variables over sliding windows when the network
has heavy traffic.
Recently several algorithms are proposed for capturing different kinds of characteristics of
large data streams over sliding windows [16, 17, 35, 45, 50, 51, 67, 104, 121]. For the problem
of variance estimation over sliding windows, the best algorithm was proposed by Babcock et
al. [17]. However, as mentioned by the authors of [17], there is still a gap between the optimal
space bound and their upper bound. Also, the running time of their algorithm is not constant
in worst case. Consequently, it is desired to find an efficient variance estimation algorithm over
sliding windows which needs less space and runs in constant time.
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3.1.1.2 Problem Definition
Definition 1. Variance: Let {x1, x2, · · · , xN} be a series of N integers (which may be neg-





where µ = 1N
∑N
i=1 xi denotes the mean of these N integers.
To calculate the exact variance of fixed N numbers is trivial. We only need to keep two
variables: one is the sum of all numbers, and the other is the sum of all numbers’ squares.
However, calculating exact variance over sliding windows is more difficult and challenging. For
a stream of numbers, if we want to calculate the exact variance of the most recent N numbers,
the memory requirement is Ω(N). In some cases, it is impossible to keep so much memory
space for variance estimation purpose. Consequently, we have to find efficient and accurate
approximation algorithms to estimate the variance over sliding windows.
Definition 2. -Approximation: Let Vˆ denote the estimation of the real value V . Vˆ is an
-approximation of V if
|V − Vˆ | ≤ V,
where 0 <  < 1 denotes the relative error.
Problem Statement In this research, we study the problem stated as follows: Given
an arbitrary window size N and an error bound , how to maintain -approximate variance of
a stream of integers over sliding windows with size N in one pass?
3.1.1.3 Our Contributions
In this research, we address the problem of maintaining -approximate variance of data
streams over sliding windows [115]. To our knowledge, the best existing algorithm for this
problem by Babcock et al. [17] requires O( 1
2
logN) space, and its running time is O(1)
amortized and O( 1
2
logN) in worst case. Datar et al. [35] presented a space lower bound
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of Ω(1 logN) for maintaining the sum and hence the variance of the last N elements when
assuming that the maximum absolute value of the integer elements is at most polynomial in N .
Therefore, there is a gap of 1 between the optimal bound and the best existing upper bound.
In this study, we propose the first -approximation algorithm to maintain variance of data
streams over sliding windows that is optimal in both space and worst case time. Our algorithm
requires O(1 logN) space. Furthermore, its running time is O(1) in worst case.
3.1.2 Algorithm
We first describe our algorithm, and then analyze its error bound, space requirement and
running time.
3.1.2.1 Algorithm Description
Let N denote the window size and  be the relative error parameter. An existing element is
called active if it is one of the most recent N elements within the current window, or expired if
it leaves the current window. For each element xi, an index posi is used to record its position
in the data stream, which is an indicator of “active” or “expired” by comparing with pos – the
position index of the most recent element.
Similar to the algorithm in [17], elements in the data stream are partitioned into buckets.
For each bucket Bi, we keep a timestamp ti, which equals the position index of the oldest
element in this bucket. Besides the timestamp, the following statistics information (ni, µi, Vi)
is also maintained:
ni : number of elements in the bucket;
µi : mean of elements in the bucket;
Vi : variance of elements in the bucket.
Figure 3.1 shows the description of our algorithm. To estimate the variance of the data
stream in current sliding window, we maintain a triplet (nall, µall, Vall) which objects are the
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count, mean and variance of the combination of all active buckets in current window respec-
tively. Note that nall, µall and Vall are all initialized to zero at the beginning of the data
stream.
Our algorithm has three steps when a new element arrives. When a new element xt comes,
the current index pos is updated. The new element constitutes a new bucket B1 with t1 = pos,
n1 = 1, µ1 = xt, V1 = 0, and an old bucket Bi becomes Bi+1. We update (nall, µall, Vall) by
including the new bucket B1 using Lemma 1.
Also, we check the oldest bucket Bm which has timestamp tm. If it is expired, we first
update (nall, µall, Vall) by excluding the expired bucket Bm using Lemma 1. Then we delete
bucket Bm, which means our algorithm only maintains the buckets which elements are all
active in the current window. We can use a wraparound counter with maximum N − 1 to
represent the timestamps (i.e., position indices), since the oldest bucket will be deleted as soon
as it expires. Therefore, the timing information of each bucket can be represented by dlogNe
bits.
We then check whether there are qualified pairs of adjacent buckets that can be merged to
save space. Let BA = Bi+1
⋃
Bi+2 and BB =
⋃i
j=1Bj . We merge two adjacent buckets Bi+1
and Bi+2 if and only if they satisfy the following merging rules:
Rule 1. VA,B − VB ≤ 5VB.
Rule 2. nA ≤ 10nB.
Rule 3. nA + nB ≤ N2 .
We will explain why we set such merging rules when analyzing the error bound of our
algorithm. When two adjacent buckets merge into a merged bucket, the merged bucket’s
timestamp is set to be the timestamp of the older one, and the merged bucket’s statistics
information can be calculated using Lemma 1. The merging step checks newer buckets first
before checking older buckets.
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Step 1: Insert New Element xt.
Let pos = pos+ 1 mod N .
Create a new bucket for xt. The new bucket becomes B1 with t1 = pos, n1 = 1, µ1 = xt,
V1 = 0.
(Note that an old bucket Bi becomes Bi+1.)
Update (nall, µall, Vall) by including new bucket B1.
Step 2: Delete Expired Bucket.
Let Bm be the oldest bucket.
if there are at least 2 buckets and tm = pos
Update (nall, µall, Vall) by excluding bucket Bm.
Delete bucket Bm.
endif
Step 3: Merge Buckets.
Let i = 1, and BB = B1.
while Bi+2 exists
Let BA = Bi+1
⋃
Bi+2.
if nA + nB > N2
return
endif
if nA ≤ 10nB and VA,B − VB ≤ 5VB
Delete Bi+2, and let Bi+1 = BA.
(Note that bucket Bj+1 becomes Bj for j ≥ i+ 2.)
else

































Figure 3.2 An Illustration of the Buckets
3.1.2.2 Error Bound
Before determining the space requirement and running time of our algorithm, we first prove
that it can maintain -approximate variance of data streams over sliding windows. Lemma 1
gives the equations to calculate the statistics information of the combination of two buckets.
Lemma 1. When two buckets Bi and Bj are merged into a single bucket Bi,j, the count, mean
and variance of Bi,j can be computed from those of Bi and Bj as follows:





Vi,j = Vi + Vj +
ninj
ni + nj
(µi − µj)2. (3.1)
Proof. This lemma and its proof can be found in [17].
Using Lemma 1, we can immediately get the following lemma which calculates the statistics
information of the combination of three buckets.
Lemma 2. When three buckets Bi, Bj and Bk are merged into a single bucket Bi,j,k, the count,
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mean and variance of Bi,j,k can be computed as follows:
ni,j,k = ni + nj + nk,
µi,j,k =
niµi + njµj + nkµk
ni + nj + nk
,
Vi,j,k = Vi + Vj,k +
ni(nj + nk)
ni + nj + nk
(µi − µj,k)2.
Now let us analyze how estimation error is generated. For a bucket Bi which has ni = 1,
there is no estimation error when it expires, because either the single element or none element of
Bi is active when the current window slides over Bi. Consequently, only the buckets generated
by merging which have more than one element can introduce estimation error when expiring.
For instance, as shown in Figure 3.2, consider any merged bucket BA which has more than
one element, when it expires, it is split by the sliding window into two virtual buckets: the
expired bucket BAe which contains all expired elements of BA, and the active bucket BAa
which contains all active elements of BA. In Figure 3.2, we use doted boxes to denote the
virtual buckets BB and BC . The virtual bucket BB contains all newer elements when bucket
BA generates by merging, and the virtual bucket BC contains all newer elements after BB
when bucket BA expires. Note that BC may become larger when more elements in BA expires
with the slide of the current window. Because we do not have the exact variance of bucket
BAa , we have to return the estimated variance Vˆ = VB,C , which is the variance of all active
buckets kept in memory space (i.e., Vall), to estimate the real variance.1
Let δ denote the relative error of the variance estimation of our algorithm. If the real
variance V = VAa,B,C = 0, then according to Lemma 1 or 2, Vˆ = VB,C ≤ VAa,B,C = 0, and








We will prove that 0 ≤ δ <  when V = VAa,B,C 6= 0 by utilizing the two virtual buckets BB
1Although we may not know exact VB and VC since one merged bucket may expand the boundary between
virtual buckets BB and BC , we can still calculate VB,C which is the variance of the combination of all active
buckets.
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and BC . We first provide the relationship between nB and nC .
Lemma 3. For any merged bucket BA, let virtual bucket BB contains all newer elements when
bucket BA generates by merging, and let virtual bucket BC contains all newer elements after
BB when bucket BA expires. We have
nB < nC .
Proof. By construction, nAa +nB +nC = N . Thus, nC = N − (nAa +nB). On the other hand,
nAa < nA, since nAa represents the number of active elements of the bucket A, and the expired
portion of A is assumed to be non-empty. Thus, nC > N − (nA +nB). Now, by applying Rule
3 of merging rules (i.e., nA + nB ≤ N2 ), it follows that N − (nA + nB) ≥ N2 . This implies that
nC >
N
2 . Since nAa +nB+nC = N , it results that nB <
N
2 since nAa > 0. Thus, nB < nC .
To prove 0 ≤ δ < , we first relax the relative error δ to an auxiliary parameter θ, and then






VB + nBnCnB+nC (µB − µC)2
.
Lemma 4. 0 ≤ δ ≤ θ.
Proof. Equation (3.1) in Lemma 1 shows that the variance of a bucket is larger than or equal




BB,C , and thus
BB,C ⊂ BAa,B,C ⊂ BA,B,C . Consequently, we get
VA,B,C ≥ VAa,B,C ≥ VB,C .
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Therefore,
0 ≤ δ = VAa,B,C − VB,C
VAa,B,C












VB + nBnCnB+nC (µB − µC)2
= θ.
Consequently, if we can prove that θ ≤ , then our algorithm is an -approximation al-
gorithm. We consider all possibilities of µC , which is the mean of virtual bucket BC , in the
following three cases separately. We will show that in each of these three cases, θ is less than
. Without loss of generality, we assume that µA ≤ µB. When µA > µB, we can make simi-
lar analysis and get the same conclusion, since actually we only utilize the order information
between µA and µB.
Case 1. µB ≤ µC ≤ 2µB − µA
Lemma 5. In Case 1, θ < .
Proof. According to Rule 2, nA ≤ 10nB < nB10 . Furthermore, Rule 1 shows that VA,B − VB ≤

5VB. We only consider that VA,B 6= 0, thereby VB 6= 0. Thus, we get
 ≥ 5VA,B − VB
VB
= 5













VA + nA(µA − µB)2
VB
. (3.2)
Because µB ≤ µC in Case 1, and the mean of a merged bucket should be bounded between
the means of its two sub-buckets, thus µB ≤ µB,C ≤ µC . Therefore, in Case 1 that µB ≤ µC ≤
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2µB − µA, we get
µB ≤ µB,C ≤ 2µB − µA.
We have assumed that µA ≤ µB, therefore
0 ≤ µB − µA ≤ µB,C − µA ≤ 2(µB − µA).

















≤ VA + 4nA(µA − µB)
2
VB




Compared with inequality (3.2), we get θ < .
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Figure 3.3 An Illustration of the Buckets and Windows
Case 2. µC > 2µB − µA
Lemma 6. In Case 2, θ < .
Proof. In this case that µC > 2µB − µA, we get
µB − µA < µC − µB.
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We have assumed that µA ≤ µB, therefore µB < µC . Also, the mean of a merged bucket
should be bounded between the means of its two sub-buckets, therefore µB < µB,C < µC .
Consequently,
|µA − µB,C | < µC − µA = µC − µB + µB − µA







VB + nBnCnB+nC (µB − µC)2
=
VA






















· (nB + nC)
2
(nA + nB + nC)nC
· ( |µA − µB,C ||µB − µC | )
2.
Equation (3.1) in Lemma 1 shows that the variance of a bucket is larger than or equal to the
sum of variance of both sub-buckets. Therefore VA ≤ VA,B − VB. According to Rule 1, we get
VA
VB











From inequality (3.3), we get
(
|µA − µB,C |













· g(nC) · 4 = 5(1 + 2g(nC)).
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The derivative of g(nC) is
g′(nC) =
(nB + nC)[(nA − nB)nC − (nA + nB)nB]
(nA + nB + nC)2n2C
< −(nA + nB)(nB + nC)nB
(nA + nB + nC)2n2C
< 0.
Therefore, g(nC) decreases with the increase of nC . According to Lemma 3 that nB < nC ,











(1 + 2g(nC)) < .
Case 3. µC < µB
Lemma 7. In Case 3, θ < .
Proof. We claim that for any instance BC in Case 3, we can find an equal or even worse












If µC < µB, we construct BC′ from BC by adding 2(µB − µC) to each element in BC . For
bucket BC′ ,
nC′ = nC ,
µC′ = 2µB − µC > µB.
Consequently, the mean µC′ of bucket BC′ belongs to either Case 1 or Case 2, and thus θ′ < 
according to Lemma 5 and 6. Since µC and µC′ are symmetric about µB, µB,C and µB,C′
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should also be symmetric about µB. Therefore µB,C + µB,C′ = 2µB, and
µB,C′ − µB = µB − µB,C > 0.
We have assumed that µA ≤ µB, therefore
|µA − µB,C | = |(µB − µB,C)− (µB − µA)|
= |(µB,C′ − µB)− (µB − µA)|
≤ |(µB,C′ − µB) + (µB − µA)|
























Consequently, we get θ ≤ θ′ <  in Case 3.
We have shown that, when the real variance V = 0, our algorithm returns the estimation
Vˆ = 0. When the real variance V 6= 0, according to Lemma 4, 5, 6 and 7, we get 0 ≤ δ ≤ θ < 
where δ denotes the relative error of the variance estimation of our algorithm. Consequently,
we get the following theorem about the error bound of our algorithm.
Theorem 1. Our algorithm can maintain -approximate variance of data streams over sliding
windows.
Furthermore, we make the observation that our algorithm only makes one-sided error. That
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is,
(1− )V ≤ Vˆ ≤ V.
To help understand our algorithm, we shortly explain why we set such three merging rules
and why these three merging rules can bound the estimation error to O(). As shown in Lemma
4,




VB + nBnCnB+nC (µB − µC)2
.
First of all, Rule 1 implies that O(VAVB ) = O(). Furthermore, when µC is close to µB (i.e., Case












VB + nBnCnB+nC (µB − µC)2
) ≈ O(nA
nB
· (nB + nC)
2
(nA + nB + nC)nC
)
≈ O( · N
nC
).
Therefore we have to add a constraint on nC (i.e., Rule 3), such that O(nC) = O(N) to bound
relative error to O().
3.1.2.3 Space Requirement
Now consider any two adjacent buckets Bi and Bi+1 when i ≥ 2 after the merging procedure
completes. Let bucket Bi+1,i = Bi+1
⋃
Bi and bucket Bi∗ =
⋃i−1
j=1Bj , and Figure 3.3 shows
an illustration. When ni+1,i + ni∗ = ni+2∗ ≤ N2 , according to the merging rules, our algorithm
has the following invariant:
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Invariant 1. For i ≥ 2, if Bi+1 exists, Bi+1,i has either
Property 1: ni+1,i = ni+2∗ − ni∗ > 10ni∗ , or
Property 2: Vi+1,i,i∗ − Vi∗ = Vi+2∗ − Vi∗ > 5Vi∗ .
Let W denote the current N -sized window, W1 denote the current N2 -sized window, and
W2 denote the past N2 -sized window. We define three sets, P , P1 and P2. P is all adjacent
bucket pairs in W1 except the first pair (i.e. B1
⋃
B2). P1 is a subset of P which contains
all adjacent bucket pairs with Property 1, and P2 is a subset of P which contains all adjacent
bucket pairs with Property 2.
P = {Bi+1,i : ni+2∗ ≤ N2 , i ≥ 2},
P1 = {Bi+1,i : ni+2∗ > (1 + 10)ni∗ , Bi+1,i ∈ P},
P2 = {Bi+1,i : Vi+2∗ > (1 + 5)Vi∗ , Bi+1,i ∈ P}.




|P | ≤ |P1|+ |P2|.
Let m denote the number of buckets within the current N -sized window W . Let m1 denote
the number of buckets within the current N2 -sized window W1. Let m2 denote the number of
buckets within the past N2 -sized window W2. Then
m1 = |P |+ 2.
Consider any window W2, all buckets in it are from a particular old W1 after potential merging.
According to Rule 3, any bucket which passes the boundary between W1 and W2 will not change
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any more in W2 before it expires. Consequently, at any time,
m2 ≤ max(m1).
In addition, there is at most one bucket which expands the boundary between W1 and W2.
Consequently,
m ≤ m1 +m2 + 1 ≤ 2 max(m1) + 1 = 2 max(|P |) + 5. (3.4)
Therefore, if we can find the upper bound of |P |, we get the bound of m (i.e., the number of
buckets in our algorithm) accordingly.
Lemma 8. In the case that every Bi+1,i in P has Property 1 (i.e., P = P1), we have
|P1| < 2d10

e logN − 1.
Proof. In this case, since any adjacent bucket pair Bi+1,i has Property 1 when i ≥ 2, then for
any index i+ 2j ≤ |P1|+ 3 with i ≥ 2,




ni+4∗ > (1 +
1
10




ni+6∗ > (1 +
1
10









Thus when j = d10 e, ni+2j∗ > 2ni∗ . Consequently, ni∗ will be doubled when i increases every










2d 10 e < N,
|P1| < 2d10

e logN − 1.
43
Let R be the upper bound on the absolute value of the data elements.







Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 8. In this case, the maximum element number
bound N2 in window W1 becomes the maximum variance bound
N
2 R
2. Vi∗ will be doubled
when i increases every 2d5 e.
We claim that V4∗ ≥ 23 . First, V4∗ > 0, otherwise V4∗ = V2∗ = 0 which violates Property
2. Because V4∗ > 0, and all elements in the data stream are integers, then V4∗ achieves its





















Lemma 10. In any case, we have
|P | < 2d10







Proof. We check the size of subsets P1 and P2 separately. First, consider how many pairs of
adjacent buckets that have Property 1 (belong to P1) can exist to contain at most N2 elements.
Any pair of adjacent buckets which does not belong to P1 also contributes to contain some
number of elements. Further, ni∗ is still doubled after every 2d10 e pairs of adjacent buckets in
P1. Consequently, Lemma 8 is still true for |P1|. Similarly, any pair of adjacent buckets which
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does not belong to P2 also contributes to the increase of variance, and Lemma 9 is still true
for |P2|. Therefore,
|P | ≤ |P1|+ |P2| < 2d10







Consequently, we get the space bound of our algorithm as shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Our algorithm can maintain -approximate variance of data streams over sliding
windows using O(1 logN) space.
Proof. According to inequality (3.4) and Lemma 10, we get









Therefore, our algorithm is O(1 log(NR
2)) in space. Assume that R is at most polynomial in
N , the space requirement is in fact O(1 logN).
3.1.2.4 Running Time
Obviously, the running time of our algorithm is O(1 logN) in worst case. Although Step
1 and 2 are both O(1), Step 3 needs O(1 logN) in worst case. Now we propose a mechanism
which makes our algorithm an O(1) running time algorithm in worst case. The baseline idea
is that we only check constant number of pairs of adjacent buckets each time in the third
(merging) step.
Let c be an integer which is large than 1. When each element arrives, we still insert it as
a new bucket (Step 1) and delete expired bucket if any (Step 2). However, instead of checking
all pairs of adjacent buckets within W1 in Step 3, we only run the kernel while loop c times.
After that, the merging procedure is hanged up and will be resumed with the same status when
a new element arrives. Note that before the merging procedure completes, each new element
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is stored in an individual bucket, and window W1 does not slide (although window W slides
and the expired buckets are still deleted). Since many new buckets may be queued before the
merging procedure completes, we need extra space to keep them. However, such extra space
can still be efficiently bounded.
Lemma 11. Let Y denote the maximum number of buckets that window W1 can have after
merging procedure completes which is in O(1 logN) as shown in Theorem 2. Let Z denote the
maximum number of new arriving elements (buckets) during the merging procedure. Then
Z ≤ d Y
c− 1e.
Proof. Let yi denote the number of buckets that window W1 can have after the ith merging
procedure completes. Let zi denote the number of new arriving elements during the ith merging
procedure. Then for the i+ 1th merging procedure, in the beginning, window W1 can contain
at most yi + zi buckets and at most yi + zi − 2 pairs of adjacent buckets which need to check
after the first bucket B1. Because we check c pairs of adjacent buckets when receiving a new
element, we have
zi+1 ≤ dyi + zi − 2
c
e.
We claim that for any index i ≥ 1, zi ≤ d Yc−1e. We use induction to prove this claim. First,
z1 = 1. Suppose for an index i > 1, the claim is true. Then for index i+ 1,
zi+1 ≤ dyi + zi − 2
c









e ≤ d Y
c− 1e.
Therefore, we get Z ≤ d Yc−1e.
Lemma 11 shows that we can process a new element using constant time while the extra
space and thus the total space are still in O(1 logN). Further, it is clear that our algorithm can
update (nall, µall, Vall) in O(1), therefore our algorithm can answer a query of the variance in
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the current sliding window with constant time. Consequently, we get the final theorem which
concludes the optimal properties of our algorithm:
Theorem 3. Our algorithm can maintain -approximate variance of data streams over sliding
windows using O(1 logN) space. Furthermore, the running time of processing a new element
and answering a query is O(1) in worst case. Our algorithm is optimal in both space and worst
case time.
3.1.3 Conclusions
In this research, we address the problem of maintaining -approximate variance in data
streams over sliding windows. Our proposed algorithm only needs O(1 logN) space and O(1)
running time in worst case. Therefore, it is optimal in both space and worst case time. In the
future, we will continue to extend our algorithm to other data stream statistics problems over
sliding windows.
3.2 Frequency Estimation over Sliding Windows
3.2.1 Introduction
The problem of computing characteristics of large data streams has received considerable
attention [18, 82]. Many characteristics of large data streams, such as frequency, quantile, sum,
mean, variance, diameter, top-k list (hot list), distribution, etc., have been widely studied. If
we have sufficient large space and do not have time constraints, we can precisely obtain any
characteristics that we want. However, the issue in processing large data streams is that in
many cases we probably only have one chance to process each item in the data streams. We
cannot store all data because of constraints in memory space or privacy issue. Therefore, in
these cases we have to gather the interested characteristics with only one pass.
An even greater challenge is to process data streams over sliding windows. An algorithm
which works over sliding windows not only can gather the data streams’ characteristics, but
also update the characteristics by inserting new data and deleting expired data. Unfortunately,
many previous data stream algorithms cannot work over sliding windows.
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3.2.1.1 Motivation
Frequency is a fundamental characteristic in many data mining applications. For instance,
it can be used in sensor data mining, analysis of web query logs, network measurement and
monitoring, bandwidth statistics for billing purposes, transaction analysis in stocks, and iceberg
queries [44] in large-scale data bases, etc.
In recent years, such problems are considered under sliding window models. The advantage
of an algorithm which works over sliding windows is that it can get rid of the stale data and
only consider the fresh data, which is meaningful in many cases. For instance, in an intrusion
detection system (IDS), the current status of the network is usually more important than that
of one day ago. The characteristics gathered over sliding windows can provide a more smooth
view of the data stream. However, many previous algorithms cannot work over sliding windows.
Recently, several data mining algorithms over sliding windows are proposed [16, 17, 35, 45,
50, 51, 67, 104, 115, 121]. For the problem of -approximate frequency estimation over sliding
windows, Arasu and Manku [16] presented an algorithm which requires O(1 log
2 1
 ) space and
O(log 1 ) running time. Recently, an algorithm proposed by Lee and Ting [65] achieves O(
1
 )
space, but needs O(1 ) processing time for update and query. There is no algorithm which
can achieve both linear space in terms of 1 and constant running time simultaneously. In this
research, we are trying to design an efficient frequency estimation algorithm which needs O(1 )
space and O(1) running time.
3.2.1.2 Problem Definition
-Approximate Frequency Estimation Suppose we have a data stream with N items,
and each item is in the set I. A frequency estimation algorithm is an -approximate algorithm
if it guarantees that for any item i ∈ I, the error between true frequency fi and estimated
frequency fˆi is bounded by
0 ≤ fi − fˆi ≤ N. (3.5)
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Sliding Window There are two common types of sliding windows, count-based windows
which maintain the last (most recent) N items in the stream, and time-based windows which
maintain all items that arrived in the last T time units. Therefore, the time span of a count-
based window may vary, while the number of items in a time-based window may change from
time to time. For example, let < i, t > denote that an item i arrives at timestamp t. We have
a stream of items as
< i1, 1 >,< i2, 2 >,< i3, 5 >,< i1, 6 >,< i4, 7 >, . . .
If the sliding window is count-based with N = 3, then the item sets in the sliding windows
follow {i1}, {i1, i2}, {i1, i2, i3}, {i2, i3, i1}, {i3, i1, i4}, . . .. If the sliding window is time-based
with T = 2.1, then the item sets in the sliding windows follow {i1}, {i1, i2}, {i2}, {φ}, {i3},
{i3, i1}, {i3, i1, i4}, . . .
Problem Statement In this research, we consider the problem stated as follows: Given
an arbitrary window size N and an error bound , how to maintain -approximate frequency
estimation of a data stream over count-based sliding windows with size N in one pass?
We leave the problem of frequency estimation over time-based sliding windows to our future
work.
3.2.1.3 Our Contributions
To our knowledge, the best existing algorithms for the problem of estimating -approximate
frequency in data streams over sliding windows either require O(1 log
2 1
 ) space and O(log
1
 )
running time [16], or require O(1 ) both in space and running time [65]. Our contribution
in this research is that we propose two novel deterministic algorithms, Snapshot-Basic and
Snapshot-Advanced, which can maintain -approximate frequency estimation over sliding
windows only using O(1 ) space [117]. Furthermore, Snapshot-Advanced is the first efficient
deterministic algorithm which can achieve O(1 ) space requirement and only needs O(1) running
time to process each item in the data stream and to answer a query. In addition, as an
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application of our algorithms, we extend them to solve the problem of estimating flow size.
3.2.2 SNAPSHOT Algorithms
Let N denote the window size and  be the error parameter. To simplify the description,
we assume that 1 is an integer, and N can be divided by 3. We first propose a basic algorithm
named Snapshot-Basic, which is straightforward but needs quite a number of operations to
process an arrival item. Then we introduce a more sophisticated algorithm named Snapshot-
Advanced which can work in O(1) running time.
3.2.2.1 Basic Algorithm
The baseline idea of Snapshot-Basic is to snapshoot items’ position information so that
we can use the snapshots to update estimates and bound the estimation error over sliding
windows which is similar to the idea in [65]. For instance, we take snapshots on the positions
of the 1st, 101st, 201st, · · · identical items. When a snapshot expires, we can decrease the cor-
responding item’s frequency estimates by 100, therefore it is possible to bound the estimation
error to the level of 100.
Figure 3.4 describes the Snapshot-Basic algorithm. A linked list L is kept with at most 3
item entries, which is called item list. In each entry of the item list, we keep an item identifier,
a counter fˆ as its frequency estimate, and a pointer to another linked list which stores the
snapshots of this item. It means that each item entry has its own snapshot list. When a new
item i arrives, and the item list L is not full, we create an entry for it in L. We set its frequency
estimate fˆi to 1. We also snapshoot the current position, which means that we add the current
position index n into this item’s snapshot list. Instead of keeping all its positions, we only
snapshoot the 1st, ( N3 + 1)th, (
2N
3 + 1)th, (N + 1)th, · · · positions of item i. When an old
item arrives, we simply increase its frequency estimate by 1, and snapshoot if necessary. In
the case that the arrival item i is a new item, and L has kept 3 distinct items, we decrease the
frequency estimate of each item by 1. We delete all snapshots and items which are no need
to keep. To update the current sliding window, when an item arrives, we first find the oldest
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snapshot among all snapshots of all items. If this oldest snapshot is out of the current window,
this snapshot is deleted, and the corresponding item’s frequency estimate is decreased by N3 .
We delete this item from the item list L if its frequency estimate is less than or equal to 0.
Step 1: Delete expired snapshot and item.
Find the oldest snapshot.
If it is expired and belongs to item j, delete this snapshot, and decrease fˆj by N3 .
If fˆj ≤ 0, delete item j from list L.
Step 2: Process the arrival item i.
Case 1: i is an old item (i.e., i ∈ L).
Increase fˆi by 1.
If fˆi = 1 mod N3 , snapshoot the current position.
Case 2: i is a new item, and L is not full.
Create an entry for item i in list L.
Set fˆi to 1 and snapshoot the current position.
Case 3: i is a new item, and L is full of 3 items.
For each item j in list L:
Decrease fˆj by 1.
If fˆj = 0 mod N3 , delete the most recent snapshot
from j’s snapshot list.
If fˆj = 0, delete item j from L.
Figure 3.4 Snapshot-Basic Algorithm Description
Figure 3.6 shows an example of how Snapshot-Basic works. In this example, N = 18,
 = 12 , and the input data stream is shown in Figure 3.5. The item list will keep at most 6
(= 3 ) entries, and positions are snapshot for each 3 (=
N
3 ) identical items. The up arrow
“↑” in Figure 3.5 shows that there is a snapshot taken on that position. Figure 3.6(a) shows
the item list L when n = 18, and there are 6 items in list L and totally 8 snapshots in all
snapshot lists, so there is no room for new items in list L. When the 19th item i3 arrives, the
snapshot si1,1 expires and is deleted, and fˆi1 is decreased by 3. Also, a new snapshot entry
si3,2 is inserted into the head of i3’s snapshot list as shown in Figure 3.6(b). When the 20th
item i7 arrives, no snapshot expires. Because i7 is not present in the item list L and there is
no room to create a new item entry for i7, all counters in the item list are decreased by 1. The
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position 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
item i1 i1 i2 i3 i3 i4 i5 i1 i4 i6 i2 i5
snapshots in Snapshot-Basic ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
snapshots in Snapshot-Advanced ↑c ↑c ↑c ↑p ↑c ↑p
position 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 · · ·
item i2 i3 i1 i6 i5 i2 i3 i7 i8 i9 i3 · · ·
snapshots in Snapshot-Basic ↑ ↑ ↑ ⇓ ↑ ↑ ↑ · · ·
snapshots in Snapshot-Advanced ↑p ↑p ↑p ↑p ⇓ ↑p ↑ · · ·
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Figure 3.6 Example Item List when Window Slides in Snapshot-Basic.





































































































































Figure 3.7 Example Hash Table when Window Slides in Snapshot-Ad-
vanced.









































































































































































Figure 3.8 Example Partial Snapshot List when Window Slides in Snap-
shot-Advanced.
down arrow “⇓” shows that there is a decrease operation in this position. i1 is deleted from
list L as its frequency estimate is equal to 0. Also, snapshots si2,2 and si3,2 are deleted from
i2’s and i3’s snapshot lists as shown in Figure 3.6(c).
It is possible that an inserted item is deleted from L and appears again in the data stream
after the deletion. In this case, it is treated as a new item because there is no entry (memory)
for it in L. For example, when we snapshoot the 5th i3 on position 23, the old entry and
snapshots for i3 have been expired or deleted, so i3 is reinserted into the item list L again as a
new item. Also, when we snapshoot the (xN3 + 1)th position of an item, it is possible that this
position is actually the (xN3 + 1 + y)th position of this item in the data stream if the decrease
operations in Case 3 of Step 2 have happened y times, where x and y are non-negative integers.
Now we prove the correctness of the Snapshot-Basic algorithm, and give the space re-
quirement.
Theorem 4. For any item i, no matter whether it appears in the data stream or not, Snapshot-
Basic can maintain -approximate frequency estimation over sliding windows with size at most
N . Furthermore, Snapshot-Basic uses O(1 ) space.
Proof. Approximation:
The error of frequency estimation comes from two sources. One is the operation to clear the
expired snapshot in Step 1, and the other is the decrease operation in Case 3 of Step 2. In Step
1, once a snapshot just expires, we should only decrease the corresponding item’s frequency
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estimate by 1. However, Snapshot-Basic decreases it by N3 . Then this operation will
introduce a negative error at most N3 − 1. Fortunately, this kind of error will not accumulate
for the same item during data stream when multiple snapshots of the same item expire and
are deleted. The reason is that, when the next snapshot of the same item expires, the sliding
window has moved on and the error introduced by the previous expired snapshot is out of the
current window and decreases to zero. Therefore, the error introduced by the operation in
Step 1 can be bounded to N3 − 1 at any time for any items.
When Case 3 of Step 2 happens, all existing items must decrease their frequency estimates
by 1, and the new item cannot be inserted. Therefore, this operation will introduce a negative
error equal to 1 for certain items. Now we calculate how many times this decrease operation
can be performed in any current window not wider than N . Suppose the current window
size is N ′.2 Let the last(most recent) item’s position index in the current window be n. So
the items in the current window is {en−N ′+1, en−N ′+2, . . . , en}. Let sumj denote the sum of
all frequency estimates in the item list L when the current item’s position index is j. So
sumn−N ′ is the sum of all frequency estimates in the item list just before entering the current
window, and sumn is the sum of all frequency estimates in the item list at the end of the
current window. There are N ′ new arrival items in the current window, so the maximum value
that can be decreased during the current window is sumn−N ′ − sumn + N ′. The operations
in Step 1 guarantee that no expired item can be counted, so sumn−N ′ ≤ N . In the worst
case, sumn = 0, sumn−N ′ = N , and Step 1 is not performed (which means that all frequency
estimate decreases are from Case 3 of Step 2). Each time the decrease operation decreases the
sum exactly by 3 plus 1
3. Therefore, the number of the decrease operations in Case 3 of Step
2 is at most










The negative error introduced by the decrease operations in Case 3 of Step 2 is at most 2N3 .
2N ′ can be any positive integer less than or equal to N .
3All estimates in the 3

entries are decreased by 1, and the new item is not counted.
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Consequently, for any item i, we get




Therefore, Snapshot-Basic can maintain -approximate frequency estimation over sliding
windows with size at most N . Also, this algorithm only makes one-sided error.
Space Requirement:
Snapshot-Basic keeps an item list L which has at most 3 entries. Also, some snapshots
are stored. For each item in the list, there may be two kinds of snapshots. One kind is the
current snapshot. This kind of snapshots for all items is no more than the number of item
entries which is 3 . Another kind is the old snapshots which represent position information of
at least N3 identical items. Step 1 guarantees that no expired snapshot exists in the space, so
this kind of snapshots is no more than NN/3 =
3
 . Therefore, there are at most
3
 item entries
and 6 snapshots, and the total space requirement of Snapshot-Basic is O(
1
 ).
The proof also shows that for any window with size less than N , if it is included in the
current N -sized window, Snapshot-Basic can return the frequency estimates with an error
less than N .
We can also record the number of decrease operations (in Case 3 of Step 2), and use this
information to refine the frequency estimates. Suppose an item i’s oldest valid snapshot is
si,1, we can count the number of decrease operations after si,1 and add this number to fˆi
when querying its frequency. However, this additional information cannot improve the error
bound, therefore we do not utilize such information about performing decrease operations in
our algorithms.
Now we explain why we bound the number of item entries to 3 , and snapshoot positions
for each N3 identical items.
4 Suppose we bound the item entries to x , and snapshoot positions
for each Ny identical items. Snapshot-Basic totally needs
x
 item entries and
x+y
 snapshot
entries in the worst case, therefore the total number of entries is 2x+y .
4If 3





is not an integer, we snapshoot




Theorem 5. To guarantee the -approximation error in Snapshot-Basic, the total number
of entries 2x+y reaches the minimum value when x = y = 3.
Proof. We want to minimize the objective function
f(x, y) = 2x+ y. (3.8)
We have positive constraints for x and y that x, y > 0. Similar to the proof of Theorem 4, the

















x− 2 , (3.11)
and
x > 2. (3.12)
When y = xx−2 , f(x, y) can reach its minimum value. So
f(x, y) ≥ 2x+ x
x− 2 =
x(2x− 3)




2x2 − 8x+ 6
(x− 2)2 =
2(x− 1)(x− 3)
(x− 2)2 . (3.14)
When x = y = 3, dg(x)dx = 0, and f(x, y) reaches its feasible minimum value 9.
Therefore, when we bound the number of item entries to 3 , and snapshoot positions for
each N3 identical items, we use the minimum number of entries in the worst case. For instance,
if we set x = 4, then y = 2, and x + 2y = 10, which is larger than the minimum value. In
practice, the item entry and snapshot entry may spend different sizes of space. For instance,
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if we want to estimate the number of packets from each source IP in an IPv6 network over a
sliding window with 20-bit size, then each item identifier will use 128 bits, while a snapshot
entry will use about 20 bits. In this case, we can rewrite the objective function by multiplying
the space size of different entries, and calculate the optimal parameters of x and y. We also
need consider the data structure overhead for each entry in the objective function.
Although Snapshot-Basic can maintain -approximate frequency estimation over sliding
windows using O(1 ) entries, it needs O(
1
 ) operations for each arrival item in the worst case.
Both Step 1 and Case 3 of Step 2 need O(1 ) operations. Even though we can use a binary tree
to manage the item list, the decrease operation in Case 3 of Step 2 still needs O(1 ) operations
in the worst case. Therefore, Snapshot-Basic is not adequate to process large data streams
with high rates.
3.2.2.2 Advanced Algorithm
We propose an advanced algorithm Snapshot-Advanced which can maintain -approximate
frequency estimation over sliding windows using O(1 ) entries and O(1) operations. It uses
more sophisticated data structure to maintain item entries and snapshot entries such that all
operations can run in O(1) time.
First, we use a hash table T to manage all item entries. Then the operation of finding the
existence of an item can be performed in O(1) time.
To reduce the running time of inserting a new snapshot, deleting an expired snapshot, or
finding a given snapshot, all snapshot entries of all items are inserted into a doubly-circularly-
linked list S. When the current position needs to be snapshot, it is inserted to the head of
S. When the oldest snapshot entry expires, it is exactly the tail of S. Therefore, S is an
automatically sorted list, with the oldest snapshot in the tail, and the newest snapshot in
the head. All operation on the list S, i.e., inserting the current snapshot, deleting the oldest
snapshot, and deleting a given snapshot, can be performed in O(1) time.
The most difficult operation in terms of time complexity is how to decrease each frequency
estimate by 1 and delete the items and snapshots that have no need to keep (which corre-
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sponding counts go down to 0). To solve this issue, we first designate snapshots into two
groups, complete snapshots and partial snapshots. A snapshot is complete if the item’s
counter increases at least N3 after (including) that snapshot. A snapshot is partial if the
item’s counter dose not increase as many as N3 after that snapshot. In the previous data
stream example shown in Figure 3.5, the up arrows ↑c and ↑p indicate a complete snapshot
and a partial snapshot respectively (when looking from position 22). Notice that all complete
snapshots were partial snapshots at the beginning. But once a partial snapshot updates to a
complete snapshot, it will remain complete until it is expired and deleted no matter whether
the decrease operation happens or not later.
For each item i in hash table T , we use three auxiliary counters, cntci, cntoi and cntb,
combined together to represent its frequency estimate. Here cntci is the number of complete
snapshots that item i has, and cntoi is an offset counter which records the offset to cntb, where
cntb is a shared base counter for all items which is first set to 0 before processing the data
stream. Once a decrease operation happens, instead of decreasing all items’ offset counters by
1, cntb is increased by 1 mod N3 . If an arrival item i is an old item without a partial snapshot
or a new item, its offset counter is set by




If an arrival item i is an old item with a partial snapshot, its offset counter is increased by
1 mod N3 . The frequency estimate of an item i is calculated by




All partial snapshots which have the same offset counter value cntox are grouped into a
doubly-linked list Pcntox , which is called a local partial snapshot list. To save space, we keep
only one cntox for each Pcntox instead of keeping cntox for each item in this list. All such
local lists are managed by an automatically sorted doubly-circularly-linked list P . That is,
all the heads in all local partial snapshot lists are linked in P , which is called a global partial
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snapshot list. If a partial snapshot is in a local list Pcntox , we say that it is also in global list
P . As mentioned above, both complete snapshots and partial snapshots are inserted into the
snapshot list S. However, only partial snapshots are inserted into P .
At the beginning, both item table T and snapshot list S are empty. cntb is set to 0, and the
global partial snapshot list P has an entry Pcntb which is empty. The head of P always points
to Pcntb no matter whether Pcntb is empty or not, and Pcntb is called garbage list. Instead of
bounding the number of item entries in Snapshot-Basic, we bound the number of partial
snapshot entries in P to 3 in Snapshot-Advanced. Let |Pcntox | denote the number of partial





|Pcntox | ≤ 3 .
Step 1: Delete expired snapshot and item.
Let s denote the snapshot on the tail of S, and suppose s belongs to item j.
If s is not expired, goto Step 2.
Delete s from S.
If s is a complete snapshot, decrease cntcj by 1.
If s is a partial snapshot, delete it from Pcntoj .
If cntcj = 0 and j has no partial snapshot, delete item j from T .
Step 2: Process the arrival item i.
Case 1: i is an old item with partial snapshot.
Delete its partial snapshot entry from Pcntoi .
Let k = (cntoi + 1) mod N3 .
If k 6= cntb, insert this entry into Pk;
Otherwise, increase cntci by 1 and set this entry as complete snapshot.
Case 2: i is an old item without partial snapshot or a new item, and P is not full.
If i is a new item, create an item entry for item i with cntci = 0, and insert it into T .
Create a partial snapshot entry recording the current position, and insert it into the head
of S and P(cntb+1) mod N
3
.
Case 3: i is an old item without partial snapshot or a new item, and P is full.
If P(cntb+1) mod N
3
exists, move head of P to it and delete Pcntb.
Increase cntb by 1 mod N3 .
Step 3: Garbage Collection.
If Pcntb is not empty, delete its head entry from Pcntb and S.
If the corresponding item has no complete snapshot, delete this item entry from T .
Figure 3.9 Snapshot-Advanced Algorithm Description
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Figure 3.9 gives the algorithm description of Snapshot-Advanced. Figure 3.7 and Figure
3.8 show an example of how Snapshot-Advanced works. In this example, N = 18 and  = 12 ,
and the input data stream is shown in Figure 3.5. The partial snapshot list will keep at most
6 entries, and positions are snapshot for each 3 identical items. The up arrows “↑c” and ‘↑p”
in Figure 3.5 indicate that the corresponding snapshot is a complete snapshot or a partial
snapshot respectively (when looking from position 22). Figure 3.7(a) shows the hash table T
when n = 19, and there are 6 item entries in the hash table T , 5 partial snapshot entries in the
global partial snapshot list P , and totally 8 snapshot entries in the snapshot list S. We do not
draw the sorted snapshot list S to save paper space. These 5 partial snapshots are grouped
according to their offset counters as shown in 3.8(a). Now cntb = 0, the garbage list P0 is
empty and its next list is P1. When the 20th item i7 arrives, no snapshot expires. The new
item i7 is inserted into the hash table T as shown in Figure 3.7(b). As its hash value is equal
to that of i3, i7 and i3 are in the same item list. A new partial snapshot entry psi7 is inserted
into the head of the corresponding local partial snapshot list P1 as shown in Figure 3.8(b).
It is also inserted into the head of snapshot list S. Now there is no room left in the partial
snapshot list. When the 21st item i8 arrives, the complete snapshot si2,1 on position 3 which
belongs to i2 expires and is deleted from the tail of snapshot list S, and cntci2 is decreased by
1. Because i8 is not present in the item list and there is no room for creating a new partial
snapshot entry, cntb is increased by 1 mod N3 . The down arrow “⇓” in Figure 3.5 shows that
there is such a “decrease operation” in this position. The garbage list updates to P1, and P0
is deleted. The partial snapshot psi7 in the head of P1 is deleted. psi7 is also deleted from
snapshot list S. The other 3 partial snapshots in the garbage list will be released one by one
when the following 3 items arrive. i7 is deleted from the item list as cntci7 = 0 and it has no
partial snapshot. The items and partial snapshots surrounded by dotted lines in Figure 3.7(c)
and Figure 3.8(c) show that these entries should be released.
Notice that, when “decrease operation” happens, not all present items in T will decrease
their estimates by 1. Only the items with a partial snapshot perform this operation. For
example, in Figure 3.5, there is a snapshot on position 7 for item i5. It converts from a partial
60
snapshot to a complete snapshot after the 17th item arrives, and fˆi5 = 3. When the 21st item
arrives, i5 has no partial snapshot and does not decrease its estimate.
Now we prove the correctness of the Snapshot-Advanced algorithm, and give the space
requirement and running time.
Theorem 6. For any item i, no matter whether it appears in the data stream or not, Snapshot-
Advanced can maintain -approximate frequency estimation over sliding windows with size at
most N . Furthermore, Snapshot-Advanced uses O(1 ) space and O(1) running time when
processing each arrival item and answering any query.
Proof. Approximation:
The proof of approximation correctness is similar to that in Theorem 4 for Snapshot-
Basic. The error of frequency estimate still comes from two sources: One is the operation in
Step 1, and the other is the operation in Case 3 of Step 2. Similarly, the error introduced by
Step 1 is a negative error at most N3 − 1. When Case 3 of Step 2 happens, all items with
partial snapshots must decrease their frequencies by 1, and the arrival item cannot be counted.
Therefore, this operation will introduce a negative error equal to 1 for certain items. With the
same deduction, such an operation can only perform at most 2N3 times in any window with
size N or less. Finally, for any item i, we get
0 ≤ fi − fˆi < N (3.17)
Consistence:
To keep the constant time complexity in the garbage collection step, each time we only
release one garbage entry. Therefore we must consider the consistence issue. First, cntb will not
change before all garbage entries are released. Each time Step 3 will release a partial snapshot
entry which can be used to insert the next new item, so Case 3 of Step 2 will never happen
before the garbage list is empty. It is possible that an item’s partial snapshot is in the garbage
list and waiting for release while an identical item arrives. In this scenario, this partial snapshot
is removed from the garbage list to the list with offset counter value (cntb + 1) mod N3 . A
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partial snapshot can be removed out from the garbage list, however, no partial snapshot can
enter the garbage list. The reason is that once a partial snapshot’s offset counter updates from
(cntb − 1) mod N3 to cntb, according to Case 1 of Step 2, this partial snapshot converts to a
complete snapshot and deleted from the partial snapshot list.
Space Requirement:
Snapshot-Advanced keeps snapshot entries in linked lists and item entries in a hash
table. The number of partial snapshots is bounded to 3 (including the partial snapshots in
the garbage list). The number of complete snapshots is no more than NN/3 =
3
 as Step 1
guarantees that no expired snapshot exists in the space. Also, each item entry has at least
one snapshot, so the number of item entries is no more than the number of all snapshots.
Therefore, the total space requirement of Snapshot-Advanced is O(1 ).
Complexity:
As discussed above, all operations listed in Figure 3.9 can be performed in O(1) time and
there is no loop in the algorithm, therefore the complexity of Snapshot-Advanced to process
each arrival item is just O(1).
To answer an arbitrary query concerned about item i, if item i cannot be found in the
hash table, then we return 0 as its frequency estimate. If the queried item i is present in the
hash table, we can easily retrieve cntci, cntoi and cntb in O(1) time, and use equation (3.16)
to calculate its frequency estimate. Therefore, the complexity of Snapshot-Advanced to
answer a query is O(1).
3.2.3 Experimental Evaluation
In our experimental studies, we use real world Internet traffics provided by CAIDA [6] to
evaluate the performance of Snapshot-Basic and Snapshot-Advanced. The data set is
from one of CAIDA’s OC48 traces5, which records all packets’ header information collected at
one large Internet Service Provider (ISP) in San Jose, California on April 24, 2003. The OC48
network trace we used in our experiments have totally 84,579,312 packets from 225,488 unique
5OC48 is a network line with transmission speeds of up to 2488.32 Mbit/s.
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source IP addresses. The packet number distribution is shown in Figure 3.10, which indicates
that most source IPs have small number of packets and some elephant IPs hide in them. For
instance, more than half IPs have less than 10 packets.
All experiments were run on a computer with 3.2GHz Pentium IV CPU and 2GB RAM,


























Figure 3.10 Packet Number Distribution.
3.2.3.1 Estimation Error
To evaluate the correctness of our algorithms, we set the window size N to 1,000,000, and
the relative estimation error  to 0.001. Therefore, we expect that the estimation error of our
algorithms is within 1000 (= N) during last 1,000,000 packets at any position for any source
IP. Figure 3.11 shows the experimental results. Since it is hard and unnecessary to draw all
225,488 source IPs’ frequencies, to make readable figures, we only show the 24 frequent source
IPs which have at least 10,000 packets in a certain window of 1,000,000 packets when the sliding
window slides over the 84,579,312 packets. 6 Figure 3.11(a) shows the exact frequencies of
the 24 frequent source IPs in sliding windows. The X-axis denotes the last packet’s index
number in current sliding window, and here 1M equals 1,000,000; The Y -axis denotes the
exact frequencies (number of packets from a distinct frequent source IP). As shown in the
figure, the most frequent source IP has about 41,000 packets in a sliding window.
The estimation errors of these 24 frequent IP flows using Snapshot-Basic and Snapshot-
6Other source IP flows have similar pattern as these 24 frequent IP flows.
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Advanced are shown in Figure 3.11(b) and 3.11(c) respectively. The X-axes of them denote
the same as the X-axis in Figure 3.11(a); The Y -axes denote the estimation error (fi − fˆi),
where fi is the exact frequency of source IP i and fˆi is its frequency estimation. As expected,
the estimation error (fi − fˆi) is one-sided error, and the largest estimation error is about
500 which is far away from the theoretical bound (N = 1000). The estimation errors of
Snapshot-Basic and Snapshot-Advanced have similar patterns. Most of the estimation
errors vibrate between range [170,500]. The reason is that the “decrease operation” happens
about 170 times during the range of 1,000,000 packets in this data set, and the deletion of an
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(c) Estimation error of Snapshot-
Advanced
Figure 3.11 Experimental Results (N = 1, 000, 000.  = 0.001)
3.2.3.2 Space Requirement
Although there are many linked lists in Snapshot-Basic and Snapshot-Advanced, and
an additional hash table in Snapshot-Advanced, there are only 2 kinds of entries maintained
in memory: item entries and snapshot entries. We set N = 1, 000, 000 and calculated the
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maximum number of each kind of entries in memory with different . The results shown in
Table 3.1 support that both Snapshot-Basic and Snapshot-Advanced require O(1 ) space.




max # max # max # max #
of items of snapshots of items of snapshots
102 300 323 303 322
102.25 534 591 538 591
102.5 949 1098 955 1102
102.75 1688 2089 1699 2093
103 3000 4071 3017 4092
3.2.3.3 Running Time
We implemented the Lee-Ting algorithm [65] and compared with Snapshot-Basic and
Snapshot-Advanced. In Snapshot-Advanced, we set the size of the hash table T to 3 (i.e.,
the average length of T is slightly larger than 1). We use (int32(IP address) mod sizeof(T )) as
the hash function. For instance, suppose  = 0.001 and the size of T is 3000, an item with IP
address 1.2.3.4 is hashed to the entry with index (1 · 224 + 2 · 216 + 3 · 28 + 4)%3000 = 1060.
In our experiments, we set N = 1, 000, 000, and profiled the running time of these algorithms
with different .
Figure 3.12 shows the results. We made the observation that both Lee-Ting and Snapshot-
Basic have nearly linear running time with respect to 1 , and Snapshot-Basic is faster than
Lee-Ting. However, the running time of them is unacceptable if we need more precise es-
timation with smaller . In this case, Snapshot-Advanced has significant advantage over
Lee-Ting and Snapshot-Basic since its running time is nearly constant as shown in Figure
3.12.
3.2.4 Extensions
As an application, we extend our algorithms to another problem – how to estimate flow
size. Here a flow is defined as a substream which items have the same item identifier. In this


































Figure 3.12 Running Time
an Internet packet). we need to estimate the accumulation of these positive numbers of each
distinct item. For example, in an Internet packet stream collected from an ISP with millions
of different source IP addresses, all packets from an identical source IP are combined into a
flow, and each packet may contain more than one byte of payload. We are interested in how
to estimate the payload bytes sent out from distinct source IP addresses.
There may be two definitions of the sliding windows in this case, and hence two problems
on how to maintain -approximate frequency. The first sliding window is defined to cover the
most recent N payload bytes, and the second is defined to cover the most recent N packets.
Because of page limitation, we only give sketches of the solutions.
Problem 1. Given a packet stream, a window size N and an error bound , how to estimate
the size of any flow with error no more than N bytes in the sliding window of the most recent
N payload bytes?
Sketch Solution: Under this sliding window definition, we can replace each packet as a
series of payload bytes with adjacent position indices. For instance, we receive a packet of flow
i with a payload of x bytes. Suppose the position index of the last payload byte of the previous
packet is n, then these new bytes will be indexed as n+ 1, n+ 2, . . ., n+x. The naive solution
is to seem these x bytes as x identical items and call our algorithms x times. However, it is
time consuming. We can just run our algorithms one time with the following changes. When
checking expired snapshots in step 1, more than one snapshot may be expired and deleted.
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When processing an old item, there may be more than one position that need to be snapshot
(when x > N3 ). When performing decrease operation, we perform decrease operation x times,
or until an entry is deleted after k times. We then insert the new item with a counter x− k.
Problem 2. Given a packet stream, a window size N and an error bound , how to estimate
the size of any flow with error no more than N bytes in the sliding window of the most recent
N packets?
Sketch Solution: Under this sliding window definition, let c denote the maximum number
of packet payload bytes. We must assume that c << N . Otherwise, any deterministic
algorithm must keep each packet’s information in memory to maintain -approximation in the
worst case. When c << N , we just bound the number of flow entries to 3c , and snapshoot
positions for each N3 payload bytes of identical packets.
3.2.5 Conclusions
In this research, we address the problem of estimating -approximate frequency in data
streams over sliding windows. Two novel deterministic algorithms, Snapshot-Basic and
Snapshot-Advanced are proposed which only need O(1 ) space. Furthermore, Snapshot-
Advanced is the first efficient algorithm which can achieve O(1 ) space requirement and only
need O(1) running time to process each item in the data stream and to answer a query. Our
experimental studies show the advantages of our algorithms when processing large-scale data
sets. In addition, as an application of our algorithms, we extend them to solve the problem
of estimating flow size. In the future, we will continue to study the problems of gathering
characteristics of data streams over different types of sliding windows.
3.3 Geometric Estimation over Sliding Windows
3.3.1 Introduction
Geometric computation has been widely studied by many researchers in different domains
and utilized in many different applications in recent decades. Many geometric problems have
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had optimal solutions. However, the same geometric problem may lack efficient algorithm if it
is reconsidered under data stream model. Recently, data streams have received considerable
attention [56, 18, 82]. If we have sufficient large space and do not have time constraints, we
can precisely answer any geometric queries. However, the issue in computing geometry in large
data streams is that in many cases we probably only have one chance to process each point in
the data streams. We cannot store all data because of constraints in memory space or privacy
issue. Therefore, in these cases we have to gather the interested geometry information with
only one pass.
An even greater challenge is to compute geometry over sliding windows. An algorithm
which works over sliding windows can not only gather the data streams’ geometry informa-
tion, but also update the geometry information by inserting new points and deleting expired
points. Unfortunately, many previous geometry computation algorithms cannot work over
sliding windows. In this research, we are interested in estimating diameter, convex hull and
skyline over sliding windows.
3.3.1.1 Motivation
Geometric computation has many applications, such as computer graphics, computer-aided
design and manufacturing (CAD/CAM), geographic information systems (GIS), integrated
circuit geometry design and verification, etc. Also, geometric computation becomes an im-
portant issue in network security after distributed networks (e.g., sensor networks) are widely
researched and deployed. For instance, in the early age of worm propagation, after receiv-
ing thousands of alarms from distributed network monitors, a geometric map is necessary to
show which regions have been affected so that countermeasures can be executed to interrupt
the worm propagation. Diameter can scale how far the worm has propagated, and convex
hull can reflect the boundary of the affected hosts. Furthermore, geometric computation is
required not only in the domain of geometric coordinates, but also in many other fields in
network security. For instance, network logs contain a lot of hosts which volume, connection
numbers, etc. are recorded, and we want to analyze and detect the dominant hosts in some
68
terms which should have more chance to be attackers. The skyline calculation can be applied
to this purpose.
In recent years, some geometric computation problems are considered under sliding window
models. The advantage of an algorithm which works over sliding windows is that it can get
rid of the stale points and only consider the fresh points, which is meaningful in many cases.
For instance, in an intrusion detection system (IDS), the current status of the network is
usually more important than that of one day ago. The geometry information gathered over
sliding windows may provide a more fresh and smooth view of the data stream. Recently,
several geometry algorithms over sliding windows are proposed [45, 28, 68, 103]. However,
the algorithms for diameter and convex hull estimation over sliding windows still need some
improvement. To the best of our knowledge, skyline estimation over sliding windows still lacks
efficient algorithms. In this research, we are trying to design efficient algorithms for diameter,
convex hull and skyline estimation over sliding windows.
3.3.1.2 Problem Definition
-Approximate Diameter Estimation




i.e., the maximum Euclidean distance between any pair of points in P . Let D and Dˆ denote
the true diameter and estimated diameter respectively. A diameter estimation algorithm is an
-approximate algorithm if it guarantees
|D − Dˆ| ≤ D. (3.19)
69
-Approximate Convex Hull Estimation
Suppose we have a stream of points in set P . The convex hull of P is the smallest polygon
that contains all points in P . Let H denote the set of all points within the true convex hull,
and Hˆ denote the set of all points within the estimated convex hull. A convex hull estimation
algorithm is an -approximate algorithm if it guarantees




(‖p− q‖)) ≤ D, (3.20)
where D is the diameter of set P .
-Approximate Skyline Estimation
Suppose in d-dimension, we have a stream of points in set P . For two points a =
(a(1), a(2), . . . , a(d)) and b = (b(1), b(1), . . . , b(d)) in P , a dominates b if a(i) ≤ b(i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ d.
The skyline is the set of points which are not dominated by any other point in P . Let S
denote the set of points on the true skyline, and Sˆ denote the set of points on the estimated
skyline. A skyline estimation algorithm is an -approximate algorithm if it guarantees that




(‖p− q‖)) ≤ D, (3.21)
where D is the diameter of set P .
Sliding Window
A sliding window , first introduced by Datar et al. [35], only contains the last N items
in the data stream, which is updated once a new element comes and an old element expires.
Here N is the width of the sliding window.
Problem Statement
In this research, we consider the problems stated as follows:
Given an arbitrary window size N and an error bound ,
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• How to maintain -approximate diameter estimation of a data stream of points over
sliding windows with size N in one pass?
• How to maintain -approximate convex hull estimation of a data stream of points over
sliding windows with size N in one pass?
• How to maintain -approximate skyline estimation of a data stream of points over sliding
windows with size N in one pass?
3.3.1.3 Our Contributions
To our knowledge, the best existing algorithm for the problem of estimating -approximate
diameter in data streams over sliding windows requires O((1 )
d+1
2 log R ) space [28], where R is
the ratio between the largest distance and the smallest distance of a pair of points, and d is the
dimension. We first present an improved algorithm which only requires O((1 )
d+1
2 logR) space.
We then extend our algorithm to solve convex hull estimation problem over sliding windows,
and prove that the exact diameter algorithm can get the -approximate convex hull estimation





3.3.2.1 Chan and Sadjad’s Previous Algorithm
We first briefly review Chan and Sadjad’s algorithm on diameter estimation over sliding
windows [28]. In one-dimension, they proposed an optimal algorithm to maintain the ap-
proximate maximum and minimum. As an instance, to maintain the maximum, let Q =<
q1, q2, . . . , qk > be a subsequence of P such that q1 < q2 < . . . < qk, where P is the set of input
points. Let predQ(p) denote the maximum value in Q that is at most p, and succQ(p) denote
the minimum value in Q that is at least p. Q is called a summary sequence of P if
1. Q is in decreasing order of arrival time.
2. For all p, predQ(p) is not older than p if existing.
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3. For all p, either ‖p− predQ(p)‖ ≤ Dp or succQ(p) is not older than p.
Here Dp denotes the diameter of all points in P which are not older than p. The summary
sequence Q is enough to maintain the -approximate maximum of P . When inserting a new
point p, all points in Q that are not greater than p are removed, and p is put at the beginning
of Q. After 1 logR new points are inserted, a refine process is executed to reduce the points
in Q.
Refine in Chan and Sadjad’s Algorithm:
Let q1 and q2 be the 1st and 2nd points in Q respectively. Let q := q2.
while q is not the last element of Q do
Let x and y be the elements before and after q in Q.
if ‖y − x‖ ≤ ‖x− q1‖
then remove q from Q.
Continue with q equal to y.
To estimate one-dimensional diameter, two similar data structures that approximate the
maximum and minimum of the points are maintained. Chan and Sadjad’s algorithm in one-
dimension needs O(1 logR) space and O(1) running time in worst case (by running refine in
a ”lazy” mode). It is proved that this algorithm is optimal in one-dimension. To extend their
algorithm to higher fixed dimensions, they use Θ((1 )
d−1
2 ) lines in d-dimension which guarantee
that for each vector x in d-dimension, the angle between x and some line is at most arccos( 11+).
The one-dimension summary sequence structure is maintained on each line by projecting all
points to the line, and the maximum expansion on these lines are returned as the approximated
diameter, which is an -approximate.
Chan and Sadjad observed a problem that naively projecting points to the lines can make
the spread of the one-dimensional points arbitrarily big, since the distance of two projected
points could be much smaller compared with their distance in d-dimension. To solve this
problem, they always keep the location of the two newest points p1 and p2. Let Q(l) =<
q1, q2, . . . , qk > be the summary sequence of projected points on line l. All qi’s that satisfies
‖qi − q1‖ ≤ ‖p1 − p2‖ are removed before the refine algorithm, since q1 can represent them.
After the removal, the distance between q1 and next point in Q is at least ‖p1 − p2‖, and the
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refine algorithm guarantees the size of Q(l) is O(1 log
R
 ). Consequently, Chan and Sadjad’s
algorithm can maintain -approximate of diameter in d-dimension using O((1 )
d+1
2 log R ) space
and O((1 )
d−1
2 ) running time.
3.3.2.2 Improved Algorithm
Although Chan and Sadjad’s algorithm has significant improvement compared with the
algorithm in [45], it is still not optimal when applied in higher dimensions.
We propose an algorithm which only needs O((1 )
d+1
2 logR) space. Similarly, we still main-
tain Θ((1 )
d−1
2 ) lines in d-dimension which guarantee that for each vector x in d-dimension, the





lines. The one-dimension summary sequence structure is maintained on each line l ∈ L by
projecting all points to the line l, and the maximum expansion on these lines are returned
as the approximated diameter, which is an -approximate. However, we use a different refine
process which is more efficient.
Refine:
Let p1 and p2 be the 1st and 2nd points in P respectively. Let q1 and q2 be the 1st and
2nd projections in Q respectively. Let q := q2.
while q is not the last element of Q do
Let x and y be the elements before and after q in Q.
if ‖y − x‖ ≤ max(‖x− q1‖, ‖p1 − p2‖)
then remove q from Q.
Continue with q equal to y.
Figure 3.13 shows an example of how our refine process works. All points are projected
onto line l, and suppose that currently Q(l) =< q1, q2, . . . , q9 >. During refine, projections q2
and q3 are removed because ‖q4−q1‖ ≤ ‖p1−p2‖. Similarly, projection q5 is removed because
‖q6 − q4‖ ≤ ‖q4 − q1‖, and projection q8 is removed because ‖q9 − q7‖ ≤ ‖q7 − q1‖. After
refine, Q(l) =< q1, q4, q6, q7, q9 >.
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21 pp −⋅ε 17 qq −⋅ε
Figure 3.13 An Example of How Refine Process Works
Theorem 7. Our algorithm can maintain -approximate diameter estimation over sliding
windows in d-dimension. Furthermore, it uses O((1 )
d+1
2 logR) space7, and the worst running




We prove that our algorithm can maintain a sequence Q with the three properties of a
summary sequence.
For property 1, suppose that before inserting a projection p, the current Q is in descendant
order of arrival time. Since all points in Q that are not greater than p are removed, and p
is put at the beginning of Q, Q remains descendant order. The following refine only removes
points from Q, therefore Q is always in decreasing order of arrival time.
Property 2 is also obviously true in our algorithm, since any point’s old predecessor can
only be replaced by newer points.
Now we consider property 3. First, the insertion of new points cannot destroy this property.
If a projection p’s successor is removed by the insertion of a new projection, then the new
projection will be p’s new successor which is newer than p. If p’s predecessor is removed by
7Since the space requirement is independent with the sliding window size N , it is not necessary to delete
expired points. This is also true for our convex hull algorithm and skyline algorithm.
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the insertion of a new projection, then the new projection will be p’s new predecessor which
is closer to p than previous one. Second, the refine cannot destroy this property. Suppose p’s
predecessor or successor is removed during refine. Let x and y be p’s current predecessor and
successor respectively. Our algorithm guarantees that ‖y − x‖ ≤ max(‖x − q1‖, ‖p1 − p2‖).
Since ‖x− q1‖ ≤ Dp, and ‖p1 − p2‖ ≤ Dp, we have
‖p− x‖ ≤ ‖y − x‖ ≤ Dp. (3.22)
Therefore, property 3 is still true.
Consequently, our algorithm guarantees that Q is a summary sequence. Therefore, suppose
projection p is exactly the maximum value in all projections not older than p on line l ∈ L,
we can use its predecessor to approximate p with error bounded by Dp. Similarly, we can
maintain another sequence which can approximate the minimum value on line l ∈ L. Suppose
projections p and q are the maximum value and minimum value in all projections on line l in
current sliding window respectively, then our algorithm can return p′ and q′ to represent p and
q respectively, and
0 ≤ ‖p− q‖ − ‖p′ − q′‖ = ‖p− p′‖+ ‖q − q′‖ ≤ 2D, (3.23)
where D is the diameter of all points within current sliding window.
Let pa, pb ∈ P be the furthest pair of points in P , and ‖pa − pb‖ = D. Suppose line l ∈ L
has the least angle θ to line segment pq. Then θ ≤ arccos( 11+). Let pal and pbl denote the
projection of pa and pb on line l. Suppose projections p and q are the maximum value and
minimum value in all projections on line l ∈ L in current sliding window respectively. We get
‖pa − pb‖ = ‖pal − pbl‖cos θ ≤ (1 + )‖pal − pbl‖ (3.24)
≤ (1 + )‖p− q‖ (3.25)
≤ (2+ 22)D + (1 + )‖p′ − q′‖ (3.26)
= (2+ 22)‖pa − pb‖+ (1 + )‖p′ − q′‖. (3.27)
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And
‖p′ − q′‖ ≥ 1− 2− 2
2
1 + 
‖pa − pb‖. (3.28)
We get
0 ≤ ‖pa − pb‖ − ‖p′ − q′‖ ≤ 3 + 21 +  ‖pa − pb‖ (3.29)
≤ 3‖pa − pb‖ (3.30)
= O()‖pa − pb‖ (3.31)
= O()D. (3.32)
Since our algorithm can return ‖p′− q′‖ as the approximated diameter, it is an -approximate
algorithm.
Space Requirement:
To maintain maximum projection on line l ∈ L in our algorithm, after running refine,
suppose Q(l) =< q1, q2, . . . , qk >. When 1 ≤ i ≤ k− 2, for any two projections qi and qi+2 that
have one projection between them, we have
‖qi+2 − qi‖ > max(‖qi − q1‖, ‖p1 − p2‖). (3.33)
where p1 and p2 are the 1st and 2nd points in P respectively. Therefore, on line l, when
‖qi − q1‖ ≤ ‖p1 − p2‖, we have
‖qi+2 − qi‖ > ‖p1 − p2‖. (3.34)
Consequently, on the line segment between q1 and q1+‖p1−p2‖, there are at most 2 +1 = O(1 )
points after refine process.
Let qj be the first projection after q1 + ‖p1 − p2‖. Then for each j < i ≤ k − 2, we have
‖qi+2 − qi‖ > ‖qi − q1‖. (3.35)
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Therefore, with a factor (1+), the expansion ‖qi−q1‖ exponentially increases with the number
of projection pairs, and the base is at least ‖p1 − p2‖. Consequently, we have
k − j ≤ 2 log1+
D




Since j is at most O(1 ), there are at most O(
1
 logR) projections on each line l ∈ L. The
number of lines in L are Θ((1 )
d−1




The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1 in [28], and we skip it to save paper.
3.3.3 Convex Hull Estimation
Our diameter estimation algorithm can be directly applied to estimate convex hull in sliding
windows. For convex hull problem, we maintain a similar data structure on Θ((1 )
d−1
2 ) lines,
and just return the points which are extremes in any line as the vertex of the estimated convex
hull.
Hˆ 1H H 2H
Figure 3.14 Example of H, Hˆ, H1 and H2 in Two-Dimension
Now we prove the correctness of our algorithm, and give the space requirement and running
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time.
Theorem 8. Our algorithm can maintain -approximate convex hull estimation over sliding
windows. Furthermore, it uses O((1 )
d+1
2 logR) space, and the worst running time to process a
new point is O((1 )
d−1
2 ).
Proof. Since the convex hull algorithm is exactly the same as the diameter algorithm, it has
the identical space requirement and running time. We only need to prove that this algorithm
can maintain -approximate convex hull estimation over sliding windows.
Let H be the real convex hull in current sliding window, and Hˆ be the estimated convex
hull using our algorithm. Obviously, Hˆ ⊆ H. For each line l ∈ L, let p be its extreme, and
we draw a supporting line (or plane) of l through p, and these supporting lines (or planes)
construct a convex hull H1 which contains Hˆ. We expand H1 by moving each edge (or plane)
out with distance 1−Dˆ and let H2 denote this new convex hall. From Theorem 7, we know
that D − Dˆ = O()D, and we assume that D − Dˆ ≤ D. We have
Dˆ ≥ (1− )D, (3.37)
and 1−Dˆ ≥ D. Therefore, any vertex on H must be included in H2, and
Hˆ ⊆ H ⊆ H2. (3.38)
Obviously,
‖H − Hˆ‖ ≤ ‖H2 − Hˆ‖ ≤ ‖H1 − Hˆ‖+ ‖H2 −H1‖. (3.39)
If we can prove that the maximum distance between Hˆ and H2 satisfies ‖H2 − Hˆ‖ = O(),
then our algorithm can maintain -approximate convex hull. Figure 3.14 shows an example of
H, Hˆ, H1 and H2 in two-dimension.
We first consider ‖H1−Hˆ‖. Since Hershberger and Suri [57] have proved that the maximum
gap between Hˆ and H1 is O() in two-dimension, we only consider higher-dimensional spaces.









Figure 3.15 Example of Hˆ and H1 in Three-Dimension
θ = O(). For each plane G of Hˆ, it has exact d vertices v1, v2, · · · , vd, which are extremes at d
different directions. From each vi, we draw a supporting plane Fi perpendicular to its extreme
direction. These d supporting planes generate an intersection point u which is a vertex in H1.
Figure 3.15 shows an example in three-dimension. Obviously, the angle between G and any
supporting plane is at most θ. Let v be the projection of u on plane G. Since uv ⊥ G, and vi
is an intersection of G and the supporting plane Fi, then 6 uviv is at most the angle between
G and Fi. Therefore, 6 uviv ≤ θ. Since vvi ∈ Hˆ, we have ‖vi − v‖ ≤ D. Consequently,
‖u− v‖ ≤ ‖vi − v‖ · tan θ = O()D. (3.40)
Since the distance between any vertex u ∈ H1 and Hˆ is O()D, we get ‖H1 − Hˆ‖ = O()D.
Now we consider ‖H2 − H1‖. For each vertex ui ∈ H1, it has a corresponding vertex
wi ∈ H2. Then
‖H2 −H1‖ ≤ max(‖wi − vi‖). (3.41)
The length of the projection of line segment viwi on any line l ∈ L is at most 1−Dˆ according
to the construction of H2. Since there exists a line l ∈ L which has a angle of at most θ with
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line segment viwi, we have





Therefore, ‖H2 −H1‖ = O()D, and ‖H2 − Hˆ‖ = O()D.
3.3.4 Skyline Algorithm
To estimate skyline of the stream of input points P in sliding window, we maintain a
subsequence Q of points which is in descendant order of arrival time. Let Dp be the diameter
of all points in P not older than p, and Dˆp be the -approximation of Dp using our diameter
approximation algorithm.









is the width of p’s restricted zone. Figure 3.16 shows an example of restricted zones in two-
dimension.
When a new point p comes, we simply insert it to the header of Q. After 1
d
logR points
are inserted, we run the following refine process.
Refine:
Let p be the first point in Q. Let Sˆ = Φ.
while p is a point of Q do
Use our diameter algorithm to update Dˆp.
If p is dominated by current skyline Sˆ, remove p from Q.
If Sˆ intersects with p’s restricted zone, remove p from Q. Otherwise, insert p into Sˆ,
and remove any points in Sˆ which are dominated by p.
Continue with p equal to next point in Q.
Figure 3.16 shows an example of how refine works in two-dimension. Suppose after inserting




























Figure 3.16 Example of Restricted Zones and How Refine Works in
Two-Dimension
When the refine starts, p1 is inserted into Sˆ. Since p2 is dominated by Sˆ, p2 is removed from
Q. Also, p3 is removed from Q because Sˆ intersects with Zp3 . Then p4 is inserted into Sˆ and p1
is removed. Similarly, p5 is removed from Q, and p6 is inserted into Sˆ. Notice that compared
with the newer points, the width of Zp6 doubles since now Dˆp6 is larger. p7 is removed from
Q because Sˆ intersects with Zp7 . Finally, after refine process, Q = {p1, p4, p6}, and Sˆ is the
skyline decided by p4 and p6, although the real skyline S contains p4 p5, p6 and p7.
After refine, we have the following facts.
Fact 1. Sˆp is dominated by Sp.
Fact 2. For any pair of points p and q in Q, suppose q is newer than p. Then either Zq ⊆ Zp
or Zq ∩ Zp = Φ.
Proof. Let Zp(i) = [bp(i)wp cwp, (b
p(i)
wp
c+ 1)wp) be the expansion of Zp in dimension i (1 ≤ i ≤ d).
Let Zq(i) = [b q(i)wq cwq, (b
q(i)
wq
c + 1)wq) be the expansion of Zq in dimension i (1 ≤ i ≤ d). We
prove that in each dimension i, either
Zp(i) ∩ Zq(i) = Φ, (3.44)
or
Zq(i) ⊆ Zp(i). (3.45)
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Since q is newer than p, then Dˆp ≥ Dˆq. Therefore, wp ≥ wq. Furthermore, since wpwq =
2blog Dˆpc−blog Dˆqc, wpwq can only equal 2
x, where x is a non-negative integer. Then in dimension
i, we have the following 3 cases.












Since both sides in inequality (3.46) are integers, we get
bq(i)
wq












Therefore, Zp(i) ∩ Zq(i) = Φ.
Case 2: bp(i)wp cwp ≤ b
q(i)
wq









Since both sides in inequality (3.49) are integers, we get
bq(i)
wq












Therefore, Zq(i) ⊆ Zp(i).




Obviously we get Zp(i) ∩ Zq(i) = Φ.
Therefore, either Zq ⊆ Zp or Zq ∩ Zp = Φ.
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Fact 3. After refinement, for any two points p and q in Q, their restricted zones have no
overlap, i.e., Zp ∩ Zq = Φ.
Proof. Suppose before refinement, there are two points p and q in Q, which restricted zones
have overlap. Without loss of generality, suppose q is newer than p. From Fact 2, we know
that q’s restricted zone is included in p’s restricted zone. Our refinement will remove point
p if q is still in Q. Therefore, after refinement, any two points in Q have no overlap in their
restricted zones.
Now we prove the correctness of our algorithm, and give the space requirement. We set
the design of an efficient data structure for our algorithm as our future work.
Theorem 9. Our algorithm can maintain -approximate skyline estimation over sliding win-




Obviously, estimation error is introduced only in refine process when a point p is removed
from Q, while p is actually on the skyline S. However, the error is bounded in our algorithm.










Let D(Zp) be the diameter of Zp, then
D(Zp) =
√
d · wp ≤ Dp. (3.53)
For any point q ∈ S, it is removed if and only if Sˆp intersects with Zq. Therefore, the distance
from p to Sˆp is at most D(Zp) which is no more than Dp.
With the sliding of current window, before p expires, if Sˆp does not dominate p, it tends
to be closer to p. Therefore, the error distance from p to Sˆp never exceeds Dp.
Space Requirement:
Let p be the first point and D0 be the minimum distance between any pair of points














Figure 3.17 Example Virtual Zones in Two-Dimension
i = 1, 2, · · · , dlog√dRe. Since R is the ratio between the largest distance and the smallest
distance of a pair of points, then all points in the data stream are included in the largest




dReD0. Figure 3.17 shows an example of such a set of zones in











Let Va(i) be the volume of the virtual zone with width
√
d2iD0. Let Vb(i) be the volume of
the restricted zone with width 1√
d










Any point which restricted zone’s width is 1√
d




2i+1D0. From Fact 3, after refinement, any two points’ restricted zones cannot have
overlap. Therefore, the number of points which restricted zone’s width is 1√
d



















dRe = O( 1
d
logR). (3.58)
Here we provide a lower bound of space requirement to maintain -approximate skyline
estimation over sliding windows.
Theorem 10. The lower bound of space requirement to maintain -approximate skyline esti-
mation over sliding windows is Ω( 1
d−1 log R).
Proof. We construct a special case to show that the lower bound of space requirement to
maintain -approximate skyline estimation over sliding windows is Ω( 1
d−1 log R). Let p and q
be the pair of points which have the minimum distance D0, and hence the maximum distance




 (1 + )D0 + δ, · · · , 1 (1 + )iD0 + iδ, · · · , until the radius reaches 1√dRD0 . Here δ is a
infinitely small quantity. It is guaranteed that the maximum distance of a pair of points is
RD0. On each surface si, we evenly distribute O( 1d ) points. Obviously, all these points in
the same surface do not dominate each other. These points are placed carefully so that the
distance of any point to the skyline by other points are at least (1 + )iD0 + δ. Suppose p is
the newest point and the points on surface si become older with the increase of i. Therefore,
all these points must be kept to guarantee -approximate. There are total O(log R) surfaces,
and each surface has O( 1




















Figure 3.18 Example Virtual Zones in Two-Dimension
3.3.5 Conclusions
In this research, we addressed several -approximate geometric estimation problems in data
streams over sliding windows. We proposed a diameter approximate algorithm which only uses
O((1 )
d+1
2 logR) space, and the worst running time to process a new point is O((1 )
d−1
2 ). We
proved that our diameter algorithm can be applied to estimate convex hull over sliding windows.
Finally, we studied the skyline estimation problem over sliding windows, and proposed a novel
algorithm which uses O( 1
d
logR) space. A lower bound of this problem is provided. In the
future, we will continue to study the geometric estimation problems over sliding windows.
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CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH IN ATTACK ATTRIBUTION PART II:
TRACEBACK TECHNIQUES
4.1 Stepping Stone Attack Attribution
4.1.1 Introduction
The number of network based attacks is growing because attackers can very easily hide
their identities, and thereby reduce the chance of being captured and punished. It has become
difficult and complicated to discover the true identity of attackers when they relay their attacks
through stepping stones (intermediary hosts). The attack flow from the origin of the attack
may travel through a chain of stepping stones before it reaches the victim. It is difficult for
the victim to learn anything about where the attack comes from except that she can see the
attack traffic from the last hop of the stepping stone chains. Therefore, it is desirable to design
effective and efficient stepping stone attack detection schemes to attribute the attackers.
Several approaches have been designed to detect stepping stone attacks [23, 39, 98, 100,
106, 107, 108, 113, 119]. If the contents in the connections in the network are plain-text (i.e.
unencrypted), it may be used to trace back to the origin of the attacker. Staniford-Chen and
Heberlein [98] used thumbprints which are short summaries of the contents of a connection.
The thumbprints can be compared to determine whether two connections contain the same
text and are therefore likely to be part of the same connection chain. Wang et al. [108]
injected detectable watermarks into the unencrypted traffic echoed back to the attacker, so
that the attack can be traced back. For encrypted stepping stone connections, content based
approaches cannot work any more. Neither do packet-size based approaches, if all packets are
padded to the same size. Zhang and Paxson [119] proposed the first timing-based method which
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only uses the packets’ arrival time information. After that, several timing-based approaches
were proposed [23, 39, 100, 106, 107, 113]. However, the attacker still can conceal its identity
by destroying the time correlation between stepping stone connections. None of the current
methods can effectively defend against delay and chaff perturbations simultaneously.
In this research, we discuss two different scenarios when delay and chaff perturbations
exist, and propose three schemes [118]. We provide the upper bounds on the number of
packets required to confidently detect stepping stone connections from non-stepping stone
connections with any given probability of false attribution. We compare our schemes with
previous approaches, and experimental results show that our schemes are more effective in
these two scenarios.
4.1.2 Problem Definition
To avoid detection, an attacker may attack the victim using an encrypted link through
several stepping stones, where the encrypted attack packets may show different contents among
stepping stones while being padded to the same size. This indicates that one cannot use packet
contents or packet sizes to detect and identify the attacker.
Several approaches have been proposed which only use the timing information. However,
the attacker may evade detection by perturbing the timing information. It may introduce
random delay before each packet departs from a stepping stone, or insert superfluous packets
as chaff into the original attack flow on a stepping stone. In this research, we mainly consider
two scenarios on stepping stone attribution problem:
Scenario 1: Only delay perturbation is introduced and no chaff perturbation exists.
Scenario 2: Delay and chaff perturbations exist simultaneously.
Not only can the attacker introduce delay and chaff perturbations, but the network itself
may produce such perturbations. When packets travel through the network, the propagation
delay of these packets is unavoidable. In anonymous networks, it is common that the attack
connection is captured somewhere with several other connections which cannot be differentiated
from the attack flow. Then these normal connections can seem to be as chaff to the attack
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Table 4.1 Previous Schemes’ Assumptions
Scheme 1 2 3 4
ON/OFF Yes No – Yes
Deviation No No – Yes
IPD No No – Yes
Watermark No Yes – Yes
State-Space Yes No – Yes
Multiscale Yes Yes Yes Yes
Detect-Attacks & Detect-Attacks-Chaff Yes Yes Yes Yes
flow. Therefore, the delay and chaff perturbations introduced to the attack flow may have two
sources: one is the attacker, and the other is the network itself. No matter where the delay
and chaff perturbations come from, we propose our solutions under the following assumptions:
1) The skew between the clocks of hosts where packets are captured is known.1
2) The total delay must be in the range of [0, ∆), where ∆ is the maximum probable
delay2.
3) The chaff perturbation is independent with the original flow.
4) No original packet is dropped, which means that each original packet will appear in both
sides of the stepping stone connection.
Table 4.1 shows previous schemes’ assumptions together, where ‘–’ means that these schemes
do not consider the scenario of chaff perturbation.
4.1.3 Our Schemes
To simplify the description of our schemes, let flow A denote the flow which contains only
the original packets, and flow B denote a flow captured in the network. Flow B may be
unrelated to flow A, or a related flow which contains all the original packets with or without
chaff perturbation. Considering flows A and B in a stepping stone connection chain, our
knowledge of the directional information between A and B has three possibilities:
1The hosts’ clocks are different from each other. For simplicity, we assume the skew between different clocks
is known such that we can compare the packets’ timestamps from different hosts.
2In fact, the delay should be in the range of [∆min, ∆max), where ∆min is the minimum probable delay and
∆max is the maximum probable delay and 0 ≤ ∆min < ∆max < ∞. For instance, if the two flows are linked
through a satellite, ∆min may be more than 1 second. However, we can change the delay range to [0, ∆) by
skewing one flow left or right by ∆min, and setting ∆ = ∆max−∆min. To simplify the analysis in this research,
we use the delay range [0, ∆) instead of [∆min, ∆max).
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1) A can only be an upstream flow of B;
2) A can only be a downstream flow of B;
3) A can be either B’ upstream or downstream flow.
Sometimes we know the directional information. For instance, if flow A is the attack flow
received by the victim, then B can only be A’s upstream flow if they are correlated. If flow
A is the response flow sent by the victim, then B can only be the downstream flow of A if
they are correlated. However, if we do not know much about the causality of links, we have
to consider both possibilities of flows sequence. To simplify the description of our schemes, we
suppose that we have enough information that flow A has to be B’s upstream flow if they are
in a stepping stone connection chain. We expand our schemes to the other two cases later in
this section.
4.1.3.1 Scheme S-I (for Scenario 1)
According to the assumption that maximum probable delay is bounded, each original packet
i in flow A with arrival time ui must have a corresponding packet in flow B within [ui, ui+∆).
In our scheme, we use ∆′ to estimate ∆, because ∆ may not be known by our scheme, and ∆′
should be no less than ∆.
Scheme Description:
First, we set ∆′ using foreknowledge. For the first observed original packet in flow A with
arrival time u1, we select the first arrival packet after u1 in flow B as its corresponding packet.
After the first corresponding packet is determined, each following original packet’s correspond-
ing packet is the successor of the previous original packet’s corresponding packet. We observe
whether all original packets’ corresponding packets are in their probable arrival time range. If
so, report CORRELATED and terminate. Otherwise, we repeat the observation with deferring
each original packet’s corresponding packet to the next one until we report CORRELATED,
or until the arrival time difference between an original packet and its corresponding packet is
larger than ∆′ and we report UNCORRELATED.
In this scenario, if ∆′ ≥ ∆, the false negative rate of scheme S-I is 0%. Now we provide
90
a tight bound on the number of original packets that are required to be observed to achieve
any given bounded false positives. Blum et al. [23] provide the upper bounds of their schemes.
They first analyze the bounds by assuming that any normal flow can be modeled as a Poisson
process with fixed Poisson rate. They then relax this assumption by assuming that any normal
process can be modeled as a sequence of Poisson processes with varying rates and over varying
time periods. In our analysis, we follow their steps and derive the expression of a tight bound.
We must point out that the importance of the bound is not on the detailed value, but on
the limits of the ability of attackers to evade detection by simply introducing delay and chaff
perturbations.
We first assume all connections behave as Poisson processes and then generalize the as-
sumption as Blum et al. do. Suppose original flow A and the other flow B are two unrelated
flows with fixed Poisson rate λA and λB respectively. We begin to observe from time 0 and
observe n packets in original flow A. Let u1, u2, · · · , un denote each original packet’s arrival
time in flow A. Then the probability function of these n packets arrival times is:
f(u1, · · ·un) = λ
n
Ae
−λAun , if un ≥ · · · ≥ u1 ≥ 0 (4.1a)
0, otherwise. (4.1b)
Let v1 be the first packet’s arrival time after u1 in flow B, and v2, v3, · · · , vm be the following
packets’ arrival times. Then the conditional probability function of these m packets arrival
time on u1, · · · , un is:
f(v1, · · · , vm|u1, · · · , un) = λ
m
B e
−λB(vm−u1), if vm ≥ · · · ≥ v1 ≥ u1 ≥ 0 (4.2a)
0, otherwise. (4.2b)
Therefore we can obtain the joint probability function of u1, · · · , un, v1, · · · , vm:
f(u1, · · · , un, v1, · · · , vm)
= f(v1, · · · , vm|u1, · · · , un)f(u1, · · · , un). (4.3)
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Let Zn denote the event that an unrelated flow is reported correlated by our scheme when







f(u1, · · · , un, v1, · · · , v∞)






f(u1, · · · , un, v1, · · · , v2n−1)












0 ≤ u1 ≤ · · · ≤ un <∞
u1 ≤ v1 ≤ · · · ≤ v2n−1 <∞
u1 ≤ vi ≤ u1 + ∆′
· · ·
un ≤ vn+i ≤ un + ∆′

(4.6)
is the integral field when the ith packet after u1 in flow B is selected as the first original packet’s
corresponding packet.
It is clear that the false positive rate decreases as the number of original packets we observe
increases. For any given false positives, we may calculate the bound of the needed number
of packets. Furthermore, we can prove that the bound of S-I is tighter than that of Detect-
Attacks[23], which means S-I needs less packets than Detect-Attacks to achieve the same false
positive rate.
Although it is difficult to calculate the bound using above formulas, we simulate S-I over
millions of Poisson flows and obtain a computer simulated bound shown in Figure 4.1(a) when
false positive rate is set to 1%. We make the following observations:
• For a given λA and ∆′, the maximum bound occurs when λB ≈ λA.
• For a given λA and λB , the bound increases quickly with the increase of ∆′.
92
• When λA∆′ ≤ 7.5, using less than 50 packets can achieve 1% false positive rate.
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(b) Bound of S-II when False Positive Rate is set to
1%
Figure 4.1 Bounds of S-I and S-II
4.1.3.2 Scheme S-II (for Scenario 2)
Scheme Description:
First, we set ∆′ using foreknowledge. For each original packet i in flow A with arrival time
ti, we select the first arrival packet in the range [ti, ti + ∆′) in flow B as its corresponding
packet. If the packet has been selected by the previous original packet, select the first unselected
packet. If we cannot select a corresponding packet in flow B for an original packet in flow A,
we report UNCORRELATED. Otherwise, we report CORRELATED.
Let vi be the arrival time of the ith original packet’s corresponding packet in flow B. Then
v1 only depends on u1, and vi only depends on vi−1 and ui when i ≥ 1, so
f(v1|u1) =
 λBe







−λB(vi−ui), if vi ≥ ui ≥ vi−1 (4.8a)
λBe
−λB(vi−vi−1), if vi > vi−1 > ui (4.8b)
0, otherwise. (4.8c)
We then obtain the joint probability function of u1, · · · , un, v1, · · · , vn:
f(u1, · · · , un, v1, · · · , vn)
= f(v1, · · · , vn|u1, · · · , un)f(u1, · · · , un) (4.9)
= f(vn|un, vn−1)f(vn−1|un−1, vn−2) · · · f(v2|u2, v1)
f(v1|u1)f(u1, · · · , un). (4.10)
Let Zn denote the event that an unrelated flow is reported correlated by our scheme when









0 ≤ u1 ≤ · · · ≤ un <∞
v1 ≤ · · · ≤ vn <∞
u1 ≤ v1 ≤ u1 + ∆′
· · ·
un ≤ vn ≤ un + ∆′

(4.12)
is the integral field.
Besides this tight bound on the number of original packets needed, we may also provide a
loose bound:
Theorem 11.
P (Zn) ≤ (1− e−λB∆′)n, for n ≥ 1. (4.13)
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Proof. We use mathematical induction to prove this theorem. First,
P (Z1) = 1− e−λB∆′ . (4.14)
Suppose that for i ≥ 1,
P (Zi) ≤ (1− e−λB∆′)i, (4.15)
then
P (Zi+1) ≤ P (Zi) · P (at least one packet appears within
[ui+1, ui+1 + ∆′) in flow B|Zi) (4.16)
≤ (1− e−λB∆′)i(1− e−λB∆′) (4.17)
= (1− e−λB∆′)i+1. (4.18)
When we observe log
1−e−λB∆′ δ packets, the false positive rate is at most δ.
We simulate S-II on millions of Poisson flows generated by computer and get a computer
simulated bound shown in Figure 4.1(b) when false positive rate is set to 1%. We make the
following observations:
• For a given λA and ∆′, the bound increases quickly with the increase of λB .
• For a given λA and λB , the bound increases quickly with the increase of ∆′.
• For a given λB and ∆′, the bound decreases with the increase of λA.
4.1.3.3 Scheme S-III (for Scenario 2)
Though the scheme S-II is simple enough, it requires that ∆′ ≥ ∆. If our foreknowledge
cannot tell us what ∆ should be, we have to set ∆′ to a large ‘safe’ value, for instance, 100
seconds. However, according to our analysis on the bound of number of needed packets, as
∆′ increases, the needed number of packets increases quickly, which means that for a given
number of packets, the false positives rise with the increase of ∆′.
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Here we propose a scheme to reduce false positives when the number of original packets is
limited and ∆′ is large. According to the probable delay bound, each packet of the original flow
has a limited number of probable candidate packets in the other flow. That is, for an original
packet i with arrival time ui, only packets whose arrival times are in the range [ui, ui + ∆) on
the other flow have the possibility to be the corresponding packet. Since the number of the
original packets in flow A is limited, and each packet’s number of candidates in flow B is also
limited, we may reconstruct a limited number of probable flows from flow B with the same
number of packets as the original flow A. The real corresponding flow of the reconstructed ones
must be one of them. However, our goal is not to try and find the real corresponding flow, but
to conclude whether the two flows are correlated or not. We then calculate the correlation of
each probable flow with the original flow A using a certain correlation criterion, and use the
largest correlation value to make the final decision.
Scheme Description:
First, we use Scheme S-II on the two flows and get a report. If it is reported uncorrelated,
we return UNCORRELATED. Otherwise, we find all probable corresponding flows and choose
a certain criterion to compute the correlation value between these two flows. We then make a
decision.
This scheme is quite time consuming. Let n denote the total packets number in original
flow A, and ni denote the number of candidate packets for each original packet i. Let N be





which is unacceptable in most cases. Therefore, for certain criteria, we hope to find some fast
solutions.
We find that when we choose deviation as the criterion, we may construct a fast solution
which reduces the number of probable corresponding flows required to calculate correlation
to no more than
∑n
i=1 ni. Let v
(j)
i denote the ith corresponding packet’s arrival time in
the jth probable corresponding flow. Then the deviation between flow A and the probable
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(v(j)i − ui)− min1≤i≤n(v
(j)
i − ui), (4.20)





1 For each original packet i in flow A with arrival time ui, we select the first arrival packet in the range [ui,
ui + ∆
′) in flow B as its corresponding packet. If the packet has been selected by the previous original
packet, then select the first unselected packet. This obtains the initial probable corresponding flow.
2 We search the original packet which has the minimum arrival time difference from its corresponding packet.
This original packet updates its corresponding packet and selects the next packet in the flow. If the new
corresponding packet to be selected has been selected by the next original packet, the next original packet
in the flow needs to update its corresponding packet to the next one, and so on. We then obtain a new
probable corresponding flow.
3 Repeat Step 2 until one of the original packets cannot select a corresponding packet.
Using the fast solution, we obtain a series of probable corresponding flows which are about∑n
i=1 ni. Furthermore, because each selected probable corresponding flow differs from the
previous one with only 1 or several packets, then dev(j) can be derived from dev(j−1) easily. It
can be proved that this fast solution achieves the same performance as the original scheme for
the deviation criterion.
Theorem 12. If deviation is chosen to be the correlation criterion, the fast solution achieves
the same performance as the original scheme.
Proof. Let u1, u2, · · · , un be the original packets arrival time of flow A, w1, w2, · · · , wm be the
packets arrival time of flow B, and v1, v2, · · · , vn be the packets’ arrival time of the correspond-
ing flow which achieves the minimum deviation. According to the deviation definition, if the
minimum gap min1≤i≤n(vi − ui) = wk − uj , which means that the minimum gap is achieved
by the pair of original and corresponding packet (uj , wk), then the corresponding flow with
3We provide the definition of deviation here because it is slightly different with that in [113].
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the minimum deviation must exactly be the flow that each original packet i chooses the first
appeared packet in the range [ui+wk−uj , ui+∆) which has not been chosen by its predecessor.
The fast solution traverses all the probable combination of the pair of packets (uj , wk) with
minimum gap, so it really achieves the corresponding flow with the minimum deviation.
4.1.3.4 Complexity Analysis
Suppose we observe n packets in flow A and m packets in flow B. In the worst case of
scheme S-I, the first packet in A has up to m candidate packets, so we must check such many
rounds. In each round, we must check up to n packet pairs. Therefore the time complexity in
the worst case is O(n ·m). For fast solution of S-III, directly from what we discussed before,
the time complexity is also O(n · m). However, both schemes normally have much better
performance than their worst cases. For S-II, we need to select the corresponding packets
among m packets in flow B, and each packet in B only needs to be checked once. Therefore
the time complexity in the worst case is O(m).
4.1.3.5 Directional Information Discussion
In the above description of our schemes, we assume that we know the directional information
of case 1 that the original flow A has to be B’s upstream flow if they are in a stepping stone
connection chain. It is very simple to expand our schemes to the other two cases. In case 2
that we can confirm A is a downstream flow of B, we just simply add ∆′ to the arrival time of
each packet in flow B, and then execute the same schemes. In case 3 that we cannot confirm
the direction between A and B, we simply run the schemes two times, one with directional
information of case 1, the other with directional information of case 2. If both of the results
are UNCORRELATED, we report UNCORRELATED. Otherwise, we report CORRELATED.
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Detect-Attacks & ∆ 20s
Detect-Attacks-Chaff δ 0.01
S-I, S-II & S-III ∆′ 30s
S-III Threshold 6s
4.1.4 Experimental Evaluation
To make comparison, we implement the following six approaches: ON/OFF [119], Deviation
[113], IPD [107], State-Space [100], Multiscale [39] and Detect-Attacks/Detect-Attacks-Chaff 4
[23]. We do not compare these passive schemes with Watermark which is the only active
approach. We compare these six present schemes with scheme S-I in Scenario 1, and with
schemes S-II and S-III in Scenario 2.
We list the values of all used parameters of these nine approaches in Table 4.2. These
values are the original values used by the authors or typical values if the authors do not clearly
indicate. We omit the meaning of these parameters which may be found in their original papers.
Table 4.2 also shows that S-I and S-II have the smallest number of control parameters, so
they can be easily implemented. In contrast, ON/OFF has five control parameters, and it is
hard to train and test whether they are set to the optimum values.
In our experiments, we use the data set of Auckland-IV traces in NLANR PMA Daily
Traces Archive [2]. We extract 293 Telnet/SSH flows which have more than 1000 packets,
4Detect-Attacks is used in experiments for Scenario 1, and Detect-Attacks-Chaff is used in experiments for
Scenario 2.
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and totally 1.3 million packets. These flows’ packet rate distribution is shown in Figure 4.2.
However, most of these flows are not overlapped, and therefore any scheme with Assumption
1 can get high score, which is unfair to other schemes. Therefore, in our experiments, we
randomly adjust the flows’ start time such that they always overlap. Furthermore, in all our
experiments, we only consider such pairs of test flows that the one seemed as original flow A
is totally covered by the other one. We have also built a stepping stone attack attribution
test-bed environment consisting of 40 machines and developed an automated interactive traffic
(Telnet, SSH, etc.) generator [111]. We modified telnetd and sshd source code so that they
can introduce random delay and chaff perturbations with various controllable distributions


















Figure 4.2 Packet Rate Distribution
4.1.4.1 Experiments Set 1
This set of experiments is designed to answer the following questions:
1) How effectively can different schemes detect stepping stones in Scenario 1 with different
delay perturbations added?
2) How effectively can different schemes detect stepping stones in Scenario 2 with different
chaff perturbations added?
For scenario 1, we add uniform distributed delay to each original flow and get 293 delayed
































































(b) False Positive Rate
Figure 4.3 Scenario 1 with Different Delay Perturbations
Thus we get 293 stepping stone connection pairs and 66, 140 non-stepping stone connection
pairs. We consider 10 different kinds of uniform delays, and their maximum delays increase
from 2 seconds to 20 seconds with a step of 2 seconds. To avoid the influence of different packets
number of flows, each scheme must return its result after they receive 250 original packets.
Figure 4.3 shows the false negative rates and false positive rates of these seven approaches. We
make the following observations:
• Only Detect-Attacks and S-I can detect all stepping stone attacks. However, the false positive rate
of Detect-Attacks is much higher than that of S-I. The reason is that S-I has a tighter bound than
Detect-Attacks.
• Using only 250 packets, S-I can achieve as low as 0.82% false positive rate even when the maximum delay
is 20 seconds.
To simulate Scenario 2 that delay and chaff perturbations exist simultaneously, we first add
uniform distributed delay with maximum of 10 seconds. We then generate Poisson distributed
chaff with packet rate 0.5 packet/s, 1 packet/s, ..., 4 packet/s. For each scheme, 1000 original
packets are used. Figure 4.4 shows the false negative rates and false positive rates of these
eight approaches. We make the following observations:
• Only S-II and S-III can detect all stepping stone attacks. S-III is a bit better than S-II.
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(b) False Positive Rate
Figure 4.4 Scenario 2 with Different Chaff
• Detect-Attacks-Chaff totally loses detecting ability. The reason is that the added chaff perturbation
exceeds its detection bound.
• The false positive rates of S-II and S-III increase with the packet rate of chaff, which complies our
previous analysis. They need more original packets to achieve arbitrary low false positives when chaff
perturbation is heavy.
4.1.4.2 Experiments Set 2
This set of experiments is designed to answer the following questions:
1) How effectively can different schemes detect stepping stones in Scenario 1 with different
number of available original packets?
2) How effectively can different schemes detect stepping stones in Scenario 2 with different
number of available original packets?
For scenario 1, we add uniform distributed delay with maximum of 10 seconds. The number
of available packets increases from 50 to 1000. Figure 4.5 shows the false negative rates and
false positive rates of these seven schemes. We make the following observations:
• Deviation, Detect-Attacks and S-I can detect all stepping stone attacks. However, the false positive rates
of Deviation and Detect-Attacks are higher than that of S-I.
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Figure 4.6 Scenario 2 with Different Number of Original Packets
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To simulate Scenario 2 that delay and chaff perturbations exist simultaneously, we use the
real flows as the source of chaff perturbation. We chose the longest 30 flows from these 293
original flows. We combine one of the residual 263 flows with one of these 30 flows together and
get 263× 30 = 7, 890 combined flows. We then add uniform distributed delay with maximum
of 10 seconds to these combined flows. We calculate the correlation between each original flow
and each combined flow. In these combined flows, the packets from one of the 30 flows may be
seemed as chaff perturbation to the other flow. We finally get 7, 890 stepping stone connection
pairs and 1, 649, 870 non-stepping stone connection pairs. Figure 4.6 show the false negative
rates and false positive rates of these eight approaches. We make the following observations:
• Only S-II and S-III can detect all stepping stone attacks. The false positive rates of S-II and S-III
totally overlap in Figure 4.6(b). It means that when used in real flows, S-II is good enough and we need
not to use S-III which is more time consuming.
• Detect-Attacks-Chaff totally loses detecting ability.
• Multiscale can achieve 10% false negative rate when using more than 500 packets. However, its false
positive rate is about 40%.
• S-II and S-III can achieve about 1% false positive rate using 1000 packets.
4.1.5 Conclusion
Network based attackers often launch attacks through stepping stones to evade detection,
who also make detection even more difficult by encrypting attack traffic and introducing delay
and chaff perturbations. Several approaches have been proposed to detect stepping stone
attacks. However, none of them performs effectively when delay and chaff perturbations exist
simultaneously.
In this research, we discuss two different stepping stones scenarios and proposed three
schemes to attribute stepping stone attacks. Two of the three schemes can effectively detect
stepping stones even when delay and chaff perturbations exist simultaneously. We analyze
our schemes and provide the bounds on the number of packets needed to confidently detect
stepping stone connections from non-stepping stone connections with any given probability of
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false attribution. We compare our schemes with previous ones and experiments show that our
schemes are more effective in detecting stepping stones in the two scenarios.
Our mathematical analysis and experimental results show that although the attackers can
make detection more complicated by introducing delay and chaff perturbations, if the attack
connections are long enough, they cannot evade detection only by introducing limited and
independent delay and chaff perturbations. Attackers may be forced to introduce dependent
delay and chaff perturbations, and reduce the number of attack packets. As a next step, we
are continuing the research on attributing stepping stone attacks with message merge and split
[112].
4.2 Topology-aware Single Packet Attack Traceback
4.2.1 Introduction
With the phenomenal growth of the Internet, more and more people enjoy and depend
on the convenience of its provided services. Unfortunately, the number of network-based at-
tacks is also increasing very quickly. The consequences are serious and, increasingly, financial
disastrous, but ironically, only few of the attackers have been captured and thereby punished
because of the stateless nature of the Internet. Network-based attackers can easily hide their
identities through IP spoofing, stepping stones, network address translators (NATs), Mobile IP
or other ways, and thereby reduce the chance of being captured. The current IP network infras-
tructure lacks measures which can effectively deter and identify motivated and well-equipped
attackers. As a result, due to the lack of effective attack attribution techniques and concerns
for negative publicity, the percentage of organizations reporting computer intrusions to law
enforcement has continued its multi-year decline [52]. Therefore, it is desirable to design ef-
fective and efficient IP traceback systems to attribute attackers and help to reconstruct cyber
crime scenes.
Building systems that can reliably trace attack packets back to their real origins in the
current IP networks is a first and important step in making cyber criminals accountable. There
are many forms of network-based attacks. While the most-widely reported DDoS attacks
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are conducted by flooding networks with large amounts of traffic, there are network-based
attacks that require significantly smaller packet flows. Some attacks (e.g., Teardrop) can even
succeed by using only one well-targeted packet. In building such traceback systems, there are
a number of significant challenges including which packets to trace, how to trace long-lifetime5
and short-lifetime6 attacks, and how to minimize router processing overhead and storage space
requirements, while satisfying applications’ and network users’ privacy requirements.
Several IP traceback schemes have been designed to attribute the origin of IP packets
through the Internet. We roughly categorize them into four primary classes: (i) Active Prob-
ing [25, 99], (ii) ICMP Traceback [21, 71, 110], (iii) Packet Marking (including deterministic,
probabilistic, and algebraic packet marking) [20, 36, 85, 93, 96], and d) Log-based Traceback
[66, 74, 94, 95]. The IP traceback systems built atop of approaches of Active Probing, ICMP
traceback and Packet Marking usually require a sufficiently large set of attack packets to
make traceback possible, which are not effective to traceback short-lifetime or single packet
attacks. Log-based traceback schemes seem suitable to attribute individual packet to its origin.
However, several log-based methods such as [74] require recording the entire network traffic for
future attack traceback. Obviously, such methods have overly high storage space requirements,
which make them impractical to be used for current high-speed IP networks, especially those
with heavy traffic.
Thereafter, to address the problem of log-based IP traceback systems’ overly large stor-
age space requirement, two IP traceback systems [94, 95] were designed using Bloom filters
[22], a space-efficient data structure for representing a set of elements to respond member-
ship queries. However, although Bloom filters are space-efficient data structures in responding
membership queries, they have inherent unavoidable collisions which produce false positives,
and thus restrain the effectiveness of these systems.
In this research, we propose a Bloom filter-based topology-aware single packet IP traceback
system, namely TOPO, which utilizes router’s local topology information, i.e., its immediate
5By long-lifetime, we mean that there are a sufficiently large number of attack packets available for traceback
systems.
6By short-lifetime, we mean that there are a significantly smaller number of attack packets available for
traceback systems. Some attacks might only use a single packet.
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predecessor information, to traceback [114]. Our theoretical analysis and experimental evalu-
ation show that TOPO can significantly reduce the number and scope of unnecessary queries
and thus, significantly decrease the false attributions to innocent nodes.
Furthermore, we consider the practicability of Bloom filter-based IP traceback systems. In
some real world networks, it is difficult or even impossible to install an IP traceback system
on all the routers on the network. Therefore, partial deployment is an important and desired
property when designing and implementing IP traceback systems. We analyze and show that
TOPO is suitable to be partially deployed while maintaining its traceback capability.
Finally, we discuss an issue on utilizing Bloom filters which has never been studied. When
Bloom filters are applied in IP traceback systems, it is difficult to decide their optimal control
parameters a priori and thus achieve the lowest false positive rate. Based on our analytical
results, we design a k-adaptive mechanism to dynamically adjust parameters of Bloom filters
such that our IP traceback system can achieve the best performance in terms of false attribution
rates and storage space requirement.
4.2.2 Problems and Goals
4.2.2.1 Problems in Existing Traceback Schemes
To prevent the Internet from being attacked, it is desirable to design effective and efficient
IP traceback systems to attribute the attackers and help reconstruct cyber crime scenes. IP
traceback problem is to traceback the network path(s) the attack traverses and identify the real
attackers.
Active Probing, ICMP traceback and packet marking schemes are designed to traceback
those long-lifetime attacks, and they are not suitable to traceback single packet attacks or
short-lifetime attacks. SPIE is designed to trace the origin of a single IP packet delivered by
the network in the recent past. In SPIE, when an intrusion detection system (IDS) detects an
attack, it sends out a query message to SPIE. SPIE then dispatches the query message to the
relevant routers for processing. After a router receives a query about whether it has forwarded
a packet with a specific arrival time, it checks its Bloom filter for that time interval. If the result
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is ‘present’ in the Bloom filter, the router must continue to query all its upstream neighbors.
Consequently, there would be a lot of unnecessary queries sent to innocent routers. The
unnecessary queries force the routers to spend CPU time and other resources to respond, and
thus reduce the performance of their tasks as routers. Furthermore, these unnecessary queries
can introduce innocent nodes into the attack graph because of the unavoidable false positives
of Bloom filters, which in turn cause false attributions. Consequently, it is desirable to design
new mechanisms to control the unnecessary queries and thus reduce the false attributions to
innocent nodes.
For any proposed IP traceback systems, besides traceback effectiveness, practicability is
also an important and desired property in evaluating their system performance. In some real
world networks, it is difficult or even impossible to install Bloom filter-based IP traceback
systems, such as SPIE [95], PAS [94] and TOPO proposed in this research, on all routers.
Although some routers in these networks may easily install and activate a Bloom filter-based
IP traceback system, there are some routers such as core routers that are hardly to be updated
because of the high overhead involved or other administrative issues.
If a Bloom filter-based IP traceback system can be partially deployed without losing (or
compromising a little) traceback capability compared with the fully deployed system, then it
will have the following potential advantages:
• Low cost: Such a system may avoid wasting money and labor on updating routers which
are difficult and expensive to update. In addition, it is possible to reduce memory space
required by the whole traceback system [69].
• Flexibility: Such a system may be implemented on networks which have routers that are
impossible to be updated. Furthermore, it also provides flexibility to the administrator
who launches traceback or investigation of a particular attack. She may enable only a
portion of network routers and thereby avoid alerting the attacker.
Therefore, an IP traceback system which can be practically deployed should have the property
of partial deployment.
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Bloom Filters have been used in many network applications. In some applications, the
element number n that should be inserted is known a priori before the construction of Bloom
filters. For instance, Bloom filters are used to store a dictionary of unsuitable passwords for
security purposes, where the number of passwords is countable [97]. With the fixed element
number n, given any required false positive rate f and the memory size m, the optimal hash
function number k can be calculated by equation (2.2). However, in IP traceback systems,
the traffic volume that needs to be recorded varies significantly, especially when the network
is under attacks. This indicates that the packet number n is unknown a priori, when m and
k have to be decided in advance before traceback system is deployed. For different values of
n, there are different optimal values of k. Therefore, a Bloom filter-based IP traceback system
faces the problem of how to adaptively adjust parameter k to achieve a better false positive
rate.
4.2.2.2 System Model
We consider IP networks (the Internet) where TCP/IP architecture and protocols are being
used. An IP network consists of a number of host computers and network devices (e.g., routers
or switches), which are connected by physical links on which packets are forwarded. We make
the following assumptions in IP networks:
• Most routers are reliable.
• Some routers’ software and hardware can be updated.
4.2.2.3 Threat Model
With the phenomenal growth of Internet, more and more people enjoy and depend on
the convenience of its provided service. Meanwhile, the number of network-based attacks is
increasing very quickly. The reality is that only few of the attackers have been captured
and punished due to the stateless nature of the Internet and the readily available tools and
techniques on the Internet that are easily taken to conceal themselves from being discovered.
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It is well-documented that many attackers use spoofed IP source addresses in their attack
packets. As these packets traverse the Internet, little useful information is left for the victims
to identify their true origins. Some attackers also launch their attacks behind a chain of
compromised machines which are called “stepping stones”. Some attacks, such as SYN flood
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack, need to flood network links with large amounts of packets,
while there are other attacks which require significantly smaller packet flows. Furthermore,
some sophisticated attackers can start and finish their attacks using a single well-targeted
packet, such as LAND attack [3], Ping of Death attack [4] and Teardrop attack [5].
4.2.2.4 Problem Definition and Our Goals
In this research, we aim at designing a Bloom filter-based topology-aware single packet IP
traceback system, namely TOPO, to solve the problems discussed above. We set the following
as our goals in the design of TOPO:
1. To design a single packet IP traceback system which has fewer unnecessary query mes-
sages and fewer false attributions to innocent nodes.
2. To design a single packet IP traceback system which needs not to be fully deployed in
the entire network.
3. To design a mechanism which helps achieve the best performance of Bloom filters by
adaptively adjust parameter k.
4.2.3 System Description
In this subsection, we first introduce topology-aware IP traceback mechanism which is the
baseline idea of TOPO, and then discuss the partial deployment issue and the design of the
k-adaptive mechanism for dynamically adjusting parameters of Bloom filters to achieve better
performance.
4.2.3.1 Topology-aware IP Traceback
We first define three terminologies used in this research:
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• Packet Signature is defined as the information to identify individual packet from each
other.
• Packet Predecessor is defined as the immediate upstream neighbor which sends the
packet to the current router.
• Predecessor Identifier is defined as the information to identify the predecessor of a
packet from other upstream neighbors.
As we discussed above, we need to find a way to control the production of unnecessary
queries. This can be achieved if the routers have the ability to identify which upstream routers
should be queried and which else should not be queried. Therefore, if we can check not only
the presence of each packet but also the packet predecessor information, we can only query the
exact predecessor and thus significantly reduce the unnecessary queries. This requires that we
record not only the packet signature but the predecessor information.
An intuitive way to record packet predecessor information is to separate the incoming
packets into several Bloom filters, each of which only store the packets coming from a distinct
predecessor. Snoeren et al. [95] discussed that a router may maintain separate Bloom filters
for each of its input port, because different upstream neighbors typically use different input
ports. Although this complicates the query process, the input port isolation may reduce the
number of upstream neighbors that need to be queried. However, the number of predecessors
(or active ports) within a certain time interval is an unknown parameter: Most routers cannot
decide how many upstream neighbors will send packets to it within a time interval in a real
world network. Even though we may estimate the maximum probable number of predecessors,
another problem appears that how to divide the limited memory on the router for the Bloom
filters of individual predecessors. We do not know how many packets will be received from a
certain predecessor. As we learn from equation (2.1), the false positive rate of Bloom filters
depends on m/n. If we divide the memory equally, then the Bloom filter which a large amount
of packets are inserted into will have high false positive rate. Therefore, it is not an effective
and practical solution to divide the limited memory into several separate Bloom filters.
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Another way of recording predecessor information is to create a list for each bit which is
set to 1 in the Bloom filter. This list is used to record all the predecessors which have set this
bit. With these lists, the presence of a packet is that all the k corresponding bits are set to 1,
and there is at least one common predecessor which appears on all the k corresponding lists.
However, the extra lists will consume a lot of memory, and thus degrade the Bloom filter’s
performance or increase the system memory requirement.
We propose that the router still only maintains one Bloom filter at a time. The Bloom
filter not only keeps the packet signature, but also the predecessor identifier. The predecessor
identifier can be hashed into the Bloom filter with the packet signature together. Such an
operation really can record the topology information without increasing false positive rate or
requiring larger memory space.
Now we introduce TOPO which is based on the above idea. TOPO is constructed on
some special routers which are equipped with Bloom filters, and we call them TOPO-equipped
routers. When a packet travels through the network where TOPO is deployed, no matter
whether it is an attack packet or not, the TOPO-equipped routers on its path record the
packet signature and predecessor information. If an attack packet is identified by the victim,
the victim’s address, packet signature, and packet arrival time, are reported to TOPO as a
traceback request. TOPO then begins traceback by sending a query message to the TOPO-
equipped router responsible for the region containing the victim. This router then checks its
record and continues to query other TOPO-equipped routers if necessary. Finally, all responses
from queried TOPO-equipped routers are gathered by TOPO to generate the attack graph.
The attack graph is used for further analysis and corresponding actions.
We show the details of TOPO-equipped router’s behaviors when it records a packet and
responds a query in Figure 4.7 and 4.8 respectively.7
Record a Packet
• When a TOPO-equipped router receives a packet, it first extracts the packet signature
7We do not discuss the topic of malicious behaviors of compromised routers, which is beyond the scope of
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Figure 4.8 Router’s Behaviors when Receiving a Query Message
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and predecessor identifier.
• The predecessor identifier is inserted into an extra predecessor list if the predecessor has
not been inserted before.
• The router calculates the k hash values of the combination of packet signature and
predecessor identifier, and inserts them into its Bloom filter by setting the corresponding
bits to 1.
• At the end of the anticipated time interval, the current Bloom filter and the predecessor
list are archived by flushing the oldest ones, and a new Bloom filter and predecessor list
start.
Respond a Query
• When a TOPO-equipped router receives a query message, it first retrieves the Bloom
filter and the predecessor list for the relevant time interval using the given attack packet
arrival time in the query message.
• Each predecessor identifier on the list is combined with the packet signature provided by
the query message, and the combination is hashed using the same k hash functions to
check if it is present in the Bloom filter.
• The router will respond the query that it forwarded this packet before if there is at least
one presence found. If so, it only continues to query the predecessor(s) which is (are)
present in the Bloom filter.
For a router which is not TOPO-equipped, when receiving a packet, it just simply forwards
it to the next hop in the path; when receiving a query message, it simply forwards it to all of
its upstream neighbors.
4.2.3.2 Partial Deployment
Ideally we can equip TOPO on all routers on the network, and thus can trace back single
packet effectively. However, many legacy routers cannot be updated, or there is no enough
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money to update all routers. Therefore, with resource and policy restriction, in most cases we
have to partially deploy an IP trace back system. One simple partial deployment mechanism
is that Bloom filter-based IP traceback system is only installed on edge routers and all internal
routers remain unchanged. Under such architecture, all edge routers will be queried for any
traceback request. Therefore all innocent end nodes have the possibility to be considered
attackers, and thus introduce more false positives. Furthermore, there are two other drawbacks
using such a partial deployment mechanism. First, the victim cannot get a full attack graph;
second, the query burden on each edge router might be very heavy. Therefore, it is necessary
to deploy Bloom filters at least on part of internal routers if the full attack graph is desired or
traceback requests are frequently delivered.
To partially deploy TOPO, we need to find a way to select particular routers to equip
TOPO to achieve the highest traceback performance with the lowest cost. We call it TOPO-
equipped routers placement problem. Actually, this problem should be solved as an optimization
problem. For instance, given the network map, the network traffic information, the distribution
of attacks, and the costs of updating routers to TOPO-equipped, we optimize the traceback
system with respect to the total cost and traceback performance (i.e., a combination of cost,
false positives and false negatives). When the number of candidate routers is huge, it is time-
consuming to find the optimized result. Furthermore, it is hard to get the distribution of
attacks before deployment of TOPO.
In this research, we propose an intuitive but effective method to place the TOPO-equipped
routers. The basic idea is that if the distribution of attacks is not available, intuitively an
evenly distributed IP traceback system should have better performance. We assume that we
know all the possible paths of the network, which can be achieved through some known network
mapping tools [31, 53, 58]. To evenly distribute N TOPO-equipped routers on the network,
we first sort all paths in descending order. We then equip TOPO on the median router of the
longest path. Each path through this router is divided into two shorter paths. We sort all
paths again and choose the median router of the longest path. We repeat these steps until we
equip TOPO on N routers. We provide the performance analysis of partially deployed TOPO
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in the next subsection.
4.2.3.3 k-Adaptive Mechanism for Bloom Filters
When a new Bloom filter starts to record the arriving packets, the exact number of packets
that would be inserted into this Bloom filter is unknown. As shown in formula (2.1), the false
positive rate is decided by n and k when m is fixed. Although we can estimate a possible value
of n using historical knowledge about network statistics and choose a corresponding k, in some
scenarios n may dynamically change in a large range, especially when the network is under
attacks. In such cases, the false positive rate will be (greatly) higher than the optimal rate, as
shown in Figure 4 of [43]. However, we cannot reconstruct a Bloom filter with the optimal k
after we finally know the packet number n, because when we notice that we should use a better
k, the previous packets have passed because of the limited memory on routers. Therefore, we
have no chance of selecting a better k and hashing all the previous packets again.
Someone may argue that when a Bloom filter is saturated, it can be archived and a new
filter starts. However, when the memory is limited, there may not be extra memory space for
those unexpected packets. For instance, a router in the IP traceback system is designed to
trace the traffic within 1 hour with the granularity of 1 minute, and divides its memory into 61
slices (1 slice is used to store the packets in the current minute, and the other 60 slices are for
these 60 archived Bloom filters in the recent past.). If the router finds that the current Bloom
filter saturates after 30 seconds, it cannot archive the current Bloom filter by flushing the
oldest archived filter, because such an operation makes the router fail to respond the queries
of the previous packets between 59 minute 30 second and 60 minute ago, and thus violates
the traceback system goals and requirements. Otherwise, after an attacker finishes a serious
attack, it can easily flood the network and flush its previous attack traffic before the system
is aware of its attack and starts the traceback. Therefore, we need a mechanism to adjust
the hash function number k with respect to the dynamic n to achieve the best performance of
Bloom filters.
A direct solution is to construct several Bloom filters simultaneously which have different
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numbers of hash functions. After all elements are inserted, we archive the Bloom filter with
the optimal k and throw away all others. Obviously, this solution requires much more memory
for the extra Bloom filters, and thus perhaps decreases the entire performance eventually.
We propose an effective k-adaptive mechanism as shown in Figure 4.9 which uses a table
v with m Q-bit entries to record the results of K m-bit Bloom filters with different numbers
of hash functions, if every smaller hash function set is the subset of larger ones, where
Q = dlog2(K + 1)e. (4.22)
Let H1, H2, · · · , HK be the K hash function sets which have k1, k2, · · · , kK hash functions
respectively, and k1 < k2 < · · · < kK .
H1 = {h1, . . . , hk1},
H2 = {h1, . . . , hk2},
. . .
HK = {h1, . . . , hkK}.
Therefore H1 ⊂ H2 ⊂ · · · ⊂ HK . For each hash function hi among the total kK hash functions,
let si denote the number of hash sets it belongs to in H1, H2, · · · , HK . For instance, if hi /∈ Hj
and hi ∈ Hj+1, then si = K − j. si is a number between 1 and K.
At the beginning, the whole table v is initialized to 0. When a packet arrives, the packet
signature pkt and predecessor identifier pid are extracted and hashed using each hash function
hi. si is written into entry hi(pkt, pid), if si is larger than the entry’s current value. After cur-
rent time t passes the required end time tend, the optimal kj is calculated among k1, k2, · · · , kK
which minimizes false positive rate f based on the actually inserted element number n using
formula (2.1). The next job is to restore and archive the Bloom filter b with the optimal kj
hash functions. Each entry’s value v(i) is compared with K − j. If v(i) is larger than K − j,
the corresponding bit b(i) in Bloom filter is set to 1.
We use the following example to demonstrate the k-adaptive mechanism in detail. Let
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( 1) Initialize the table v and Bloom filter b to 0
( 2) n← 0
( 3) while (t < tend AND receive a new packet pkt with pid)
( 4) n← n+ 1;
( 5) for (i← 1 to kK)
( 6) j ← hi(pkt, pid)
( 7) v(j)← max(v(j), si)
( 8) Find the index j of kj which minimizes f in k1, k2, · · · , kK
( 9) for (i← 1 to m)
(10) if (v(i) > K − j)
(11) b(i)← 1
Figure 4.9 k-adaptive Procedure
m = 106, Q = 2 and K = 3. Suppose we want to choose the best k among k1 = 1, k2 = 3 and
k3 = 4, and the hash function sets are H1 = {h1}, H2 = {h1, h2, h3}, H3 = {h1, h2, h3, h4}.
Instead of recording 3 m-bit Bloom filters b1, b2 and b3 in the memory which use the hash set
H1, H2, and H3 respectively, we only keep a table v with m 2-bit entries. Now we show that
we can restore b1, b2 and b3 using v. We observed that if finally an entry b1(i) is set to 1, then
the entries b2(i) and b3(i) must also be 1, because H1 ⊂ H2 ⊂ H3. Therefore, there are only 4
possible value combinations of the 3 entries b1(i), b2(i) and b3(i). As shown in Table 4.3, we
can find a bijection between b1(i), b2(i), b3(i) and the number of 1s in them, and thus we can
use only 2 bits to represent the 3 entries. In this case, s1 = 3, s2 = s3 = 2, and s4 = 1, and
they represent the number of 1s that the corresponding hash function will set in the 3 Bloom
filters. If finally we receive n = 2.5 ∗ 105 packets, we get the following false positive rates using
formula (2.1): fb1 = 0.221, fb2 = 0.147, fb3 = 0.160. Therefore, we choose k = k2 = 3 and
restore Bloom filter b2. We compare each entry v(i) with K − 2 = 1 and set b(i) to 1 if v(i) is
larger.8
8When K = 3, we can effectively use logical operations instead of comparison operations to restore any
desired Bloom filter from the table. b1 can be restored by AND of the two bits in each entry of v; b2 is just the
most significant bit of v; b3 can be restored by OR of the two bits in each entry of v.
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Table 4.3 Bijection Between K = 3 Bloom Filters and 2-bit Table
b1(i) b2(i) b3(i) v(i) (# of 1s)
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 1 1 2
1 1 1 3
We must point out that this k-adaptive mechanism can be used not only in Bloom filter-
based IP traceback, but in other Bloom filter applications that the element number is not
known a priori.
4.2.4 Theoretical Analysis and Experimental Evaluation
In this subsection, we first analyze and evaluate the traceback performance of fully deployed
TOPO, and then analyze TOPO when it is partially deployed. We focus on the performance
comparison between TOPO and SPIE. We finally analyze the performance of our k-adaptive
mechanism for Bloom filters.
4.2.4.1 Analysis under Full Deployment of TOPO
Theoretical Analysis In the Bloom filter-based IP traceback systems, the traceback
request is initiated by the victim (or IDS) when it detects intrusions. Finally the victim will
get an attack graph from the IP traceback system which not only contains the real attack path,
but also some extra innocent nodes because of the false positives of Bloom filters.
In SPIE’s analysis [95], an upper bound of the expected number of extra nodes ex all in
the attack graph G is given by:9
ESPIE(ex all) =
Ldf
1− df , (4.23)
where d is the maximum number of each router’s predecessors on the network, and L is the
number of routers on the attack path. This formula requires that 0 ≤ df < 1, otherwise it
will not converge. However, this formula does not answer all the questions we exactly desire
9We get a slight different bound in Theorem 13.
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to know: How many unnecessary queries are sent out into the network? How many innocent
end nodes are there in the attack graph? A good IP traceback system must have no or less
unnecessary queries and innocent end nodes.
Let ex query denote the total number of extra (unnecessary) queries that are sent out into
the network, and ex end denote the number of extra end nodes in the attack graph. We can




1− df . (4.24)
ESPIE(ex all) = f
L(d− 1)
1− df (4.25)
= f · ESPIE(ex query). (4.26)
ESPIE(ex end) = (1− f)df L(d− 1)1− df (4.27)
= (1− f)d · ESPIE(ex all). (4.28)
Proof. Figure 4.10 demonstrates the tree structure of predecessors (d = 3 in this case) viewing
along the reverse attack path: V ictim→ R1 → . . .→ RL → Attacker. In real world it should
be a merged net instead of a tree, because many routers share the same predecessors. Figure
4.10 shows the worst possible scenario, since we want to calculate the upper bound of the
expectations. Each level consists of the innocent nodes which have the same probability to be
queried. As shown in Figure 4.10, the number of nodes on level q is
L(d− 1)dq−1. (4.29)
According to SPIE, the probability that an innocent node on level q is queried, the probability






(1− f)df q (4.32)
respectively. Therefore, we get equation (4.24), (4.25) and (4.27).
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Figure 4.10 Tree Structure of Predecessors
Now we analyze the traceback performance of TOPO. Let F = 1 − (1 − f)d. If df << 1,
F ≈ df . If we ignore the memory consumed by the predecessor list, we can get the following
theorem.10
Theorem 14.
ETOPO(ex query) = f · ESPIE(ex query). (4.33)
ETOPO(ex all) = F · ESPIE(ex all). (4.34)
ETOPO(ex end) = (1− fF )dETOPO(ex all) (4.35)
≈ F · ESPIE(ex end). (4.36)
Proof. In TOPO, the probability that an innocent node on level q is queried, the probability
that it is falsely included in the attack graph, and the probability that it is end node in the
attack graph are
f q, (4.37)





(1− fF )dFf q (4.39)
respectively. Therefore, we get equation (4.33), (4.34) and (4.35), and
ETOPO(ex end) =
F (1− fF )dESPIE(ex end)
(1− f)d (4.40)
≈ F · ESPIE(ex end).
As indicated in Theorem 14, the number of unnecessary queries in TOPO is only f times
to that in SPIE, which is a significant improvement. Also, the numbers of extra nodes and
extra end nodes reduce to F times to those in SPIE. If f = 0.0001, and d = 100, F ≈ 0.01,
which means that, compared with SPIE with the same resource, only 1% nodes will appear in
the attack graph using TOPO.
Experimental Study In our theoretical analysis, we have assumed that all routers have
equal degree of predecessors. However, it is not realistic in real world networks, where the
degrees of routers are different. In this experimental study, we use real world Internet topologies
provided by CAIDA [7] to evaluate and compare the performance of SPIE and TOPO in
traceback.
In our experiments, we use real world Internet topology captured on Nov. 5, 2005 from
one of CAIDA’s skitter monitor b-root.skitter.caida.org, which is a topology map viewed from
a single origin (128.9.0.109) to 317, 218 destinations11. Each router is assumed to be equipped
with Bloom filters that have the same false positive rate. We simulate the traceback from the
single origin to every destination and calculate the expected number of extra queries, extra
nodes and extra end nodes with respect to the false positive rate of Bloom filters. Figure 4.11
shows our experimental results.
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(c) Extra End Nodes
Figure 4.11 Experimental Results
As shown in Figure 4.11(a), as the false positive rate f of Bloom filters decreases, both
SPIE and TOPO generate less extra queries. However, when f is less than 10−2, the expected
number of extra queries in SPIE almost remains the same (about 156), which indicates that
there exists a lower bound in SPIE on expected number of extra queries. This can be explained
using equation (4.24). Meanwhile, the expected number of extra queries in TOPO always
decreases as f decreases. When f = 0.01, the expected number of extra queries is less than
2, while SPIE’s expected number of extra queries is more than 165 for the same f . Figure
4.11(b) shows the expected number of extra nodes in the attack graph. As f decreases, both
SPIE and TOPO create less extra nodes. However, TOPO has much smaller expected number
of extra nodes than SPIE. Figure 4.11(c) shows that TOPO also has smaller expected number
of extra end nodes compared to SPIE.
In sum, both the theoretical analysis and the experimental results show that TOPO has
better traceback performance compared to SPIE. In other words, TOPO can achieve the same
performance as SPIE with lower memory requirement on Bloom filters. For instance, TOPO
with f = 0.005 can achieve better traceback performance than SPIE with f = 0.0001. This
means that TOPO requires less memory allocated for Bloom filters on routers. Therefore,
TOPO is more efficient with the same traceback capability.
123
4.2.4.2 Analysis under Partial Deployment of TOPO
It is difficult to analyze the performance of partially deployed Bloom filter-based IP trace-
back systems because of the varieties of deployment. To simplify the analysis, we consider
partially deployed systems with the following constraint: On all possible paths in the partially
deployed system, there is at least one Bloom filter-equipped router within any S steps.
Let ESPIEpd(x) and ETOPOpd(x) denote the upper bound of the expected number of pa-
rameter x in partially deployed SPIE and TOPO respectively. When S ≥ 2 and dSf < 1, we




1− dSf . (4.41)
ESPIEpd(ex all) =
L[dS−1 − 1 + (d− 1)dS−1f ]
1− dSf . (4.42)
ESPIEpd(ex end) =
L(d− 1)dS−2(1− f)d
1− dSf . (4.43)
ETOPOpd(ex query) = ESPIEpd(ex all). (4.44)
ETOPOpd(ex end) =
L
1−dSf · [dS−2 − 1 + (d− 1)dS−2(df + F )] (4.45)
ETOPOpd(ex end) =
L(d− 1)dS−3(1− F )d
1− dSf , if S > 2 (4.46a)
L(d− 1)df(1− F )d
1− d2f , if S = 2. (4.46b)
We skip the proof because it is similar to the proof of Theorem 13 and 14. Theorem
15 indicates that the performance of a partially deployed SPIE or TOPO may exponentially
12In the analysis of partially deployed systems, we assume that there are no or little packet transformations
which can be omitted on the common routers without Bloom filters.
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decline as S increases. If a Bloom filter-based IP traceback system is partially deployed in a
network, the Bloom filter-equipped routers should be evenly distributed among all routers.
Comparing Theorem 15 with Theorem 13 and 14, we learn that both partially deployed
SPIE and TOPO would have lower performance than that of the fully deployed systems.
However, partial deployment also saves the total amount of memory. If the saved memory is
used to enlarge the existing Bloom filters, the false positive rate would reduce and thus help
alleviate the performance losing in the partially deployed systems. Based on Theorem 15, if
dSf << 1, we get
Theorem 16.
ETOPOpd(ex query) ≈ 1
d
ESPIEpd(ex query), (4.47)






ESPIEpd(ex end), if S > 2 (4.49a)
dfESPIEpd(ex end), if S = 2. (4.49b)
Therefore, TOPO has better performance than SPIE when both of them are partially
deployed in the same way. TOPO is more suitable when the IP traceback system must be
partially deployed on certain networks compared with SPIE.
4.2.4.3 Analysis of k-Adaptive Mechanism
We design an experiment to analyze the performance of k-adaptive mechanism for Bloom
filters. Suppose a router is designed to store traceback information within 1 hour with the
granularity of 1 minute. First, it divides its memory into 61 equal slices and each slice is 1M
bits. 1 slice is used to store the packets in the current minute, and the other 60 slices are for
these 60 archived Bloom filters. The hash function number is fixed to k = 4. Now we divide
the same memory into 63 slices and each slice is 0.968M bits. 3 slices are used as a table to
store the values of 7 Bloom filters with different numbers of hash functions: k1 = 1, k2 = 4,
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k3 = 7, k4 = 10, k5 = 13, k6 = 16, and k7 = 19.
Figure 4.12 shows that when packet number n varies in a large range, although the real
size of single Bloom filters in our k-adaptive mechanism is smaller than the original size, our
mechanism generally can achieve better performance than the original Bloom filter with fixed
number of hash functions. Our performance is very close to the performance when k always
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Figure 4.12 False Positive Rate Comparison
4.2.5 Further Discussions
In this section, we will discuss several considerations when designing and implementing
TOPO.
4.2.5.1 Packet Signature Choice
Packet Signature can be flexible. There are different choices which can meet the requirement
of distinguishing different packets. For instance, a subset of the IP header fields and the first
several bytes of the packet payload are used in [74] and SPIE. PAS only uses a long excerpt
of payload, which is useful when the exact packet header is unavailable. However, the excerpt
must be long enough to identify different packets, and thus the attackers may avoid detect by
attacking through a lot of packets with short payload. In TOPO, it is preferred to use a packet
signature which contains IP header information.
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4.2.5.2 Predecessor Identifier Choice
When a router has only one predecessor at each of its input port, for example, inner routers
on the Internet, we choose the input port of each packet as its predecessor identifier. For a
router that has multiple predecessors at one input port, we can use Layer 2 (i.e., data-link layer)
information (such as source MAC addresses) to differentiate these multiple predecessors. For
instance, on the Ethernet, the multiple predecessors and the router are connected through
the broadcast-based transmission media. When the router receives a packet from one of its
predecessors, the source MAC address of the header of the Ethernet frame can be used as
the predecessor identifier. Similarly, ATM’s VPI/VCI information can also be used for this
purpose on ATM networks.
We propose to use local topology information in TOPO. The local topology information
means the router’s immediate predecessor and immediate successor. In the current system, we
only use predecessor information. We believe the successor information can also be utilized.
We will address this in the future research.
4.2.5.3 Predecessor List Memory Size
In most cases, the memory size of the predecessor list is much smaller than those of the
Bloom filters, and that is why we ignore its influence on Bloom filters when we analyze the
performance of TOPO in Section 4.2.4. Generally, inner routers do not have a large number
of predecessors (which are typically no more than 100), and these predecessors often remain
unchanged for a long time. Therefore, we need not archive the predecessor list often. Instead,
a router may maintain a static list to store all appeared predecessor identifiers for more than
one Bloom filters, and only archive 1 bit for each predecessor on the list when archiving the
Bloom filters: value 1 means that the router receives packets from that predecessor in that
certain time interval, and value 0 not.
To find the direct support to our point of view from the real world Internet, we analyze
CAIDA’s Internet Topology Data Kit #0304 (ITDK0304) [9]. ITDK0304 is the skitter data of
the Internet router-level graph collected between Apr 21 and May 8, 2003. There are a total of
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Table 4.4 Distribution of Internet Routers’ Upstream Degrees
Upstream Degree 0 - 24 25 - 49 50 - 74 75 - 99 100 - 124 125 - 274 ≥ 275 Average: 3.31
Number of Routers 190469 1501 191 52 20 11 0 Total: 192244
Percent of Routers 99.0767% 0.7808% 0.0994% 0.0270% 0.0104% 0.0057% 0
192244 nodes and 636643 directed links. Table 4.4 shows the distribution of Internet routers’
upstream degrees derived from ITDK0304. The average upstream degree is as low as 3.31, and
the maximum upstream degree is only 269. Moreover, more than 99% routers have less than
25 upstream neighbors, and more than 99.98% routers have less than 100 upstream neighbors.
These facts quite support our point of view that the memory sizes of predecessor lists need to
be archived are adequately small compared with the large sizes of Bloom filters.
4.2.5.4 Membership Check Burden on Routers
In TOPO, suppose that there are d predecessors on one router’s predecessor list. When the
router receives a query message, it has to do d membership checks by combining the packet
identifier with each predecessor identifier on the list, while the router in SPIE only need to do 1
membership check. It seems that TOPO complicates the membership check process, and thus
aggravates the computation burden on each router. However, after using topology information
in TOPO, the probability that each innocent router is queried becomes f times of that of
SPIE. Let member check denote the number of membership checks, and we get that
ETOPO(member check) = df · ESPIE(member check). (4.50)
In most cases, d · f << 1, therefore actually TOPO alleviates the membership check burden
on each router which receives fewer query messages and does fewer membership checks.
4.2.5.5 Applying Compressed Bloom Filters
Mitzenmacher [81] introduced compressed Bloom filters. He proposed that Bloom filters
can be compressed to improve their performance by achieving either a lower false positive rate
with the same memory size, or smaller memory size with the same false positive rate. The
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compressed Bloom filters can be used to reduce the number of bits broadcast in sharing Web
cache information. As shown in Table VI in [81], a compressed Bloom filter can achieve the
same false positive rate as the standard Bloom filter while reducing the memory over 20%. The
tradeoff costs are the increased processing requirement for compression and decompression and
larger memory requirements at the endpoint machines.
In Bloom filter-based IP traceback systems, if a router stores a lot of archived pages of
previous Bloom filters, and the received query messages are infrequent, the gain of applying
compressed Bloom filters can overcome the processing costs introduced by compression and
decompression. However, if a router only has a few archived Bloom filters, the memory over-
head of implementing compression will be unacceptable. Furthermore, if the query messages
are frequently received which always query different Bloom filters, the router would be busy in
decompressing the required Bloom filters. The reason is that the router usually has no enough
memory to keep two decompressed Bloom filters at the same time.13
4.2.5.6 Applying Hierarchical Bloom Filters
We also consider applying the Hierarchical Bloom filters [94] in TOPO. However, we find
that actually hierarchical architecture has no benefit to false positive rate compared with the
standard Bloom filters, and is even worse. The authors of [94] referred to the false positive
rate of the standard Bloom filter upon which their Hierarchical Bloom filters are built as basic
false positive rate fo, and referred to the false positive rate resulting from their Hierarchical
Bloom filters as effective false positive rate fe. They showed that fe << fo. We agree with
it. However, hierarchy also introduces more inserted elements into the Bloom filters, which
increases the false positive rate and achieve no benefits eventually. Suppose n packets are
inserted into a Hierarchical Bloom filter using q different strings for each, and the totally
inserted elements are n0 = qn. Then we get
fe = foq ≈ (0.6185
m
n0 )q = 0.6185
m
n = f, (4.51)
13Usually, the size of decompressed Bloom filters is over 10 times larger than that of the original Bloom filters.
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where f is exactly the false positive rate when the standard Bloom filter inserts n packets
each using just one string. Therefore there is no benefit to false positive rate using hierarchy.
It makes false positive rate even worse considering that hierarchy needs to check all possible
alignments of payload excerpt.
4.2.6 Conclusion
Several Bloom filter-based IP traceback schemes have been proposed. However, Bloom
filters’ inherent false positives restrain the effectiveness of previous schemes. In this research,
we have proposed TOPO, a topology-aware single packet IP traceback system, in which the
predecessor information is used for traceback purpose. Our analysis showed that TOPO sig-
nificantly reduces not only the number of unnecessary queries but also the false attributions.
In addition, practicability is an important and desired property of IP traceback systems. We
have studied the partial deployment problem of Bloom filter-based IP traceback systems and
carefully designed to allow TOPO to be partially deployed while maintaining its traceback ca-
pability. We also proposed k-adaptive mechanism for Bloom filters which control parameters
may be adaptively adjusted according to the number of actual received packets. Such adjust-
ments can help Bloom filters-based IP traceback systems to achieve the best performance in
terms of false positive rate and storage space requirement when the number of arrival packets
varies significantly over time.
In the future, we will continue to improve the design of TOPO in terms of processing
overhead and memory space requirement.
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CHAPTER 5. RESEARCH IN ONLINE FRAUD DETECTION
5.1 Introduction
With the rapid growth of the Internet, online advertisement plays a more and more impor-
tant role in the advertising market. Among several online advertising models, pay-per-click
model is the most popular one. However, pay-per-click model is suffering serious fraud prob-
lems: attackers earn extra incomes or deplete competitors’ advertising budget by simply click-
ing (seldom by hands, often by automated scripts or bots) the pay-per-click advertisements
without actual interest in the content of the ad’s link. Such fraudulent clicks not only exhaust
online advertisers’ money, but also destroy the trust between online advertisers and adver-
tising publishers, and hence damage the healthiness of online advertising market. Recently,
there are several class action lawsuits against large online advertising publishers. Therefore,
the development of feasible and effective solutions to click fraud problems may benefit both
the advertisers and the publishers.
The source of click fraud may be from search engines, online ad publishers, ad sub-
distributors, competitors and web page crawlers, etc. Fraudulent clicks can be produced in
various forms, such as by hands, by malicious java scripts, or by botnets. Some types of click
fraud such as hit shaving problem [90] and hit inflation attacks [15], have received considerable
attention recently, and several algorithms were proposed to prevent these types of click fraud.
An important issue in defending click fraud is how to deal with duplicate clicks. If we simply
regard all identical clicks as fraudulent clicks, it is unfair to advertisers in some scenarios such
as that an interested client visits the same ad link several times in a week. On the other hand,
if the advertisers are charged for any identical clicks, then it is very easy for an attacker to
make money by continuously clicking the same ad link. A reasonable tradeoff is to define a
131
timing threshold and only count identical clicks once within the timing window. Decaying
window models, such as landmark, jumping and sliding window models, are feasible to solve
this problem. However, most traditional duplicate detecting algorithms may not be directly
deployed to address this problem over decaying window models.
One possible solution is to use data streaming algorithms, which have received considerable
attention recently [18, 82]. Many characteristics of large data streams, such as sum, mean,
variance, frequency, quantile, top-k list (hot list), distribution, etc, have been widely studied.
However, the problem of duplicate detection over different decaying window models still lacks
efficient and effective solutions. In this research, we will describe two effective and efficient
algorithms to detect click fraud in pay-per-click streams over different kinds of decaying win-
dows, while using as little space and operation as possible and making only one pass over the
click streams.
5.1.1 Motivation
Although online advertising is an infant comparing with traditional advertising media,
it grows very quickly and plays a more and more important role in the advertising market.
Several studies show that more than ten billion dollars are spent in online advertising market
annually [40, 60]. There are several online advertising models, such as pay-per-action, pay-per-
call, pay-per-click, etc, and pay-per-click model is the most popular one among them. Online
advertisers bid on keywords of search engines or ad links of online publishers such that their
target links can have more chance to be visited by end users. The search engines and/or online
publishers then charge advertisers based on the number of clicks. The price of a click is usually
decided by the market, which varies from less than $0.01 to even above $30. However, click
fraud problem heavily challenges the pay-per-click advertising model: the ad link is clicked
without actual advertising impression. A survey indicates that Internet advertisers paid $0.8
billion for click fraud in 2005 and $1.3 billion estimated in 2006, and about 14.6% clicks are
fraudulent [83].
The possible source of click fraud may be:
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1. Search engines or online ad publishers themselves.
Since they charge advertising fees directly from advertisers, it is possible that some dis-
reputable search engines or ad publishers generate click fraud by themselves to increase their
revenue.
2. Ad sub-distributors.
The ad sub-distributors which are paid by contracted search engines or ad publishers can
also benefit through generating fraudulent clicks, and they are possibly the primary source of
click fraud.
3. Competitors.
The competitors may have intentions to generate click fraud to increase their rival adver-
tisers’ bill. Furthermore, since most advertisers have limited budgets on online advertising,
the competitors can just click the ad links to quickly exhaust their rival companies’ limited
advertisement budgets such that the ad links are removed from search engines or online ad
publishers sooner. For instance, if an advertiser can only afford 5000 clicks per month, then its
competitors can easily generate large number of fraudulent clicks in a week to make their ad
links unavailable to end clients. The competitors can even get a better position in the keyword
search results with a lower price by depleting the higher bidders. There has been a reported
case of such attacks [73].
4. Web page crawlers.
There are a lot of automated web page crawlers which periodically scan the Internet to
update their web page databases for search, archive or other purposes. They may generate
click fraud by entering the ad links inadvertently.
Fraudulent clicks can be produced by hands, by automated scripts, or by botnets, etc.
Several types of click fraud, such as hit shaving problem [90] and hit inflation attacks [15], etc,
have been studied, and several algorithms have been proposed to prevent such types of click
fraud. However, many of them can only be deployed by the advertising publishers. Not all
advertising publishers have enough motivations to deploy these algorithms, since they receive
money for each click, even if it is fraudulent. Therefore, there is a conflict in detecting click
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fraud: Online advertisers have enough motivations to prevent click fraud but little abilities;
Online advertising publishers have more power to play a decent role in defending click fraud but
without enough incentives. Such a conflict may lead to distrust between online advertisers and
publishers. Recently, several class action lawsuits against large online advertising publishers
appear. Google paid 90 million dollars to settle a class action lawsuit about click fraud in
March 2006 [10]. In June 2006, Yahoo settled a similar lawsuit by paying 4.95 million dollars
to plaintiffs’ counsel, and allowing credit refund to advertisers who claim click fraud back
through January 2004 [11].
A possible solution is that both the online advertisers and publishers keep on auditing the
click stream and reach an agreement on the determination of valid clicks. When determining
which are valid clicks in the click streams, an important issue is how to define duplicate clicks.
Should an advertiser be charged once or twice when there are two identical clicks? Let us
consider the following two scenarios.
Scenario 1: A normal client visited an advertiser’s web site by clicking the ad link of a
publisher. One week later, the client visited the same web site again by clicking the same ad
link.
Scenario 2: The competitors or even the publishers control a botnet with thousands of
computers, each of which initiate many clicks to the ad links everyday.
Obviously, the clicks in Scenario 1 should not be considered as click fraud, while those
in Scenario 2 should be determined as click fraud. However, it is very difficult to identify
which scenario the identical clicks belong to. A reasonable countermeasure is to prescribe that
identical clicks will not count if they are within short time interval, and will count if they
happen sparsely. For instance, the advertiser and the publisher can make an agreement that
identical clicks will not count within one day or 100, 000 clicks. For example, suppose that
it is prescribed that the same click that is 4 elements away is considered as valid click. Let
< i, t > denote that a click with identifier i arrives at timestamp t. Suppose we have a stream
of clicks as < i1, 1 >,< i2, 2 >,< i3, 3 >,< i1, 4 >,< i1, 5 >, . . . Then the click < i1, 4 >
should be determined as a duplicate click. However, the click < i1, 5 > is a valid click although
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it is identical to the previous click, since no click with identifier i1 is counted in the previous
4 elements. Unfortunately, although detecting duplicate in a large database has been studied
by many researchers, classical duplicate detecting algorithms cannot be directly utilized to
address the problems in such scenarios.
Therefore, a feasible duplicate detecting algorithm should have a mechanism that is able
to eliminate expired data and only consider fresh information. Decaying window models are
feasible to be utilized to eliminate expired information. Although recently many algorithms
are proposed for capturing different kinds of characteristics of large data streams over decaying
window models [16, 17, 35, 50, 51, 65, 67, 104, 115, 117, 121], the problem of duplicate detection
in data streams over decaying window models still lacks efficient and effective solutions. In the
following, we will discuss a number of useful decaying window models.
5.1.2 Decaying Window Models
Decaying window models can be utilized to eliminate expired information. There are two
common types of decaying windows: count-based windows which maintain the last (most
recent) N items in the data stream, and time-based windows which maintain all items that
arrived in the last T time units. Therefore, the time span of a count-based window may vary,
while the number of items in a time-based window may change from time to time. In this
research, we mainly consider count-based windows, and our algorithms can be easily extended
to time-based windows. How to extend to time-based windows can be found in Section 5.2.1
and 5.3.1.
Landmark window: Landmark windows start and end once N elements arrive. When
processing data streams over landmark windows, a sketch can be maintained using less memory
instead of keeping all elements in current window, since all elements will expire at the same
time and we can delete the expired sketch and begin a new one.
Sliding window: A sliding window, first introduced by Datar et al. [35], only contains
the last N items, which is updated once a new element comes and an old element expires.
Since the elements in a sliding window expire one by one, usually some timing information is
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maintained to update the interested statistics when the window slides.
Jumping window: The jumping window model was first proposed by Zhu and Shasha
[121]. A jumping window is a compromise between the landmark window and the sliding
window. The baseline idea is to divide the entire window equally into several sub-windows, and
the statistics over the entire jumping window is based on the combination of the information
from the smaller sub-windows.
Generally speaking, maintaining stream information over landmark windows is easiest and
requires the least memory, while maintaining streaming information over sliding windows is the
most difficult and requires the most memory. However, the streaming information will have
big jump when an old landmark window expires and a new landmark window begins, while a
sliding window will provide more smooth information. For instance, if a click is in the end of
a landmark window and an identical click happens in the beginning of the following landmark
window, then this identical click will be determined as a valid click in the landmark window
model.
5.1.3 Problem Statement
We first give the definition of a duplicate click in pay-per-click streams over decaying
window models.
Definition 3. A click is classified as a duplicate click if in the current decaying window an
identical click has been determined as a valid click.
Notice that detecting duplicates over different decaying windows on the same click stream
may generate different outputs. For instance, suppose that we have a stream of clicks as
< i1, 1 >,< i2, 2 >,< i3, 3 >,< i3, 4 >,< i3, 5 >, . . . and the window size N is 3. If we apply
landmark window model, then < i3, 4 > is determined as a valid click and only < i3, 5 > is
reported as a duplicate. However, if sliding window model is utilized, then both < i3, 4 > and
< i3, 5 > will be reported as duplicates, since < i3, 3 > has been classified as a valid click and
it is in their current sliding windows.
In this research, we consider the problem stated as follows:
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Given limited memory and an arbitrary window size N (N elements or N time unites),
how to effectively and efficiently detect duplicates in a click stream over jumping windows or
sliding windows in one pass?
We do not consider the landmark window model since many algorithms have been proposed
which can be directly deployed to detect duplicate clicks over landmark windows.
5.1.4 Our Contributions
In this research, we are the first that address the problem of detecting duplicate clicks
in pay-per-click streams over jumping windows and sliding windows using significantly less
memory space and operations [116]. Since a naive deployment of classical Bloom filters to
jumping windows requires many memory operations, we propose an innovative GBF algorithm
using group Bloom filters which significantly reduces the memory operations when processing
click streams. Our GBF algorithm is effective and efficient over jumping windows with small
number of sub-windows.
However, in a jumping window when there are too many sub-windows, GBF algorithm still
requires many memory operations. To solve this problem, we propose a new data structure
called timing Bloom filter, which records inserted elements’ timing information. We design
a TBF algorithm based on timing Bloom filter which can process click streams over sliding
windows and jumping windows using less memory space and processing time.
One advantage of our GBF algorithm and TBF algorithm is that both of them have no
false negative. Furthermore, both theoretical analysis and experimental results show that our
algorithms are effective and efficient which can achieve low or bounded false positive rate when
detecting duplicate clicks in pay-per-click streams over jumping windows and sliding windows.
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5.2 Detecting Duplicates over Jumping Windows Using Group Bloom
Filters
5.2.1 GBF Algorithm Description
To detect duplicates in click streams over a landmark window, Bloom filters can be directly
deployed [75]. Each click has an predefined identifier, such as the source IP address, or the
cookie, etc. Then each click’s identifier is hashed into the Bloom filter. If a click’s identifier
is present in the Bloom filter before insertion (i.e., all corresponding bits are 1s), then it is
reported as a duplicate.
To detect duplicates in pay-per-click streams over jumping windows, a naive solution is
to evenly divide the entire jumping window into a number of sub-windows and maintain a
separate Bloom filter for each sub-window. To save operation time, all Bloom filters should
use the same set of hash functions. Suppose N is the size of the jumping window which is
divided into Q sub-windows. After the jumping window is full, there will be an expired Bloom
filter after each NQ elements. Therefore, if we want to use the memory space of the expired
Bloom filter for the upcoming sub-window, we must clean the entire expired Bloom filter
before the first element of the upcoming sub-window can be inserted. However, considering
that cleaning an expired Bloom filter need O(m) operations, where m is the size of the Bloom
filters, we must keep the newly arrived elements in an extra queue before we finish the clean
operations. To solve this problem, we can divide the total available memory space into Q+ 1
pieces. Q pieces are for the Bloom filters of Q active sub-windows, and the additional piece is
used to maintain a Bloom filter for the elements in the upcoming sub-window while we clean
the expired Bloom filter. Then we have more time to clean the expired Bloom filter, since we
only need to clean the expired memory before the next Bloom filter expires. Let M denote the
total number of memory bits, then each Bloom filter has size m = MQ+1 , and we only need to
clean M/(Q+1)N/Q =
QM
(Q+1)N bits when processing each newly arrived element.
When a new element comes, it is inserted into the Bloom filter of the corresponding sub-
window if and only if it is not a duplicate in the current jumping window (including all active
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sub-windows). To check whether it is a duplicate, we first calculate k hash values using the
element’s identifier. We then have to check each of the Q active Bloom filters (suppose the
jumping window is full) by reading the corresponding k bits. If the set of k bits in any Bloom
filter is all 1s, then this element is reported as a duplicate click; otherwise, the corresponding
k bits in the Bloom filter of the current sub-window are set to 1.
Obviously, such a duplicate-checking procedure may cost about (Q×k) memory operations,
which is very time consuming if Q is large. To solve this problem, we introduce a data structure
called Group Bloom Filters (GBF) which can significantly reduce required memory operations.
The baseline idea is that instead of dividing the entire memory into separate pieces for separate
Bloom filters, the bits with the same index in each Bloom filter are grouped together in GBF.
Then using this data structure, the CPU can visit the required bits in a bunch. For instance,
suppose that Q = 31 and the size of a word in the memory is 32 bits. Then the same bits of
the total 32 Bloom filters will be in the same word in the memory. Suppose that CPU can
read/write one 32-bit word each time, then we can fetch all bits we need using k memory reads.
After we get the k 32-bit words, we AND them into a single 32-bit word. We then mask the
bit which represents the expired Bloom filter in the word by setting the corresponding bit to
0. If the value of this word is none-zero, then the new element is a duplicate; otherwise, we
set each corresponding bit for current sub-window in the k 32-bit words to 1 and write them
back to the memory.
Figure 5.1 shows the description of our GBF algorithm to detect duplicates over jumping
windows using group Bloom filters. Each bit in GBF is initialized to 0 before processing the
date stream, and W [i] denotes the word with index i in GBF. Concurrently with the finish
of the new sub-window after processing NQ elements, the expired Bloom filter is cleaned and
ready to insert new elements. A counter can be used to determine when a sub-window is full
and a new sub-window starts.
As an example, Figure 5.2 shows how GBF algorithm works. Let x0, x1, x2, · · · denote a
series of clicks. Suppose that the jumping window has size N = 6, which is divided into Q = 3
sub-windows, and thus each sub-window contains 2 clicks. We maintain 4 Bloom filters with
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Step 1: Clean Expired Bloom Filter.
Starting after last cleaned word, set the corresponding bits of the expired Bloom filter of
next QM(Q+1)N words to 0.
Step 2: Process New Element xt.
Set temporary word W ′ to all 1s except that the bit which represents the expired Bloom
filter is set to 0.
for i← 1 to k
W ′ ←W ′ AND W [hi(xt)]
endfor
if W ′ 6= 0
xt is a duplicate click.
else
for i← 1 to k
Set the corresponding bit of the current sub-window in W [hi(xt)] to 1.
endfor
endif
Figure 5.1 GBF Algorithm Description
size m = 8, and the hash functions are h1() and h2(). Click x0 and x1 will be inserted into
the Column C1, and x2 and x3 will be inserted into the Column C2, and so on. Figure 5.2(a)
shows the status when the 11th click x10 is coming. Then x10 will be inserted into Column
C2. In the beginning, we will execute Step 1 to clean the first 4 bits ([b0 : b3]) of expired
Column C3. Then we hash x10 using h1() and h2() and get indices 7 and 4. We AND words
W [7] and W [4] together and get word W ′ = [0100]. We then mask the corresponding bit of
Column C3 which is expired, and get W ′ = [0000]. Therefore, x10 is a valid click and bit b7
and b4 in Column C2 are set to 1. The gray bits shown in Figure 5.2 indicate that these bits
are changed after processing a new element. When the 12th click x11 is coming, we first clean
the last 4 bits ([b4 : b7]) of Column C3. We then calculate and get two indices 1 and 5. This
time W ′ = [1000]. Therefore, x11 is reported as a duplicate, and not inserted into Column C2.
When the 13th click x12 is coming, notice that now Column C4 is expired and Column C3 is
entirely cleaned and ready to insert new elements.
Extension to Handle Time-Based Windows
GBF algorithm can be easily extended to handle time-based jumping windows. Instead of
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Figure 5.2 An Example of GBF Algorithm
dividing entire jumping window equally by counting elements, the time-based jumping window
is divided into Q sub-windows with same time expansion. Then each sub-window is equally
divided into R time units. In Step 1, the cleaning procedure executes once in each time unit,
and scans M(Q+1)R entries. Step 2 stills executes once a new element comes.
5.2.2 Theoretical Analysis
When designing algorithms to detect duplicate clicks in pay-per-click streams over jumping
windows, we must consider the false negative rate and false positive rate, the memory require-
ment, and the processing time. The following theorem provides the properties of our GBF
algorithm.
Theorem 17. Let N denote the size of the jumping window, which is divided into Q sub-
windows. Given M -bit memory, and assuming that the CPU can read/write a D-bit word in
each cycle, group Bloom filters can detect duplicates over jumping windows with the following
properties:
1. The false negative rate is 0.
2. The false positive rate is O(Q · 0.6185MN ).
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3. The running time to process each element is O(QD · MN ) in worst case.
Proof We proof the performance of GBF algorithm in terms of false negative rate, false
positive rate and running time as follows:
False Negative Rate
False negatives mean that the detection of duplicate clicks is falsely missed. According to
the definition of duplicate over decaying window models, a click is a duplicate if in current
decaying window an identical click has already been determined as a valid click. Then there
are two possible cases when checking a duplicate click xt:
Case 1: A previous identical click is accurately classified as valid click and has been
inserted into GBF.
According to GBF algorithm, since all k corresponding bits have been set to 1, then the
click xt will be reported as duplicate accurately.
Case 2: A previous identical click is falsely classified as duplicate and is not inserted into
GBF due to the inherent false positive property of Bloom filters.
In this case, it is possible that GBF algorithm determines click xt as valid. However, since
the previous valid identical click has been reported as a duplicate, such a missing detection
actually has no effect on the overall result.
False Positive Rate
To simplify the analysis, we assume that all Bloom filters of the sub-windows have the same
false positive rate f0. Since the entire jumping window with N elements is evenly divided into
Q sub-windows, then each sub-window contains n = NQ elements. GBF algorithm divides
the total memory into Q + 1 pieces, then the size of the Bloom filters of the sub-windows
is m = MQ+1 . Since GBF algorithm inserts an element if and only if an identical element is
not present in the current window, then actually each Bloom filter in GBF has less elements
inserted compared with a classical Bloom filter. Consequently, each Bloom filter in GBF is
similar to a classical Bloom filter with size m into which N elements are inserted, but has better
false positive rate. To simplify the analysis, we just assume that it has the same false positive
rate as a classical Bloom filter. According to equation (5.1), if all elements in a sub-window
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are distinct and inserted into the Bloom filter, and the number of hash functions, k, is set to
the optimal value, we get
f0 ≈ 0.6185mn = 0.6185
QM
(Q+1)N . (5.1)
In GBF algorithm of detecting duplicates over jumping windows using GBF, an innocent
element is falsely reported as a duplicate if and only if it is present in any of the Q active
Bloom filters. Suppose that all Q sub-windows are active, and let f ′ denote the false positive
rate of the most recent Bloom filter which may be not full. Then we have
fGBF ≈ 1− (1− f0)Q−1 · f ′ ≈ 1− (1− f0)Q (5.2)
≈ 1− (1− 0.6185
QM
(Q+1)N )Q (5.3)
≈ 1− (1− 0.6185MN )Q (5.4)
When 0.6185
M
N is small, we have
fGBF ≈ Q · 0.6185MN . (5.5)
Therefore, given M -bit memory and jumping window size N which is divided into Q sub-
windows, the false positive rate of our GBF algorithm is O(Q · 0.6185MN ).
Running Time
As shown in the description of GBF algorithm, when a new element arrives, we only
read/write 2QM(Q+1)N words or
2QM
N bits in GBF to eliminate expired information in Step 1. Since
each time the CPU can read/write D bits, then there are O(QD · MN ) read/write operations.
Furthermore, to insert a new element, we only check k entries which indices are calculated by
k hash functions. Suppose that the running time to calculate a hash value is O(1), then the
running time of Step 2 is O(k) = O(MN ). Therefore, the running time to process each element
is O(QD · MN ) in worst case.
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5.2.3 Comparison with Previous Work
In [75], the authors proposed to maintain a counting Bloom filter for each sub-window, and
a main Bloom filter which is a combination of all counting Bloom filters and represents the
entire jumping window. When a new sub-window is generated, the eldest window is expired
and subtracted from the main Bloom filter. Combining two counting Bloom filters is performed
by adding the corresponding counters; deleting an old counting Bloom filter is performed by
subtracting its counters from the main Bloom filter.
However, this scheme has two potential drawbacks. One is that subtracting an expired
Bloom filter from the main Bloom filter needs O(m) operations, and false positives increase if
new elements are inserted into the main Bloom filter before subtracting operation completes.
The other drawback is that this scheme may have high false positive rate, especially when the
number of sub-windows is large. There are two reasons for this drawback. First, with the
same limited available memory space, expanding bits in Bloom filters to counters make the
size of Bloom filters smaller. In worst case, the maximum value in the counters of counting
Bloom filters is NQ , and the maximum value in the counters of the main Bloom filter is N .
Therefore, each counter must have enough bits to avoid saturation, which will generate both
false negatives and false positives. Consequently, the size of the Bloom filters in their algorithm
is much smaller than the size of Bloom filters in our GBF algorithm. According to equation
(5.1), the false positive rate will be much higher than that of GBF algorithm. Second, checking
the presence of an element in the main Bloom filter which is the result of combination of all
counting Bloom filters will generate very high false positive rate, since it is as if all N elements
are inserted into the single main Bloom filter (any entry with a non-zero value in any counting
Bloom filter will set the corresponding entry in the main Bloom filter to non-zero). On the
contrary, each Bloom filter in GBF algorithm is only inserted at most NQ elements.
Figure 5.3 shows the comparison between the algorithm in [75] and our GBF algorithm.
We draw the false positive rate when Q = 31, m = 220, and N increases from 215 to 221.
We make the observation that with the increasing window size, the false positive rate of the
algorithm in [75] increases more quickly compared with GBF algorithm when both algorithms
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maintain Bloom filters with the same size. For instance, when N = 220, the false positive rate
of the algorithm in [75] is about 0.62, while the false positive rate of GBF algorithm is only
about 0.000011. Notice that when both algorithms maintain Bloom filters with the same size,
the algorithm in [75] requires more memory space since its Bloom filters are counting Bloom
filters which contain more bits in each entry.





















Figure 5.3 Comparison Between Previous Algorithm and GBF Algorithm
5.3 Detecting Duplicates over Sliding Windows Using Timing Bloom
Filters
GBF algorithm works well over jumping windows with small number of sub-windows. How-
ever, there is a limitation of GBF algorithm that it is not feasible in the sliding window model,
or when the number of sub-windows Q is very large in a jumping window. In sliding windows,
although we can keep N Bloom filters, each of which only hold one element, maintaining N
Bloom filters make the running time unacceptable. For instance, suppose the window size
N = 220, and the CPU can read/write 64 bits per cycle. Before an element is inserted into the
Bloom filter for that sub-window, 16384·k reads must be executed, where k denotes the number
of hash functions. Therefore, the GBF algorithm cannot process high-speed click streams over
sliding windows or jumping windows with large number of sub-windows. We hence devise an
innovative TBF algorithm based on a new data structure called Timing Bloom Filters (TBF)
to detect duplicate clicks over sliding windows and jumping windows with large number of
sub-windows.
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5.3.1 TBF Algorithm Description
We propose a new data structure called timing Bloom filters which contain timing infor-
mation derived from classical Bloom filters. The timing information contained in TBF can be
utilized to evict stale data out of our data structure, and make TBF applicable to process data
streams over sliding windows. Let N denote the sliding window size. An existing element is
called active if it is one of the most recent N elements within the current window, or expired if
it left the current window. For each element xi, an index posi is used to record its timestamp
(i.e., position) in the data stream, which is an indicator of “active” or “expired” by comparing
with pos – the position index of the most recent element.
Our new data structure TBF is based on Bloom filters. To insert timing information into
TBF, each bit in the classical Bloom filter is replaced by an entry with O(logN) bits. At the
beginning of the click stream, all bits in all entries of the TBF are initialized to bit 1. When
a new element arrives, we first calculate the k hash functions and get (at most) k indices. We
then check the corresponding k entries to judge if this element is both present1 in the TBF
and active2 in the current sliding window. If it is present and active, then we just ignore it and
report it as a duplicate click; otherwise, we set the corresponding k entries using this element’s
timestamp. The timestamps are represented by wraparound counters, and the number of bits
in each entry of TBF is set to be large enough such that no timestamp is represented by all 1s.
Our TBF algorithm has two steps when a new element arrives. Step 1 deletes expired
information in TBF; Step 2 processes the new element. When a new element xt comes, the
current timestamp pos is updated. Usually there is an old element expired (except at the
beginning of the click stream when the sliding window is not full). Therefore, besides processing
the new arriving element, the expired timestamps in the TBF must be removed, which means
TBF algorithm only maintains the timestamps of active elements in the current window. To
bound the bits to represent the timestamp in the continuous click stream, we have to use a
wraparound counter. We first consider the scenario that we use a wraparound counter with
maximum N−1 to represent the timestamps, that is, the N -th element’s timestamp is 0 instead
1“Present” means no entry in the k corresponding entries is all 1s.
2“Active” means all timestamps in these k corresponding entries are within the current sliding window.
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of N . Suppose the newly arrived element’s timestamp is P , then in this scenario the expired
element also has timestamp P . Therefore, before inserting the new element into the TBF,
we must first remove these expired timestamps if they have been inserted before. However,
since the expired element is not maintained in memory, we have no knowledge about where
the potential k expired timestamps are in the TBF. Consequently, we must scan the entire
TBF with m entries to find these expired timestamps and replace them by all 1s. Since this is
time consuming which needs O(m) operations, such an algorithm cannot process high-speed
click streams. We therefore propose an advanced update mechanism which only uses O(mN )
operations and only consumes very small additional space.
In our update mechanism, instead of setting N−1 as the maximum value in the wraparound
counter, we set N + C − 2 as the maximum timestamp, where C is a positive integer. Since
now we expand the range of timestamp representation, we get extra time to remove stale
timestamps and thus less entries in TBF need to be scanned each time. As discussed above, if
C = 1, we have to scan entire m entries when processing each new element. If C = 2, we only
need to scan half of the m entries. Therefore, when a new element arrives, we only need to
check mC entries in TBF. The entire TBF will be scanned thoroughly after C elements arrive.
The choice of value of C is flexible. Since dlog(N +C)e is the number of bits in an entry to
represent timestamps, and mC is the number of entries that need to be scanned per element to
update the TBF, then a smaller C means less space requirement and larger operation time, and
a larger C means larger space requirement and less operation time. In the following analysis
and experiments, we typically choose C equal to N .
Figure 5.4 shows the description of TBF algorithm to detect duplicates over sliding windows
using timing Bloom filters. In the algorithm description, ipre is initialized to 0 before processing
the click stream, which records the index of entry that has been scanned previously; P [i] denotes
the timing information (i.e. position or timestamp) in entry i of TBF; flagdup indicates whether
the newly arrived element is a duplicate or not.
As an example, Figure 5.5 shows how TBF algorithm works. Let x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, · · ·
denote a series of clicks. Suppose that the sliding window has size N = 4. We maintain a TBF
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Step 1: Delete Expired Information.
pos← (pos+ 1) mod (N+C−1)
for i← ipre to ipre + mC
if (pos− P [i mod m]) mod (N+C−1) ≥ N
P [i mod m]← [11...1]
endif
endfor
ipre ← (ipre + mC ) mod m
Step 2: Process New Element xt.
flagdup ← 1
for i← 1 to k
if P [hi(xt)] = [11...1]





if flagdup = 1
xt is a duplicate click.
else
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Figure 5.5 An Example of TBF Algorithm
with size m = 8, and each entry has 3 bits. The hash functions are h1() and h2(). We set
C = 4, which means we only need to scan and update 2 entries when processing each element.
Figure 5.5(a) shows the status when the 5th click x4 is coming. Notice that all entries with
position [000] are expired. In the beginning, we execute Step 1 to scan the first 2 entries, and
P [1] is set to all 1s. Then we hash x4 using h1() and h2() and get indices 6 and 4. Since both
P [6] and P [4] are present and active, x4 is reported as a duplicate. The gray entries shown
in Figure 5.5 indicate that these entries are changed after processing a new element. When
the 6th click x5 is coming, we first scan entries P [2] and P [3], and this time P [2] is set to all
1s. We then calculate and get two indices 0 and 5. Since P [0] = [001] is expired and P [5] is
all 1s, x5 is determined as a valid click, and its position information is inserted into P [0] and
P [5]. Notice that although P [7] = [000] has been expired after x4 comes, it may remain in
the memory until x7 comes. However, its presence does not affect duplicate detection in TBF
algorithm.
Extension to Handle Time-Based Windows
TBF algorithm can be easily extended to handle time-based sliding windows. Suppose the
entire sliding window is equally divided into R time units. In Step 1, the cleaning procedure
executes once in each time unit, and scans mR entries. Step 2 stills executes once a newly
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arrived element comes. However, instead of inserting the counting-based position, the time
unit information is inserted into the entries of TBF.
Furthermore, TBF can also be easily extended to handle jumping windows. If TBF is
utilized over a jumping window which is evenly divided into Q sub-windows, then all elements
in the same sub-window will have the same timestamp, and they will be eliminated from TBF
simultaneously. When Q is large, GBF cannot process the click stream efficiently, and TBF is
a better choice.
5.3.2 Theoretical Analysis
The following theorem provides the properties of our TBF algorithm when detecting du-
plicate clicks in pay-per-click streams over sliding windows.
Theorem 18. Let N denote the size of the sliding window. Given M -bit memory, timing
Bloom filters can detect duplicates over sliding windows with the following properties:
1. The false negative rate is 0.
2. The false positive rate is O(0.6185
M
N logN ).
3. The running time to process each element is O( MN logN ) in worst case.
proof We proof the performance of TBF algorithm in terms of false negative rate, false
positive rate and running time as follows:
False Negative Rate
Since the proof is similar to that in Theorem 17, we skip this part to save space.
False Positive Rate
As shown in TBF algorithm description, TBF only keeps the timestamps of the most recent
N elements, and all expired timestamps will be removed in time. Therefore, in worst case there
are N distinct elements’ timestamps present in TBF when we process a newly arrived element.3
Since TBF algorithm inserts an element if and only if an identical element is not present in
the current window, then actually TBF has less elements inserted compared with a classical
3Although some expired timestamps can survive in TBF for a certain time before they are cleaned, they do
not affect the result when determining whether a new element is a duplicate or not.
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Bloom filter. Consequently, TBF is similar to a classical Bloom filter with size m into which N
elements are inserted, but should have better false positive rate. To simplify the analysis, we
just assume that TBF has the same false positive rate as a classical Bloom filter. Suppose that
we set C = N , then each entry occupies dlog 2Ne bits, and m = Mdlog 2Ne . Similar to equation
(5.1), when the number of hash functions, k, is set to the optimal value, the false positive rate
of TBF is
fTBF ≈ 0.6185mN ≈ 0.6185
M
N log 2N . (5.6)




As shown in our TBF algorithm description, each time when a new element arrives, we only
remove expired timestamps in TBF by scanning mC entries in Step 1. Generally C is O(N),
and O(mC ) = O(
M
N logN ). Furthermore, to insert a new element, we only check k entries which
indices are calculated by k hash functions. Assuming that the running time to calculate a hash
value is O(1), then the running time of Step 2 is O(k) = O( MN logN ). Therefore, the running
time to process each element is O( MN logN ) in worst case.
5.4 Experimental Evaluation
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(a) False Positive Rate of GBF
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(b) False Positive Rate of TBF
Figure 5.6 False Positive Rate of GBF and TBF Algorithm over Sliding
Windows
In this section, we evaluate GBF algorithm and TBF algorithm for duplicate click detection
over jumping windows and sliding windows. Since our algorithms have no false negative, we
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only ran experiments to evaluate the false positive rate of our algorithms. Hence, we simulate
our algorithms by processing synthetic click streams which have no duplicate click.
We first consider the theoretical results. Our algorithms are a little different comparing
with the classical Bloom filters. In our algorithms, we only insert an element if and only if an
identical element is not present in the current window. Therefore, let f denote the false positive
rate of our algorithm, and then only about (1 − f)N expected elements are inserted. In our
GBF algorithm for jumping windows, let f0 denote the false positive rate of the sub-windows,
and fGBF denote the overall false positive rate. Then
fGBF ≈ 1− (1− f0)Q (5.7)
≈ 1− (1− (1− e−(1−fGBF )kn/m)k)Q (5.8)
≈ 1− (1− (1− e−(1−fGBF ) kNQm )k)Q (5.9)






fGBF ≈ 1− (1− 2−k)Q. (5.11)
In our TBF algorithm for sliding windows, let fTBF denote the overall false positive rate.
Then
fTBF ≈ (1− e−(1−fTBF )kN/m)k. (5.12)






fTBF ≈ 2−k. (5.14)
In the experiments of evaluating our GBF algorithm over jumping windows, we set the
jumping window size to N = 220, and the number of sub-windows to Q = 8. For given k,
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the size m of each Bloom filter is set using equation (5.10). We generated 20 · N distinct
click identifiers. We counted the false positives within the last 10 ·N clicks to make sure that
GBF has been stable. Figure 5.6(a) shows the theoretical and experimental results. We make
the observation that the experimental result of GBF algorithm is very close to the theoretical
result when detecting duplicates over jumping windows. When k = 10 and m = 1, 876, 246,
the false positive rate is only about 0.007.
In the experiments of evaluating our TBF algorithm over sliding windows, we set the sliding
window size to N = 220. For given k, the size m of TBF is set using equation (5.13). We
generated 20 ·N distinct click identifiers, and counted the false positives within the last 10 ·N
clicks to make sure that the TBF has been stable. Figure 5.6(b) shows the theoretical and
experimental results. We make the observation that the experimental result of TBF algorithm
is very close to the theoretical result when detecting duplicate clicks over sliding windows.
When k = 10 and m = 15, 112, 980, the false positive rate is only about 0.001.
5.5 Conclusions
In this research, we address the problem of detecting duplicate clicks in pay-per-click
streams over jumping windows and sliding windows. We propose group Bloom filters which
significantly reduces the memory operations when processing click streams, and our GBF algo-
rithm based on group Bloom filters is effective and efficient over jumping windows. To detect
duplicate clicks over sliding windows and jumping windows with large number of sub-windows,
we propose an innovative TBF algorithm based on a new data structure called timing Bloom
filter, which can process click streams over sliding windows using less memory space and pro-
cessing time. Both theoretical analysis and experimental results show that our algorithms are
effective and efficient in terms of false negative rate, false positive rate and running time when
detecting duplicate clicks in pay-per-click streams.
In the future, we will continue to explore the issues of click fraud and click quality under
data stream models. We will consider various sophisticated click fraud attacks, and study




In this dissertation, we design effective techniques for detecting and attributing cyber crim-
inals. We consider two kinds of fundamental techniques: forensics-sound attack monitoring
and traceback, and forensics-sound online fraud detection. Our proposed techniques may serve
as fundamental components which can be widely utilized not only in network security, but
also in many other domains, such as database, data mining, computer graphics, etc. The
contributions of our research are as follows:
(1) We propose several innovative algorithms which answer some open problems in fun-
damental statistics estimation over sliding windows. Those algorithms can be used to detect
anomaly and attacks in networks. We also propose efficient and effective algorithms which can
trace back stepping stone attacks and single packet attacks.
• We study the problem of maintaining -approximate variance of data streams over sliding
windows. We propose the first -approximation algorithm that is optimal in both space
and worst case time. Our algorithm requires O(1 logN) space and O(1) running time in
worst case.
• We address the problem of estimating -approximate frequency in data streams over
sliding windows. We propose the first efficient deterministic algorithm which can achieve
O(1 ) space requirement and only need O(1) running time to process each item in the
data stream and to answer a query.
• we consider the problem of estimating -approximate diameter, convex hull and skyline
in data streams over sliding windows. We first present an improved algorithm which
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only requires O((1 )
d+1
2 logR) space to estimate the diameter over sliding windows. We
then extend our algorithm to solve convex hull estimation problem. Finally, we propose
a novel algorithm to estimate skyline which requires O( 1
d
log R) space.
• Several algorithms are proposed to attribute stepping stone attackers. Our schemes
can effectively detect stepping stones even when delay and chaff perturbations exist
simultaneously.
• A topology-aware single packet IP traceback system, namely TOPO, is proposed to
traceback single packet attacks. We design TOPO to allow partial deployment while
maintaining its traceback capability. A k-adaptive mechanism is designed which can
dynamically adjust parameters of Bloom filters to reduce the false positive rate.
(2) We propose streaming algorithms to detect click fraud in pay-per-click streams of online
advertising networks.
• We address the problem of detecting duplicate clicks in pay-per-click streams over jump-
ing windows and sliding windows, and propose two innovative algorithms that make only
one pass over click streams and require significantly less memory space and operations.
A patent [55] is pending based on our research.
6.2 Future Work
6.2.1 Data Stream Processing
Although our research in this dissertation have answered several open problems in data
stream processing, there still have many unsolved problems in this area.
Currently, basic-counting and variance estimation over sliding windows have been re-
searched and optimal algorithms were proposed. However, higher-ordered moments estimation
problems still lack efficient algorithms.
In geometric computation area, although many algorithms were presented, we still don’t
know the lower bound of high-dimensional diameter, convex hull and skyline, and thus we don’t
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know whether current algorithms are optimal in space requirement or not. Further research is
required in this topic.
6.2.2 Attack Traceback
There are still some open problems in attack detection and traceback.
6.2.2.1 VoIP Attribution
Like the Internet, the VoIP also provides unauthorized services. Therefore, some security
issues existing in the Internet may also appear in the VoIP systems. For instance, a phone
user may receive a call with a qualified caller ID from his/her credit card company, so he/she
would answer the critical questions about social security number and date of birth, and so on.
However, this call comes actually from an attacker who fakes the caller ID using a computer.
Compared with a PSTN phone or mobile phone, IP phone lacks monitoring. Therefore, it is
desirable to provide schemes that can attribute or trace back to the VoIP callers.
6.2.2.2 Botnet Traceback
A botnet is a network of compromised computers, or bots, commandeered by an adversarial
botmaster. Botnets usually spread with virus and communicate through Inter Relay Channel
(IRC) [29]. With the army of bots, the bot controllers can launch many attacks, such as spam,
phishing, key logging, and denial of service. Now, more and more scientists are interested in
how to detect, mitigate, and trace back botnet attacks.
6.2.2.3 Traceback in Anonymous Systems
Another issue is that a lot of anonymous systems, such as Tor [8], exist all over the world.
Tor is a toolset for anonymizing web browsing and publishing, instant messaging, IRC, SSH,
and other applications that use the TCP protocol. It provides anonymity and privacy for
legal users, and at the same time, it is a good platform to launch stepping stone attacks.
Communications over Tor are relayed through several distributed servers called onion routers.
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There are more than 800 onion routers all over the world so far. Since Tor may be seemed as
a special stepping stone attack platform, it is interesting to consider how to trace back attacks
over Tor.
6.2.3 Online Fraud Detection
Online auction networks, such as eBay, have attracted a lot of buyers and sellers. More
and more people begin to purchase goods and services through eBay or other online auction
networks. However, fraud transactions happen everyday. In these online auction systems, users
are often intent on doing transactions with accounts who have high feedbacks. Nevertheless,
fraudsters can easily bypass the feedback systems. One method for a fraudster to build excellent
feedback is to construct a clique and prompt each other. The cliques of accomplices can easily
prompt many fraudsters, while never jump out to cheat directly by themselves, which makes
it difficult to detect these cliques.
Two preliminary papers [87, 86] have been finished with Yanlin Peng1 and Dr. Yong Guan,
and further research is ongoing.
1Yanlin Peng did the majority work including algorithm design, implementation and writing.
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